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An undeniable distinction exists between a sign we use for a particular thing and a sign
for a multitude of things. The sound ‘mamma’ made by a child seems to be related to
nothing but the child’s mother like a photograph of her, whereas a pedestrian crossing
road sign seems to be about a repeatable road event.1
Some but not all occurrences of proper names are signs of the former kind. We
singularly use a name such as Immanuel Kant to talk about a particular individual, not
a multitude of individuals. I will discuss in what follows how it is possible. In my
view, proper names themselves are, despite their appearance, general terms applicable to
a multitude of things, but they make up passing, context-dependent singular terms.
This dissertation is mainly concerned with the semantics of proper names. I will
present a semantic theory that adequately describes the propositional contributions of
proper names in various constructions of both English and Japanese. I will argue that
1I suggest that the distinction is at least pre-theoretically intuitive. John Locke says:
There is nothing more evident than that the ideas of the persons children converse with ...
are, like the persons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurse and the mother are
well framed in their minds; and, like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals.
The names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals; and the names of ‘nurse’
and ‘mamma’, the child uses, determine themselves to those persons. Afterwards, when ...
[children] observe that there are a great many other things in the world, that ... resemble their
father and mother, they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do partake in;
and to that they give ... the name ‘man’, ... And thus they come to have a general name, and
a general idea.
(Locke, 1964, Book III, iii, 7.)
1
proper names used as arguments of sentences are complex phrases that are essentially
equivalent to definite descriptions, which are analyzed as non-quantificational referring
expressions. A number of semantic properties we observe in the uses of proper names
and definite descriptions (e.g., rigidity, the de re/dicto distinction, etc.) are derived from
the general features of complex nominal phrases. Other bare nominal expressions such as
bare plurals and mass terms are also analyzed in an analogous fashion: they are a variant
of definite descriptions, which results in a unified approach to all bare nominals in English
and Japanese.
I will begin, first, by introducing the basic notions and assumptions that I will pre-
suppose throughout the dissertation (1.1). I will then present three competing accounts of
proper names (1.2). I will conclude this introductory chapter by describing the overview
of the dissertation (1.3).
1.1 Basic Notions
1.1.1 Names
This section discusses important terms such as ‘proper name’ and ‘semantics’ while in-
troducing my assumptions. To begin with, I delineate what counts as a proper name.
I borrow the terminology and examples from (Huddleston and Pullum, 2002, 515-523).
Proper names are what speakers of natural languages regularly use to talk about particular
objects in past, present and future, whether they are real or fictional. By a ‘particular ob-
ject’ or ‘individual’, I intend to mean a non-repeatable and non-multirealizable thing that
we can intuitively identify and distinguish from others in the world, such as a television
2
and a tree. Names apply to a wide range of particular objects including persons (John,
Clinton), places (Lake Michigan, the United States of America), institutions (Oxford Uni-
versity, the Knesset), historical events (the Second World War, the Plague), etc.
I distinguish ‘proper name’, which is a pre-theoretical label for a piece of our lin-
guistic act, from ‘proper noun’, which forms a narrower class in a linguistic theory. Proper
nouns are simple word-level units that belong to the noun category (e.g., Italy, Machi-
avelli), along with common nouns (e.g., cat, key). English allows any proper noun on its
own to appear as a proper name. For instance, Saul and Kripke each can be independently
used as a proper name of someone or something. I consider names such as Saul Kripke
and The Holy Roman Empire to be compounds of proper nouns and/or other expressions,
not simple proper nouns. Proper names take a wide range of forms: some of them are
simple (Mary, Pollock); some are simple but take definite articles (the Guggenheim, the
Economist); some are complex and consist of proper nouns and other expressions such as
adjectives or common nouns (New York, University of Manchester, Virginia Woolf, Who’s
Afraid of Virginia Woolf).
The pattern is exactly the same in Japanese except for the nonexistence of articles:
(1) a. Osaka (PLACE OR PERSON ‘Osaka’)






(‘Research Institute for Microbial Diseases at Osaka University’)
e. Tokaido-Chu-Hiza-Kurige
Tokaido-On-Knee-Chestnut.colored.Horse
(Sometimes translated as ‘Shank’s Mare’, the name of a Japanese comic novel
in the early 18th century)
Now I turn to the uses of proper names. In English, there are mainly three types
of sentences in which proper names appear. First, a proper name may appear on its own
with no modifier as the subject or object of a sentence.
(2) a. Aristotle is the last great philosopher of antiquity.
b. Russell sent Kennedy a telegram.
I call this use of a proper name the ‘singular, non-modified use’ of a proper name (‘the
singular use’ in short). Many instances of the singular use seem to be rigid designators
in the sense discussed by Saul Kripke (1980), according to which an expression is a rigid
designator just in case it denotes the same object in all counterfactual circumstances. In
other words, when we counterfactually evaluate a use of a sentence that contains a proper
name, we consider nothing but the actual referent of the name intended by the speaker;
we do not consider anyone else who could be referred to with another use of the name.
My theory explains why occurrences of names can be rigid designators without making
them inherently singular referring.
Second, a name in English can be modified by an article, quantifier, number word,
or demonstrative. Consider the sentences in (3), adopted from Tyler Burge’s article on
proper names (Burge, 1973). I call such an occurrence of a name as in (3) the ‘modified
4
use’ of a proper name.
(3) a. Every Tyler I know studied in Princeton.
b. A Tyler joined the club today.
c. George Wallace is a Napoleon.
d. The Tyler who joined the club today studied in Princeton.
e. Some Tylers are smart; some are not.
f. There are two Tylers in the department.
g. I know every Tyler in the department.
h. That Tyler is different from this one. (a-g after Burge, 1973)
I will argue that the modified use is possible because a proper name is constituted by one
or more proper nouns and a proper noun is a general term, semantically on a par with
common nouns.2
Third, the interpretation of a proper name can co-vary with that of some preceding
expression. In (4a), the name Bambi in the consequence clause seems to stand for whoever
the phrase a child in the antecedent picks out. I call this type of use the ‘bound use’ or
‘co-varying use’ of a proper name because such an occurrence of a name appears to be
bound by a previous expression.
(4) a. If a child is christened ‘Bambi’, then Disney will sue Bambi’s parents.
2Although Burge (1973) seems to treat (3a-h) uniformly, (3c) requires an independent discussion be-
cause Napoleon therein invokes a somewhat richer connotation in comparison with the uses of Tyler in the
other sentences. We can consider it to be an independent, derived expression from the name of Napoléon
Bonaparte. The OED includes an independent entry for Napoleon as a noun, which explicates its meaning
as ‘a person regarded as resembling Napoleon I, esp. in having gained supremacy in his or her sphere
through (ruthless) ambition’. Then the question I face is, ‘What is wrong with treating the modified oc-
currences of Tyler as independent expressions different from proper nouns?’. One might posit a productive
rule that transforms a proper noun to a common one. I will return to this issue later in Chapter 2.
5
(Geurts, 1997, 321)
b. Every time John goes to see a performance of Hamlet, he falls in love with
Ophelia. (That is, he falls in love with ‘the actress who plays the part of
Ophelia at that play’.)
(Geurts, 1997, 322)
c. Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius
takes only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention. (Elbourne, 2005, 181)
We can observe all three uses of proper names in Japanese. The following exam-




























































‘I met two Tylers.’3









































‘Every time he goes to see a performance of Hamlet, John falls in love with
Ophelia.’
Three points are worth noting concerning the presented Japanese sentences, which
will be discussed more in Chapters 3 and 5. First, Japanese nouns, whether proper or












‘Mary always carries around one/three cellphone(s).’
As emphasized in (6c), proper nouns in the basic form can play the role of pluralized
nouns in English. Whether it is singularly used to refer to a particular object, the proper
noun Tyler does not change its form.5
Second, not only proper names, but also other nominals can be preceded by modi-
fiers multiple times. (9) is an example of demonstratives, and (10) involves a first-person
is unclear as is the case in (6c). That is, no sometimes clearly corresponds to of in English, but not always.
It is controversial whether a unified analysis of no is plausible (Watanabe, 2010). I will not always specify
the role of no in the gloss.
4In Japanese two words mosi and -ra sandwich a clause to make a supposition.
5Japanese has associative plural constructions, which are explicitly concerned with more than one thing
(Dryer and Haspelmath, 2011, Ch. 36). Associative plural suffixes in Japanese (e.g., -tati) are, however,
usually not analyzed as pluralizing the extension of the head noun (Nakanishi and Tomioka, 2004). The















































Lit. ‘yesterday’s that I before meeting you’
Third, Japanese allows a proper name to be directly modified by an adjective or
(non)restrictive relative clause, both of which appear prenominally as follows:






























‘You better not speak to Masayasu when he’s smoking because he’s in a bad
mood.’; ‘You don’t want to talk to the smoking Masayasu because he is in a
bad mood.’
Both in Japanese and English there are also vocative and exclamatory uses of proper
names.












‘John, please come to my house’
c. Damn you, John.
d. John kono yaro
John this bastard
The task of my dissertation is to theoretically account for all of these uses of proper names
in a non-ad hoc manner.
1.1.2 Thought, proposition, logical form
Now I want to introduce several assumptions that prepare us to theoretically characterize
the sentences above, proper names therein, and their uses by speakers. An important but
benign assumption I want to make first is the following:
(13) Speakers of natural languages can have ‘propositional thoughts’ that are ‘truth-
evaluable’ and exhibiting ‘logical form’.
9
By ‘truth-evaluable’ I do not intend the logical positivist notion ‘truth-verifiable’—a
thought can be proven to be true or false based on experience—instead I merely mean
that a thought can be judged or taken to be true or false, given background knowledge of
the world. For example, given the actual history of philosophy, I might judge that Aris-
totle is the last great philosopher of antiquity. I might also take it to be the case that a
cat went up to that oak tree based on my actual observation. And I might disagree that
‘Excavation’ is de Kooning’s most important work. I would say, ‘that’s not true’. In such
circumstances, I have some thought that I consider true or false. For something to be
truth-evaluable, it need not be true simpliciter or false simpliciter. With respect to the
actual world or a counterfactual circumstance, a thought that is truth-evaluable can be
judged true or false.
By ‘logical form’ I mean a structural pattern shared by many different thoughts that
characterizes logical reasoning or inference. We can think of logical form at the level
of arguments (e.g., modus tollens) and at the level of individual statements (e.g., negated
statements). Two distinct thoughts sometimes share a single logical form. For example,
my thoughts that every glass is empty and that every bottle is full share the same logical
form, which can be made perspicuous in a regimented language, e.g., ‘∀x(Fx→ Gx)’.
A thought is ‘propositional’ when it is truth-evaluable and has logical form.6 No
matter how we define a proposition, I take it to be truth-evaluable and exhibiting logical
form because propositions would be the minimum unit in truth-preserving arguments.
Regardless of one’s view about propositions, there are some reasons to accept (13).
Many philosophers and cognitive scientists are realists about thoughts and other mental
6There might as well be non-propositional thoughts.
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states, which figure in the explanation of human actions. For example, various speech
acts are understood in terms of thoughts. I can ‘assert’, ‘say’ or ‘claim’ that my dinner
is ready by uttering my dinner is ready or some other sentence. One of the preconditions
of my assertion seems to be the fact that I think that my dinner is ready. In asserting or
saying so I also want the interlocutor to think that my dinner is ready. If propositional
thoughts do not exist, it would be hard to make sense of our speech acts. Furthermore, a
thought can stand in an inferential relation to another. If I think that A. J. Ayer quarreled
with Austin and he also quarreled with Mike Tyson, then I think that Ayer quarreled with
Mike Tyson. The inference seems truth-preserving. It is also the case that two different
thoughts can share the same logical pattern. My thought that Ayer quarreled with Austin
is structurally analogous to my thought that Ayer quarreled with Mike Tyson. Therefore,
I assume that there are some thoughts that are truth-evaluable and exhibit logical form.
The assumption (13) is important because I need some tractable medium of com-
munication. I assume that propositional thought is the target that a speaker attempts to
express by means of language use. A speaker often succeeds in expressing a thought by
uttering a sentence. Natural language has enough structure suitable to specify novel and
complex thoughts, which enables speakers to influence the mental states of others and
their own. As a theorist I will discuss what properties proper names possess, and how the




Now I turn to the notion of semantic theory.7 There are two questions concerning the
notion of semantics: What is semantic theory a theory of?; What form should a semantic
theory of a natural language take? In order to answer the first question and to illumi-
nate the objects of semantic theory, I adopt a Chomskyan cognitive or knowledge-based
conception of semantics, semantics being a part of generative grammar or generative lin-
guistics.
According to Noam Chomsky, the subject-matter of generative grammar is the lin-
guistic capacities of particular speakers (Chomsky, 1965, 1966, 1986, 2000). The human
mind includes a component devoted to linguistic activities, the faculty of language. The
language faculty of an infant begins with an initial state, the theory of which is ‘Universal
Grammar’, and it attains a stable, mature state in the normal course of development, which
is called an ‘I-language’.8 I-languages are generative procedures that associate form and
meaning, on the basis of which individuals speak to others and understand others’ speech.
Generative grammar takes I-languages to be its object of inquiry.9
7I will use ‘semantics’ and ‘semantic theory’ interchangeably. Semantic theory is semantic because
it attempts to theorize the meaning of natural language. However, a semantic theory is different from a
‘theory of meaning’, which I consider to be a systematic attempt to elucidate the problem of intentionality
or Brentano’s problem. The dissertation is not directly concerned with Brentano’s problem, although I will
discuss some of its aspects as metasemantic questions.
8‘Grammar’ is used in two different senses among linguists: one of them indicates the initial state of the
language faculty itself, and the other means a theory of such states. I use the term in the latter sense.
9Since we ordinarily say that one ‘knows’ or ‘knows how to speak’ a natural language such as French
and Finnish, generative grammar can also be seen as the study of linguistic knowledge of speakers, where
the term ‘knowledge’ is proxy for the internal state of an idealized individual speaker. Semantics as a
branch of generative grammar is the study of linguistic knowledge pertaining to meaning. The knowledge
conception is defended in (Larson and Segal, 1995). In what follows I sometimes say that a speaker ‘knows’
a lexical meaning, composition rule, etc. The term ‘knowledge’, however, should not be understood in an
epistemological sense. I do not suggest that an idealized speaker goes through a justificatory step to verify
a certain set of propositions, which may be seen as the rules of a language. Speakers are also not aware
of their linguistic knowledge. The speaker’s knowledge of language is the state of the speaker’s mind
specialized to her language use, not a justified true belief. See (Collins, 2004).
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Now I turn to the second question about the notion of semantics, ‘What form should
a semantic theory of a natural language take?’. Since semantics is a theory of I-languages
that connect form and meaning, we want to specify the notion of meaning in natural
language in order to fully answer the second question. However, it is difficult to define
the notion of linguistic meaning. Following Robert Stalnaker (1997, 166), I use the term
‘semantic value’ as a neutral term for whatever it is that a semantic theory assigns to
natural language expressions. A statement in a semantic theory for a certain I-language
specifies the way in which a competent speaker of that language associates a semantic
value with an expression. As usual, a semantic theory also specifies the composition rules
by means of which the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by those of
its constituents. I also presuppose that semantics deals with only some aspects of what we
ordinarily associate with the term ‘meaning’. Understanding how a sentential semantic
value is put in use requires independent consideration, which we call ‘pragmatics’.
There are different semantic frameworks that are based on different understandings
of linguistic meaning. I believe, however, that my analysis of proper names and other
bare nominals can be reinterpreted and deployed within any such semantic framework. In
this dissertation I adopt an externalist understanding of linguistic meaning, although the
subject matter of semantic theory is an internal mental state.
What competent speakers know about meaning are rules that involve external ob-
jects. For example, a speaker knows the rule for the meaning of dog, which might be
represented as follows:
(14) For any object x, Val(x, dog) if and only if x is a dog
13
where ‘Val...’ reads ‘the semantic value of dog is x’, where x ranges over external objects.
I prefer this externalist conception of linguistic meaning for the following reason. As I
noted earlier I assume that speakers express truth-evaluable thoughts. The externalist
notion of meaning straightforwardly allows theorists to use speakers’ thoughts or truth-
conditional judgments about sentences to evaluate a given theory of meaning. We first
provide a subject an external circumstance where objects are arranged in a certain way,
and then invite the subject to judge whether the circumstance supports a given sentence.
There the subject understands the meaning of the sentence, and also forms a judgment that
reflects the external objects and their arrangement. Now, on the externalist conception of
linguistic meaning, for any given sentence, the rules of the subject’s I-language conspire
to produce a representation that involves external objects and their arrangements, so the
speaker’s understanding of the sentence involves external objects and their arrangements.
This picture explains why a speaker, who understands a sentence, can reliably report if the
sentence is ‘okay’ or ‘not-okay’ with respect to a particular circumstance. We theorists
can then exploit such reports to evaluate a theoretical description of the rules for linguistic
understanding, assuming that we all grasp external circumstances equally well or badly.
Let me add at once that the externalist conception of linguistic meaning does not
entail that the rules of natural language always determine complete propositions or truth-
conditions. For example, it is possible that semantic rules produce representations whose
variables range over external objects, but remain free. Then the outputs of a semantic
theory would not be truth-conditional. I presuppose neither isomorphic nor one-to-one
relation between natural language and propositional thought. I will come back to this
issue concerning the semantics-pragmatics interface in Chapter 5.
14
My use of an externalist notion of linguistic meaning is not supported by any a pri-
ori argument. Semanticists might discard the externalist notion of meaning in future re-
search. In other words, external objects do not necessarily have to figure in the description
of an I-language (Collins, 2007a). As of today, however, when we specify the semantic
value of some natural language expression, it is almost always inevitable to refer to exter-
nal objects. Natural language is used to communicate about medium sized dry goods, and
we theorists start from them. Although in a near future we might be able to leave behind
the ordinary categories of external objects and truth-evaluable thoughts thereof, and di-
rectly characterize the interface between natural language and the conceptual-intentional
(CI) systems, I currently have no clear idea about the format and the structure of the CI-
systems. Thus, I bypass any issues concerning the language-CI interface, while I do not
rule out the possibility that the overall structure of my semantic theory will cast some
light on the nature of the interface.
One could adopt an internalist notion of meaning in constructing a semantic theory
of a natural language. Within an internalist semantic framework, the semantic values of
natural language expressions would not be external objects, but internal mental entities.
For example, Paul Pietroski has been putting forward an internalist conception of natural
language semantics (2000; 2005b; 2006a; 2006b; 2007; 2008, ming), according to which
linguistic meaning must be understood in terms of concepts of some sort or instructions to
the CI systems. The biologically implemented human faculty of language in a competent
speaker of, say, English is in a certain state that can be said to represent an algorithm that
generates instructions to build concepts. Expressions or words such as kick in English
are associated with a special class of lexicalized concepts, ‘i-concepts’, on which the I-
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language operates to build more complex concepts by combining them in certain ways.
Each i-concept is an instruction to the CI systems; generated complex concepts are com-
plex instructions to the CI-systems. These concepts are probably not fully propositional.
Yet they eventually lead to truth-evaluable judgments, which are possible only together
with other cognitive systems beside the language faculty.
The externalist and internalist notions of linguistic meaning present two distinct
ways to cash out the semantic values of natural language expressions. I adopt the former
notion in this dissertation. However, the discrepancy between the two notions might not
indicate that they belong to two completely irreconcilable projects.
Pietroski et al. (2009) point out that David Marr’s (1982) multi-layered levels of
explanation invoked to understand vision analogously applies to our understanding of a
language faculty. We do not have to expect that a single level of explanation completes
our study of meaning. Marr (1982) claims that there are three different levels of theoriza-
tion, at which the task ‘seeing’ must be understood before we claim to have understood
it completely. The top level (Level One) is for an abstract computational theory that de-
scribes a mapping from one kind of information to another, whose properties should be
appropriate and adequate for the task at hand. Level One asks what computation the de-
vice for vision carries out. The middle level (Level Two) involves choosing an algorithm
that implements the computation. Level Two asks how the device carries out the abstract
computation. The bottom level (Level Three) is about hardware implementation of al-
gorithm. The discoveries and progress at each level would constraint the analyses at the
other two levels. However, we can pursue a theory at each level rather independently of
the others.
16
Marr’s methodological distinction, broadly construed, applies to two different se-
mantic strategies based on two different notions of linguistic meaning. The externalist
semantic theories can be seen as operating at Level One in describing abstract mappings
between linguistic objects and external objects. They characterize how uses of sentences
can relate to speakers’ truth-value judgments. The internalist theories address Level Two
questions, specifying how such mappings are possibly carried out by the interactions be-
tween the language faculty and other cognitive systems.
The theory of proper names I will present in this dissertation remains at Level One
because I adopt the externalist conception of linguistic meaning and for the most part
abstract away from the interaction between the language faculty and other cognitive sys-
tems. However, since I adopt the mentalist conception of semantics, my theory has to be
constrained by any relevant Level Two or Three considerations and findings.
Last but not least, I want to note that by ‘referring’ I mean an action of an individual.
An individual ‘refers to’ an object with some device, which may or may not be linguistic.
The ‘referent’ is the object to which an individual refers to with something. So an act
of referring does not have to be linguistic. An index finger, eye gaze, lips, etc might
be sufficient for performing a referring action. The notion of semantic value is clearly
different from the notion of referent. They could sometimes coincide, but they are usually
different. I refer to nothing with a token of although, whereas my knowledge of English
assigns some semantic value to it. An expression itself never refers to anything. An
expression is used to refer to an object, and it can be derivatively seen as referring to
an object. By the theoretical term ‘singular referring expression’ I mean an expression
that is used to refer to a single object in virtue of linguistic knowledge. I also sometimes
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loosely write a thing such as ‘this utterance expresses this proposition’, but it should not
be understood in the literal sense. Instead it means that semantic knowledge associates
the utterance with the proposition. I will also sometimes use ‘denotation’ as synonymous
with ‘semantic value’.
1.2 Three Semantic Theses about Proper Names
This section provides a brief overview of three different semantic theses about proper
names. Semantic theses must not be confused with metasemantic theses. David Kaplan
(1989) and also Stalnaker (1997) distinguish two kinds of questions that can be addressed
in semantic inquiry. On the one hand, ‘semantic’ (Kaplan) or ‘descriptive semantic’ (Stal-
naker) questions concern the specification of the content or the semantic value of a natural
language expression. First-order or descriptive semantics studies how complex expres-
sions obtain their contents on the basis of the contents of their constituents. On the other
hand, ‘metasemantic’ (Kaplan) or ‘foundational semantic’ (Stalnaker) questions ask in
virtue of what fact the expression has the content it has. Metasemantic questions are
closely related to the problem of intentionality. It is the first-order semantics that I will be
primarily discussing in this dissertation. However, after I present each semantic thesis, I
also discuss some of its metasemantic implications.
Suppose that I utter the sentence (15) to report that Bertrand Russell was Hegelian.
(15) Russell was Hegelian.
How should we theoretically characterize the expression Russell in (15)? We can distin-
guish three semantic theses about the roles of proper names.
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Descriptivism or the descriptivist thesis claims that proper names are quantifica-
tional definite descriptions in disguise, whose basic logical and semantic properties are
understood in terms of Russell’s theory of descriptions (1905). The superficial appear-
ance of the sentence (15) is misleading: its underlying structure is analogous to that of a
sentence containing a definite description in Russell’s sense. A proper name is a quan-
tificational expression of the form [ the x: Fx ] where F is usually considered to be a
conjunction of the predicates that can be used to uniquely identify the referent of the
name. The origin of the descriptivist thesis is often associated with Gottlob Frege and
Russell, and subsequently many different versions of it have been explored.
Descriptivism has an application in metasemantics, which explains why proper
names can be related to particular objects. The descriptivist thesis in semantics is in
harmony with a Russellian empiricist theory of thought: for a subject to think about
something, the subject must be empirically familiar with the object with some appropri-
ate definition of empirical familiarity. Under the constraint of such Russellian empiricism,
it is not clear if I would ever be able to entertain the thought that Russell was Hegelian,
if the thought has the form of Fa, where a is an individual constant that stands for Rus-
sell, because it is not clear if I could ever be familiar enough with Russell on the chosen
empiricist criterion. However, if the thought has the form of [ the x: Fx ](Gx)—the
possibility is opened up by the descriptivist thesis—then it seems easier to meet the em-
piricist criterion for thought because I would not have to be familiar with Russell himself,
but only with whatever F and G stand for.
So-called Millianism about proper names denies the quantificational status attributed
to a name by the descriptivist. Instead Millianism claims that proper names are analogous
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to individual constants in quantificational logic. The occurrence of Russell in (15) is
equivalent to an individual constant, while the rest of the sentence corresponds to a predi-
cate; the overall structure of the sentence can be expressed as Fa. Thus, the Millian view
of names can be appropriately called the ‘constant thesis’ about proper names. The con-
stant thesis provides a straightforward account for the rigidity of proper names. Individ-
ual constants model the behaviors of proper names very well especially when embedded
within modal constructions. By contrast, the descriptivist thesis needs some complication
to account for rigidity.10
The constant thesis in semantics is usually supplemented with a metasemantic claim
about proper names: the causal picture of naming, according to which a causal-historical
chain of human linguistic activities relates a proper name and its referent. The causal
picture of naming supersedes the descriptivist-empiricist picture of a use of a proper
name. On the causal picture of naming, I can successfully talk about an individual such
as Bertrand Russell because I stand in an appropriate causal relation to the referent of the
name Bertrand Russell. Perhaps, I know the following rule, whose origin is the naming
event in which Russell himself involved:
(16) For any x, Val(x, Russell) if and only if x is identical to r (where r is a constant
that refers to Russell)
Even if I am not acquainted with Russell, in virtue of knowing the rule that involves
Russell himself, I might be able to stand in an appropriate relation to Russell, which
makes a thought about him possible.
10As the main proponents of the constant thesis I have in mind such figures as Nathan Salmon and Scott
Soames. Kripke in Naming and Necessity (1980) provides no positive semantic thesis about proper names.
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I also classify the position that treats proper names as pronominal or variable ex-
pressions as an extension of Millianism because the position considers proper names to
be simple expressions just as Millianism.11
I will argue in Chapter 2 that the constant thesis, including the names-as-variables
view, fails to provide an adequate account of various uses of proper names. The constant
thesis is an essentially limited position because it treats proper names to form a special and
unique category, and fails to see the connections proper names have to other nominal ex-
pressions. I alternatively defend the predicate thesis, put forward in theoretical terms first
by Burge (1973), according to which proper names themselves are monadic predicates.
They are neither individual constants, individual variables, nor quantificational phrases,
but semantically on a par with other nouns. There is nothing special about proper names
to the extent that they are nominal predicates, which we employ to form complex phrases
of various kinds just as other common nouns (e.g., the chair, that chair, a chair).
Putting differently, the predicate thesis claims that proper nouns correspond to sor-
tal concepts, if an expression corresponds to a concept at all. The sortal concept TIGER, if
it exists, distinguishes tigers from those that are not. Likewise, the sortal concept ARIS-
TOTLE divides the domain of discourse into two groups: everything in one group is an
Aristotle; everything else belongs to the other. So the predicate thesis on its own does
not account for the three uses of proper names presented above. But the predicate thesis
interacts with other aspects of natural language, namely, our capacities to form referring
expressions, and correlatedly with our capacities to have demonstrative thought.
11Such a view has been expressed by various theorists at various points, e.g., Charles S. Peirce, Takashi
Yagisawa, Françoi Recanati, and Sam Cumming.
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In addition to the predicate thesis, I will argue that proper names used as arguments
of sentences are complex phrases that are essentially equivalent to definite descriptions.
The singular occurrence of Russell in (15) will be syntactically analyzed as follows, where
ø  is a phonologically empty expression that is semantically virtually identical to the defi-




I will develop a situation semantic system that treats the structure (17) to be an object-
denoting expression, whose semantic value is the individual named ‘Russell’ in the rel-
evant situation. Syntactically represented situation arguments also account for the inter-
pretive interaction of a proper name with the rest of the sentence in the bound use of a
proper name.
1.3 Overview of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 will be an examination of the constant thesis of proper names or Millianism,
as well as the view that treats names as individual variables. It will be argued that the
predicate thesis has clear advantages over the competing accounts given the wide range
of facts about proper names.
Chapter 3 will first present a syntactic analysis of a variety of uses of proper names.
We will examine evidence that proper names used as arguments of sentences are complex
noun phrases. The second half of Chapter 3 will discuss and defend the metalinguistic
theory of a proper name as an analysis of the lexical meaning of a proper noun.
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Chapter 4 will be devoted to developing a situation-based semantic analysis of def-
inite descriptions and proper names. A situation-based semantic theory is an empirically
plausible account of definite and other complex nominal phrases. The predicate thesis of
names developed in Chapter 3 will be integrated into the situation semantic analysis of
complex nominal phrases. Syntactically represented variables over situations play a cru-
cial role in deriving the semantic properties of complex nominals, which in turn account
for various uses of proper names and definite descriptions. For example, the de re/dicto
distinction, which we associate with definite descriptions, can be accounted for in terms
of the binding relation between a modal expression and a situation variable within a defi-
nite description. The situation semantic analysis explains why proper names can be rigid
designators and how they produce the bound or co-varying interpretations.
Chapter 5 will turn to other sorts of bare nominals including bare plurals (e.g.,
dogs), mass terms (e.g., water), and Japanese noun phrases. The analysis of proper names
and definite descriptions developed in Chapter 4 will be shown to extend to other bare
nominals as well. Occurrences of plural and mass terms themselves are predicative ex-
pressions, and constitute definite descriptions when used as the subjects or objects of
sentences. The predicate thesis holds not only for proper names, but also for other bare
nominals. The predicate thesis in fact provides a unified approach to the semantics of bare
nominal expressions in general, which reinforces the conclusion of Chapter 2. At the end
of the chapter is the discussion of some further philosophical implications of the proposed
account of bare nominals. I will present an argument for the view that the mapping from




The purpose of this chapter is to examine Millianism or the constant thesis about proper
names and another competing thesis, variabilism, which takes proper names to be analo-
gous to individual variables rather than individual constants. I will discuss the two views
together in this chapter because they share two basic characteristics, which also create
major differences between the predicate thesis and Millianism/variabilism.
In the first place, both Millianism and variabilism consider proper names to be
structureless, simple expressions that are inherently argumental. This characteristic forces
the Millian and variable theorists to separate the modified uses of proper names from the
other uses of names. They are bound to fail to provide a unified analysis of all three uses
of proper names.
In the second place, both Millianism and variabilism associate nothing but referents
with proper names as their semantic significance. Any other potentially specifiable com-
ponent of natural language semantics, such as a ‘mode of presentation’ and ‘Sinn’, has
nothing to do with the semantics of proper names. On the one hand, according to Mil-
lianism, the referents of proper names exhaust our semantic knowledge of proper names.
On the other hand, variabilism claims that, although the referent of a proper name varies
from time to time, nothing but a certain object in the domain is the significance of a name,
which is given by a variable assignment.
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In what follows I will discuss why these two characteristics are the limitations of
Millianism and variabilism.
2.1 Variabilism
Let me first explicate what variabilism is because it has not yet been widely discussed. I
focus on the version of variabilism presented in (Cumming, 2008).1 A use of a sentence
containing a proper name such as (1a) is first translated into what he calls a ‘semantic
representation’, which is the object for which the semantics of English delivers an inter-
pretation.2 Each use of a proper name is translated as a variable that bears an index. For
example (1a) is represented as (1b):
(1) a. Socrates fell.
b. fell x2
A use of Socrates in this particular occasion introduces the variable x2. Another use of
Socrates can introduced a different variable that bears a different index. Unlike Millian-
ism it is not a single individual constant that is associated with a use of a proper name. A
single name can be used to talk about different individuals even in the same context. One
and the same expression Socrates can be used to introduce two different variables to talk
about two different Socrateses. A sentence or discourse as a whole can contain more than
one occurrence of the same name. Disambiguation takes place when a use of a sentence
is translated into a semantic representation.
1As mentioned above, Yagisawa (1984) once proposed the variable analysis of proper names, which he
seems to no longer hold.
2I take a semantic representation to be equivalent to an ‘LF representation’: a syntactic representation
that explicitly marks semantically relevant distinctions such as scopes. See Chapter 3 for more discussion
on natural language syntax.
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Variables are assignment-sensitive in the sense that their interpretations are pro-
vided by variable assignments, not by models. A variable assignment g is a function that
corresponds to a sequence of objects 〈o1, o2, ..., on〉 (where ‘oi’ is an object) and maps a
variable bearing the index i onto the ith object of the sequence. (1b) itself does not deter-
mine a truth-evaluable proposition even after we have fixed a model or which language we
are studying. (1b) determines an ‘open’ proposition: a function that maps a variable as-
signment onto a proposition (‘closed’ proposition) that is a function from possible worlds
to truth-values. With respect to an assignment g that assigns x2 the philosopher Socrates,
(1b) yields the proposition that Socrates fell. The proposition is true in a possible world
if and only if the philosopher Socrates fell in that possible world.3
This variable analysis achieves two important things. First, for the singular use
of a proper name (when a name is used to talk about a particular object), the semantic
contribution of a use of a proper name to the proposition expressed is nondescriptive. The
nth element in a sequence is nothing but a single object (not a mode of presentation).
As a result, the interpretation of a use of a proper name with respect to an assignment
is invariable for circumstances of evaluation. The analysis predicts that some uses of
proper names are rigid designators in Kripke’s (1980) sense because the assigned value
of a use of a name remains the same across all worlds. Any adequate analysis of proper
names must explain the nondescriptive uses of proper names, and why they can be rigid
designators, as some extant analyses indeed do so.4
3It is worth noting that, for Alfred Tarski, individual constants are variables whose values do not vary
across sequences. In this sense variabilism can be seen as an extension of Millianism.
4For example, see (Burge, 1973; Recanati, 1997; Geurts, 1999; Elbourne, 2005). I also follow the spirit
of Burge and Elbourne and analyze the singular use of a proper name as a singular referring expression,
though it is a complex phrase, rather than a primitive expression as the Millian and variable theorists claim.
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Second, the variable analysis has wider empirical coverage than the Millian analy-
sis of proper names. Uses of proper names are now bindable by other expressions because
they introduce variables rather than constants. It is also possible to conceive of an expres-
sion or linguistic environment that changes the variable assignment, with respect to which
we determine which object a proper name contributes to the expressed proposition.
To understand the advantages of variabilism over Millianism, recall, first of all,
variabilism enables one and the same proper name to introduce distinct variables within
a single sentence or discourse, which implies that one and the same proper name can be
used to talk about different individuals. This aspect of the variable analysis already gives
it an edge over the Millian analysis. Jerrold J. Katz discusses a number of counterintuitive
outcomes of the Millian analysis of proper names, some of which I will return to discuss
in connection with the modified use of a name. Here I want to point out two facts about
names that Millianism cannot easily account for whereas variabilism has no trouble with.
Imagine two John Smiths who are conversing with one another. Their claim like (2)
or (3) appear to us the literal truth.
(2) We have the same name.
(3) ‘John Smith’ is my name, too. (Katz, 2001, 150)
Millianism has to deny the truths of (2) and (3), however, because it is theoretically im-
possible for one name to stand for more than one individual. At the same time Millianism
has to affirm that the two John Smiths are speaking the literal truth when they say (4).
(4) We have different names. (Katz, 2001, 150)
Likewise, according to Millianism, (5) is probably analytically false.
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(5) My name is Mary Smith, too, so I’m her namesake. (Katz, 2001, 151)
Millians need to dismiss the theoretical significance of these examples as a ‘loose talk’:
a ‘name’ here is not concerned with a natural language expression in a theoretical sense.
Two individuals cannot share one and the same name as a natural language expression
because John Smith33, which is a name as a natural language expression, never refers to
more than one individual. Millians have to presuppose that these facts observed in (2-5)
are somehow isolated from our theorization of proper names.5 By contrast, variabilism
has no need to exclude these facts as irrelevant noise. Two John Smiths can have the same
name because different occurrences of a single expression John Smith can refer to two
different individuals, i.e., the two John Smiths.
The bound use of a proper name is also within the reach of variabilism. For ex-
ample, Cumming discusses the following examples, where the referent of a name inter-
sententially depends on the interpretation of a preceding expression.
(6) There is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. Ernest is engaged
to two women. (Cumming, 2008, 535)
(7) You will meet a man named ‘Ernest’. Ernest will bring you every happiness.
(Cumming, 2008, 536)
We can use (6) and (7) when there is no specific individual in mind. Suppose that one
claims (6) based on a demographic survey and that there are more than one Ernest who
is engaged to two women. Since the speaker has no particular Ernest in mind, the second
occurrence of Ernest seems to be about any Ernest who can be a value of the existential
5For example, Kaplan (1990) posits the category of ‘generic names’ in addition to ordinary proper names
to make sense of the cases like (2-5). We will see below that such a theoretical addition is unnecessary.
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statement expressed by the first sentence, not about a unique Ernest. (6) can be para-
phrased as follows in this context.
(8) Whoever is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’ is engaged to
two women.
The paraphrase makes it perspicuous that there is some connection between the mentioned
gentleman and the referent of Ernest.
This intuition is well captured by variabilism because it assigns the following logi-
cal form to a use of (6).
(9) ∃x(gentleman-in-Hertfordshire x∧ named-Ernest x∧ engaged-to-two-women x)
Details aside, let us assume that the variable introduced by the second occurrence of
Ernest in (6) is bound by an existential quantification, which also binds the variable in-
troduced by the occurrence of a gentleman in Hertfordshire. The logical form (9) makes
it clear that the gentleman x is identical to the Ernest x who is engaged to two women.
According to Millianism, however, the fact that we can paraphrase (6) as (8) is a
mere coincidence, and there is no theoretical way to note the relation between them. On
the Millian analysis of names, a use of (6) contains two completely independent state-
ments. One is an existential statement. The other is a singular proposition concerning
a single individual. The referent of Ernest in the second statement might make the first
existential statement true, which can be nothing but a coincidence.
To summarize, the variable analysis of proper names has the same virtues as the
individual constant analysis, while it accounts for a wider set of data including the bound
use of a proper name and some intuitive facts concerning names. Below I will present,
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however, more facts about proper names that the variable analysis can only inadequately
account for.
2.2 Complexity of Proper Names
We have seen that the variable analysis of proper names can straightforwardly account
for several facts about proper names when the Millian analysis has a hard time. The
variable analysis is compatible with our intuitions about ‘having the same name’ and
‘having different names’, and it applies to the bound use of a proper name. The analysis of
proper names to be developed in Chapter 3 and 4 equally well accounts for the presented
data concerning proper names. In what follows I will examine some other facts about
proper names, which demand theoretical complexities in both Millianism and variabilism
whereas they can be easily handled by the predicate thesis about proper names, as we will
see in Chapter 3. Therefore, empirical facts indicate that the playing field is not level for
the three competing theses of proper names.
2.2.1 The modified uses of proper names
Let us discuss some of the modified uses of proper names, cited in the previous chapter.
A use of Every Alfred I know studied in Princeton is most likely to mean that every one
of the speaker’s acquaintances who goes by the name ‘Alfred’ studied in Princeton. How
do we obtain this reading upon hearing the utterance? How does the occurrence of Alfred
relate to the quantificational content. The predicate thesis has a straightforward answer
to these questions because an occurrence of Alfred is uniformly a nominal predicate. A
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nominal predicate cat can be combined with a quantifier every and so is Alfred.6
Millianism and variabilism must deny that such an occurrence of Alfred is a proper
name. If it were, for the Millian theorist, the utterance would be incomprehensible be-
cause a quantifier cannot bind an individual constant, whereas for the variable theorist,
the utterance would be either incomprehensible (the introduced variable is free) or lead to
an unobserved meaning (the quantifier binds the variable, but it is not restricted at all due
to the lack of any descriptive content). Their solution has to be that there are two words
Alfred1 and Alfred2, each of which has a different semantic specification. One of them is
an individual constant or individual variable, and the other is a nominal predicate, whose
content is metalinguistic.7
I have a few comments on this solution. First, as it will be clear in the following
chapters, to account for the same range of data, the predicate thesis only requires one kind
of natural language expression (e.g., Alfred), not two. I will argue that the referential force
of a proper name comes from the basic resource available to nominal expressions in gen-
eral. More specifically, what makes a definite description a referential expression is what
makes a proper name a referential expression. The predicate thesis requires no additional
theoretical complication that needs to be introduced on the Millian or variabilist approach.
Considerations of parsimony support the predicate thesis. Certainly such considerations
might not weigh heavily against Millianism/variabilism. But we still have prima facie
reason to deny them.
A second comment is on the following possible reply. The Millian/variabilist the-
6See also Chapter 3 for more details.
7See Chapter 3 for the discussion on the metalinguistic or quotation theory of proper names.
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orists might argue that my first comment is unfair because the Alfred1/2 ambiguity poses
no theoretical burden. In other domains of language use, we independently observe ho-
mophonous expressions whose meanings seem to be somehow related to one another.
Consider some polysemies (e.g., ‘I am writing a book’; ‘I brought a book’; ‘I booked a
hotel’). Each polysemous expression sounds the same, but has a distinct meaning. Also
compare water and three waters. The former is an uncountable mass term, which seems
to be about some amount of water. But in the latter phrase the same word water (or what
appears to be the same word) is used as a count noun, denoting perhaps three bottles of
water; two occurrences of water have two distinct meanings, just like Alfred1/2. If we
acknowledge that there has to be some productive way to relate the occurrences of water
or book (a ‘universal grinder’ of some sort), we would also be justified in presupposing
some productive relation between Alfred1 and Alfred2. Therefore, the modified uses of
proper names do not threaten Millianism/variabilism.
Note that, even if this reply is flawless, the playing field for three competing theses
of names is merely level, and the scale is not tipping in favor of Millianism or variabil-
ism. The ambiguity thesis merely makes Millianism/variabilism logically consistent with
the productive uses of proper names, and never explains why we should have such uses.
By contrast, the predicate thesis predicts that we have such uses of names because we use
other nominal predicates, such as cat, in the same productive ways. Furthermore, we have
good reason to think that the polysemous expressions mentioned above are bad analogies.
Certainly three occurrences of book above have three different meanings. However, none
of the meanings is structurally different from the others. They are all predicative expres-
sions that are true of things or pairs of things. We have not yet observed a transformation
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of meaning in which an expression for a particular object turns into a predicate, or vice
versa. Certainly it is easy to come up with a way to ‘Socratize’ an individual constant.
That is, we can devise a formal principle that turns an individual constant into a pred-
icative expression. However, such a rule as Richard Montague’s ident merely creates a
predicate whose extension is a singleton, which is irrelevant to the modified uses in ques-
tion.8 In order to account for the modified uses of proper names, we need metalinguistic
predicates true of more than one objects, not an essential predicate true of just one thing.
A productive rule between proper names and homophonous metalinguistic predicates is
hard to come by.9
The individual constant or variable theorists now have to acknowledge that the
Alfred1/2 ambiguity is rather similar to that of bank1/2. It is not the case that there is an
internally represented rule connecting a proper name to a metalinguistic predicate. This
option might not look so bad after all. Competent speakers are indeed capable of remem-
bering a great number of homophonous expressions. Furthermore, all Alfreds have some
sociological or anthropological property in common, i.e., they are all named or regularly
called ‘Alfred’. It is easy for us to pick up this property to make an independent predicate
that is true of all Alfreds.10
8The function ident gives us, for any object, a function that assigns Truth to nothing but that object.
9What about water and three waters? Perhaps, the former denotes an abstract kind, and the latter is a
predicate true of any amount of the kind water. If we have a productive rule to derive a count noun from
a kind term, then we might be able to derive a metalinguistic predicate from an individual constant. This
suggestion is problematic for two reasons. First, semanticists, such as Chierchia (1998), who utilize kind-
like denotations in the semantics of mass terms only appeal to property correlates, not abstract kinds, as
the denotations of mass terms. We can easily recover properties from property correlates based on type
theory. See Chapter 5. Second, the relation between a kind and its members is disanalogous to the relation
between an object and the other objects that share the same name. A kind instantiates particulars, whereas
a particular Alfred stands in no such instantiation relation to other Alfreds.
10Kaplan’s (1990) ‘generic names’ are such metalinguistic expressions, which are distinct from Millian
names.
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Notice, however, this process of making a metalinguistic predicate is a new theoret-
ical commitment for Millians/variabilists, and it is also the very claim that the predicate
thesis advocates for. The predicate theorist, such as Burge, is committed to the same
claim that we somehow create a predicate true of all objects that have the same name.
Millians/variabilists are committed to an additional thesis that there is also an independent
linguistic category: ‘proper names as individual constants’ or ‘proper names as individual
variables’. We are now making a full circle. In order to account for the three main uses
of proper names, Millianism and variabilism need two categories of expressions: proper
names and homophonous metalinguistic predicates. By contrast, the predicate thesis only
requires metalinguistic predicates to cover the same range of facts. Therefore, the predi-
cate thesis of names is simpler than Millianism/variabilism.
I would like to repeat the same point by using a different set of data. Consider the
following examples, which I borrow from (Paul, 1994).
(10) a. W. A. Mozart visited Paris.
b. The young W. A. Mozart visited Paris.
(11) a. Woody Allen is funny.
b. The joking Woody Allen is funny.
The predicate thesis requires no auxiliary theory in explaining (10b) and (11b). All occur-
rences of proper names in (10-11) are metalinguistic predicates, which are constituents of
complex phrases. Since I formally analyze the subject W. A. Mozart in (10a) as a definite
description, the name with an overt definite article in (10b) is reduced to its variation.
For the Millian and variable theorists, there are a couple of different ways to han-
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dle (10b) and (11b) rather than declaring them to be noise. A first option is to consider
a complex phrase such as the joking Woody Allen to be a newly created name, which
refers to just some part of an individual. This option never compositionally explains why
the joking Woody Allen applies to Woody Allen while he is joking because, on Millian-
ism/variabilism, a part of the name joking has no semantic significance. Thus, the joking
Woody Allen never means the joking Woody Allen, although it might happen to refer to a
joking slice of Woody Allen, which is an undesirable outcome of the first option.
A second option for Millians and variabilists is to follow the predicate theorist in
this limited domain. The occurrence of Woody Allen in (11b) is in fact not an occurrence
of a proper name, but an occurrence of a metalinguistic predicate. Thus, the phrase the
joking Woody Allen is a definite description whose descriptive content partly consists of
the content of the metalinguistic predicate. This option accounts for why the phrases like
the joking Woody Allen are productive and their usages are predictable from the meaning
of the modifiers (e.g., it is used to talk about Woody Allen while he is joking).
However, with the second option, the Millian and variable theorists are now danger-
ously associated with the predicate theorist. They all need to cooperatively work together
to construct a compositional semantics for (10b) and (11b). The phrase the young W. A.
Mozart is not merely about any individual who fulfills the explicitly stated description,
i.e., ‘being young and being named ‘W. A. Mozart”. Kripke’s (1980) Gödel and Feynman
cases decisively show that we cannot rely on purely qualitative contents to fix the referent
of a singular term.11 The speaker uses the phrase to refer to the famous composer W. A.
11This is what is sometimes called a ‘semantic argument’ against descriptivism. See Chapter 4 for more
discussion.
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Mozart in his early ages. But how is that possible? I will argue that the singular use of
a proper name is an incomplete description whose descriptive content is supplemented
with a particular situation in the world chosen by the speaker (Chapter 4). That is how
the young W. A. Mozart can be used to refer to that famous W. A. Mozart while he was
young, not to any other individual with the same name who happens to be young. Mil-
lans/variabilists also have to adopt this account or something equally adequate to explain
the same set of data. Now, if the Millian and variable theorists need to ally with the
predicate theorists, only temporarily though, their analyses of names are roughly twice as
complex as an analysis based on the predicate thesis, assuming that the predicate thesis
can cover the singular use of proper names, such as (10a) and (11a), without invoking the
Millian or the variable analysis. Therefore, the Millian and variable analyses of proper
names are greatly inferior to a semantic analysis based on the predicate thesis in terms of
theoretical simplicity.12
2.2.2 Generics with proper names
When we turn our attention to non-English languages, there are further facts about proper
names that Millianism and variabilism have difficulty in explaining. As we will exten-
sively discuss in Chapter 5, Japanese is one of many articleless languages where a noun
can appear on its own without being modified by any other word. Such a ‘bare’ noun can
be used to express a variety of different thoughts, one of which is a generic statement.
12There is another (rather unattractive) option available to Millians/variabilists, which is to treat the
occurrences of names in (10b) and (11b) not as predicates, but referring to particular individuals, and
develop an adverbial analysis of the modifiers in the noun phrases (Lowe, 1988). The role of Woody Allen
in (11b) is the same as that in (11a), but the way in which he is funny is somehow modified by the word
joking. The approach is unattractive not only because such an adverbial analysis is empirically implausible
(Paul, 1994), but also it does not help us explain the other modified uses of proper names.
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(12) is such an example where the bare NP chiisai kodomo (‘small child’) is equivalent to











‘It’s common that a small child is shy of strangers.’
A generic statement can be made by using a proper name as well. (13) is a claim about















‘It’s common that a Saito is from the Tohoku area.’; ‘Many Saitos are from the
Tohoku area.’
The occurrence of the name Saito in (13) is not modified by any determiner, at least
superficially, just as the count noun in (12). In whatever way we ultimately analyze the
occurrence of a name in (13), we can fully expect this type of use as long as we consider
proper names to be semantically on a par with other count nouns.
Millianism and variabilism here again need to introduce a metalinguistic predicate
to accommodate (13). On the one hand, an individual constant (e.g., Saito3) cannot yield
a statement about the majority of Saitos. On the other hand, an individual variable cannot
also contribute the metalinguistic content to the sentential meaning because it is devoid of
any predicative meaning. By contrast, the predicate thesis of names predicts that a name
can be used in the generic constructions like (13). The scale is tipping in favor of the
predicate thesis of names.
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2.2.3 Informativeness of proper names
There is another challenge to Cumming’s variabilism: it fails to semantically distinguish a
proper name from other pronominal expressions and also from other coreferential proper
names. Consider the contrast between (14) and (15), in the latter of which a personal
pronoun is used in the place of the name Ernest. For the ease of exposition, I insert the
indices ‘i’ and ‘j’ to signify that the co-indexed expressions are used to talk about the
same individual.
(14) There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. #Ernesti is engaged to two women.13
(Cumming, 2008, 543)
(15) There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. Hei is engaged to two women.
The name Ernest cannot be seen as anaphoric to the preceding indefinite phrase a gentle-
man in Hertfordshire, unlike the pronoun he in (15). An individual pronoun such as he is,
however, usually analyzed as introducing a variable that receives its value from a variable
assignment.14 Since Cumming analyzes Ernest in (14) as introducing an assignment-
sensitive variable, the semantic contribution that Ernest makes would be identical to that
of he in (15). Then there should have been no difference between (14) and (15).
Cumming attempts to explain the contrast by pointing at a possible additional struc-
ture in a linguistic antecedent, which he calls a ‘naming construction’. Compare (14) with
the earlier impeccable sentence (6).
(6) There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. Ernesti is engaged
13I use ‘#’ to indicate that a use of the sentence sounds odd to competent speakers.
14Alternatively, the E-type/D-type approach analyzes third-person pronouns as definite descriptions
(Heim, 1990; Elbourne, 2005). I doubt that Cumming adopts the E/D-type approach to pronominals, which
would defeat his comparison between names and pronouns.
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to two women. (Cumming, 2008, 535)
Once we add a metalinguistic predicate to (14), such as by the name of ‘Ernest’ in (6),
a name can take a preceding indefinite phrase as its antecedent. Cumming suggests that
this is because an indefinite phrase together with a naming construction is an operator
that binds the variable introduced by an occurrence of a name. The naming construction
by the name of ‘Ernest’ explicitly connects a use of Ernest to a previous expression. In
the absence of the naming construction, the speaker would not intend that the interpreter
recognizes such a coreferential relation on Gricean reasons.
Cumming’s suggestion does not work for two reasons. In the first place, an indefi-
nite phrase plus naming construction is not always able to bind a following name.
(16) There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. #Worthingi is
engaged to two women.
The naming operator he posits selectively binds only the variables that are introduced by
the very same name used in the linguistic antecedent. The naming construction by the
name of ‘Ernest’ binds only an occurrence of Ernest, not Worthing, which can be used
to refer to the same individual on his theory. But how is a naming construction sensitive
to the difference between Ernest and Worthing? Cumming’s variabilism has no resource
to mark such a fine-grained distinction at his semantic representations. Both Ernest in
(6) and Worthing in (16) are semantically on a par, introducing variables with indices.
There is no way to tell, for example, if x33 corresponds to an occurrence of Ernest or
Worthing in his semantics. The presence of a naming construction might be sufficient for
distinguishing (14) and (15), but it is not sufficient for distinguishing (6) and (16).
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Note that the problem is not about the disambiguation of a sequence of sounds.
Certainly, on Cumming’s approach, each occurrence of a proper name is ambiguous at
the level of pronunciation because it is open whether it should be translated as bearing
the same index as a previous variable-introducing expression. The interpreter could have
contra-indexed Worthing and a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’ in
(16), which would lead to a possible reading of the utterance. However, the problem is
not that his analysis cannot produce a possible reading of an utterance, but that his anal-
ysis has no way to exclude unattested readings. The pronoun he in (15) may or may not
be co-indexed with the previous indefinite phrase; either way, the translated semantic rep-
resentation would yield a possible reading of (15). Cumming’s analysis rightly excludes
neither of the indexing for pronouns. But he also does not exclude the bad indexing in
(16).
In the second place, Cumming’s hypothesized operator that selectively binds some
uses of names misses the right generalization. A naming construction is not a necessary
condition for an anaphoric name to be felicitously used.
(17) The succession of nuclear wars has exterminated all living creatures on earth ex-
cept one. There is just one mani who survived the disasters. The survivori often
dreams of women. Some of them look familiar to himi. Ernest Worthingi used to
be engaged to two women.
(17) seems to be fine, if not perfect, even though it does not contain any naming con-
struction. A naming construction is not always relevant. I propose that what Cumming’s
examples (14) and (6) indicate is that the speakers follow Grice’s second maxim of Quan-
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tity ‘Do not give more information than is required’ (Grice, 1975, 33). The fact that the
gentleman in (14) is named ‘Ernest’ is not important if the speaker just wants to refer
back to him. The speaker should not throw in any extra information. That is why any
expression that is no more informative than the preceding a gentleman can take it as its
antecedent.
(18) a. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. Hei is engaged to two women.
b. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. The guyi is engaged to two women.
c. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. The mani is engaged to two women.
d. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. The gentlemani in Hertfordshire is
engaged to two women.
In the absence of the naming construction, Ernest cannot be used to refer back to the
gentleman because Ernest is more informative than he, the man, etc in this context of
use. The less informative phrases the man, he etc would have been enough to refer to the
introduced gentleman. But the speaker instead used a novel expression Ernest in (14).
The interpreter, thus, infers that the speaker does not refer back to the gentleman.
To corroborate the point, consider the following examples. Why are (19a-b) so bad
in comparison with (20a-b)?
(19) a. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. #The county council memberi is en-
gaged to two women.
b. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire. #The richest personi in Hertfordshire
is engaged to two women.
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(20) a. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire, who is a member of its county council.
The county council memberi is engaged to two women.
b. There is a gentlemani in Hertfordshire, who has more money than anyone else
in the county. The richest personi in Hertfordshire is engaged to two women.
(20a-b) are better for the same reason as why (15) and (6) are better than (14). The
grammatical subjects of the second sentences in (19a-b) involve novel predicates, which
would violate the second maxim of Quantity. The speakers would have used less informa-
tive phrases to refer back to the introduced objects, but they did not. Then the interpreters
reason that they used the informative expressions for different purposes.
In short, variabilism cannot semantically distinguish a proper name from corefer-
ential names and pronouns. It cannot explain an incoherency we find in a discourse like
(16). The same problem applies to the individual constant thesis of proper names because
it also finds no semantic difference between two coreferential expressions such as Ernest
and Worthing.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that the playing field for the competing three theses of proper
names is not level when we consider them against a full range of data. We have seen nu-
merous facts about proper names stemming from their predicative nature, which pose
serious difficulties against both Millianism and variabilism. The Millian and variable the-
orists have to either dismiss the legitimate facts as theoretically irrelevant noise or ally
with the predicate theorist and multiply the size of the lexicon by creating one metalin-
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guistic predicate for each proper name. I have also pointed out a problem that is inherent
in a view that proper names have no additional content than their referents. Such a view
cannot explain why the speaker uses one proper name (e.g., Ernest) not any other expres-
sion (e.g., Worthing, he).
A common Millian response at this juncture is that I am greatly misunderstanding
Millianism (or variabilism in this context) in thinking that they associate with a proper
name absolutely nothing beyond its referent. The Millian theorist suggests that proper
names are possibly associated with a variety of different things, such as the form and
sound of a name. Such things are not semantically associated with proper names, but
somehow account for the examples we have thus far discussed.
The Millian theorist, however, does not have a clear proposal of how such possi-
ble associations are theoretically described and used to account for the wide-ranging data
we have observed. By contrast, the predicate thesis straightforwardly explains why two
proper names are same or different (because they have predicative contents rather than
referents as their meanings). Therefore, until Millianism (or variabilism to the same ex-
tent) develops a fully specified account of how one name is different from another, it has
no advantage over the predicate thesis of proper names.
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Chapter 3
The Form and Meaning of Names
The current chapter has two goals: to identify the syntactic status of a proper name and
to clarify its lexical meaning apart from the conditions of its use. On the one hand, I
will propose that the singular and bound uses of proper names in languages with articles
are constituted by overt or covert definite determiners and proper nouns. On the other
hand, the singular and bound uses in languages without articles are constituted by proper
nouns only. For the lexical meaning of a proper noun, I adopt the metalinguistic theory
of names: the proper noun Tyler expresses a relational property one can stand in to the
sound type ‘Tyler’.
3.1 Syntactic Theory
Here I present what I assume about the syntax of natural language. Syntactic theory is a
chapter of generative linguistics, which studies the form or structure of natural language.
I assume the theoretical framework being developed under the heading of ‘Minimalist
Program’ (Chomsky, 1995, a.o.). The construction of a sentence starts by enumerating a
subset of elements in the lexicon, which is the speaker’s word knowledge. Lexical ele-
ments can be independent words, such as moose or melt, as well as sub-atomic items that
cannot be used in isolation with other items, such as the English third-person morpheme
-s. Each element is associated with or defined as a group of features that are related to
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sound, meaning, or structure, which contribute to the overall properties of the sentence
containing that element.
Besides the lexicon, there exists one or more basic operations that manipulate lin-
guistic objects. One such basic operation is ‘Merge’ that combines two elements to form
a new unit, which in turn can be combined with another element or unit to form a larger
unit. For example, (1) schematically represents how Merge constructs a complex unit,
where A, B, and C are lexical elements; D and E are the composed units; and the diagonal





One thing implied by this framework is that a sentence is not a mere flat concatena-
tion of words. Although a sentence is linearly pronounced, it has a hierarchical structure.
The series of letters ‘ABC’ has no hierarchical structure: ‘A’ and ‘B’ are next to each
other, and so are ‘B’ and ‘C’. Once we impose (1) on the series, however, ‘C’ has no di-
rect relation to ‘A’ or ‘B’. Instead ‘C’ is connected to the unit ‘D’, which is derived from
‘A’ and ‘B’. Hierarchical structures of sentences are crucial in explaining why sentences
allow some interpretations and disallow any others.
Some syntactic units are, when pronounced, judged unacceptable by competent
speakers of a certain language. A syntactic theory attributes the cause of some instances
of unacceptability judgement to ungrammaticality, an error of syntax, which eventually
affects native speakers’ acceptability judgments. One way to understand an error of syn-
tax is to take it to be an error at the interface between syntax and semantics. A Merged
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unit is deemed illicit when it has any syntactic feature to which the rules of semantics
cannot apply. Some syntactic features are inherently unintelligible and uninterpretable to
the semantic system, and have to be deleted before an interpretive process begins. Let
[uF] stand for such an uninterpretable feature, which can be deleted or ‘checked’ by an
appropriate compatible syntactic feature. I sometimes describe the deletion of an uninter-
pretable feature in terms of ‘feature-checking’, where an unchecked feature [uF] can be
checked with a feature [F]. For example, the series of words the in is not an acceptable
sequence of English because some uninterpretable feature of the is not compatible with
a feature of in, and remains unchecked. By contrast the bed sounds fine because the two
words have compatible features. We might associate the with an uninterpretable feature
that always demands the feature [N] (call it ‘[uN]’), which yields a licit construction when
Merged with a noun bed (which has the feature [N]), as expressible as ‘the[uN] bed[N]’.
On the other hand, the yields an illicit construction with in because it has the feature [P]
(P for ‘pre/post-position’). Every uninterpretable feature must be checked at some point
of the derivation of a sentence in order to have a grammatical unit.
At some point of the repetitive applications of the basic operations, the constructed
unit is sent to the part of the mind related to pronunciation, the ‘articulatory-perceptual’
systems. The point is called ‘Spell-Out’. The type of linguistic representation that is
relevant to the articulatory-perceptual systems is called ‘PF’, which is constructed on
the basis of the phonetic and syntactic features of lexical items. The basic operations
sometimes manipulate the composed unit after the Spell-Out, whose ultimate outcome is
the type of linguistic representation that is relevant to meaning, called ‘LF’. I assume that
our semantic theory compositionally assigns semantic values to LF representations. How
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much information an LF representation specifies is a substantial question we will return
in Chapter 5.
I also use several theoretical terms originally developed in more traditional frame-
works in generative syntax to describe the structural properties of linguistic representa-
tions. A complex syntactic unit is organized around a ‘head’ that determines the main
properties of the entire unit. When Merge combines two elements, the Merged unit in-
herits the features of one element, the head of the structure. Alternatively we can think of
this process as the one in which a head ‘projects’ into a higher structure, so the Merged
structure is a ‘projection’ of the head. The first item that is combined with a head via
Merge is called a ‘complement’. The second item combined with the head-complement
unit under Merge is a ‘specifier’. The head-complement unit is also called an ‘interme-
diate’ or ‘bar-level’ projection of the head (written as X′, where X is the head), and the
whole structure together with a specifier the ‘maximal’ projection (written as XP, where P
indicates ‘phrase’). The presented system gives us as much of what is known as X′-theory.




A maximal projection does not always have to have the structure (2). If an element cannot
project any further, it can be seen as a maximal projection, although it has no complement
or specifier inside.
I also assume that it is sometimes possible that a constituent in a phrase is displaced
into a different position. Syntactic theory might account for the properties of displace-
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ment by introducing different basic operations such as ‘Copy’ and ‘Delete’ in addition
to Merge. I will, however, call the displacement of a constituent ‘movement’ with no
commitment to the details of how it is realized.
3.2 The Syntax of Names
Burge (1973) presents an essentially correct analysis of proper names: they are predicates
on their own. This section discusses what his predicate thesis syntactically amounts to
when we consider various languages. If a name is a predicate, then it cannot be used by
itself to denote a ‘saturated argument’ in Frege’s sense. I will argue that a proper name in
English used in an argument position is a complex phrase.1
I will first present an empirical thesis, according to which an argument of a sentence
is a projection of a determiner, not of a noun. Then I use the thesis to account for the
syntax of proper names in English, Japanese, and other languages.
3.2.1 The DP analysis
The structure of the nominal domain has been widely reconsidered and extended since
1980’s (Abney, 1987, a.o.). The ‘DP analysis’ reanalyzes what has been referred to as a
noun phrase (NP): a nominal argument is not the maximal projection of a noun, but of a
determiner. Namely, the head of what has been seen as an NP is indeed a determiner, and
1By an ‘argument position’ I merely mean the position for a grammatical subject or object of a sentence,
such as Kurt and a few tomatoes in Kurt picked a few tomatoes. In linguistics, a phrase that stands in a
certain structural relation to a verb in a clause is called an ‘argument’. An argument on a grammatical
representation should not be confused with an ‘argument as an input of a function’. In this chapter I will
mostly follow the linguistic convention and use ‘argument’ to talk about a linguistic phrase. But in the
following chapters I will also use it to talk about what it denotes, so long as no confusion arises.
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the noun is demoted to the complement of the dominating determiner. The determiner
class usually includes articles, quantifiers, and demonstratives. The DP analysis is op-
posed to the traditional position that considers determiners to be specifiers of NPs. For
example, on the DP analysis, the student in class has the structure in (3a), as opposed to















A great deal of evidence indicates that the DP analysis is required in, at least, some
cases. It is controversial to what extent the DP analysis is applicable. I here defend
the position that the DP analysis globally holds for all nominal expressions appearing as
arguments of sentences in languages that have articles. I use ‘article’ in the traditional
grammatical sense. Articles include independent words (e.g., German der) and nominal
suffixes (e.g., Norwegian, Bulgarian, etc). Strictly speaking, I will remain neutral whether
the DP analysis is also applicable to languages without articles, such as Japanese. I will
present the semantics of Japanese articleless, ‘bare’ nouns, including proper names, in
Chapter 5 on the assumption that Japanese and other articleless languages have no covert
projection that is semantically equivalent to the English definite article. However, if the
DP analysis turns out to be universally applicable to all languages, including Japanese,
then the theory of English proper names in Chapter 4 would apply to Japanese.
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I want to first show that the DP analysis is sometimes necessary. Here is evidence
for why a determiner must be a head with its own projection.2 Observe the parallelism be-
tween interrogative clauses and interrogative arguments in Greek (Horrocks and Stavrou,
1987). In an echo question (4a) the wh-word remains in the argument position, whereas










‘What did he do?’
A movement of a wh-word is usually called A′ or non-argumental movement because the
landing site of the wh-word is not an argument position. It is usually assumed that a wh-
word moves to the specifier position of a CP (complementizer phrase) in a clause, so (4b)





Now consider (6a-d), where a wh-word moves around not in a whole clause, but

















If we can assume that the fronting of the wh-word tinos in (6b) is analogous to the wh-
movement in (5), then we expect that tinos moved into a specifier position in (6b). But
which specifier position is available for the movement? If the definite article to in (6a)
were in the specifier position of the NP, then there would be no position for tinos to
move in. However, if we assume what is seen as an NP to vivlio (‘the book’) to be the
projection of a determiner, then the phrase could have a specifier position for tinos to










Is the fronting of tinos in (6b) really a movement into a specifier position? Consider
















‘You told me you read whose book?’ (Horrocks and Stavrou, 1987, 86)
b. Mu ipes [CP pos dhjavases [ tinos to vivlio tinos ] ] ?
c. [CP [ Tinos ] mu ipes [CP tinos pos dhjavases [ tinos to vivlio tinos ] ] ] ?
(8c) is the case where tinos is fronted all the way to the specifier of the matrix CP. It is
generally assumed that a long-distance wh-movement does not take place in a single step,
3The same point can be made by using the fronting of a focused element in Greek (Horrocks and Stavrou,
1987, 86).
51
but via multiple successive movements.4 It has been argued that the specifier of a lower
CP must serve as an escape hatch for A′-movement to a higher clause. That is why (8c)
includes multiple deleted instances of tinos within the embedded CP. We can assume that
the leftmost deleted tinos is the specifier of the lower CP. We also know that tinos does
not have to directly move to the lower spec CP position as in (8b). If the lowest movement
of tinos is part of the long-distance successive movements, then we can conclude that the
lowest movement also targets a specifier position.
There are many other arguments of this sort that motivate the view that traditional
NPs are headed by determiners when overt expressions such as articles are present. See
(Abney, 1987; Szabolcsi, 1994) for more evidence gleaned from various other languages.
Now I turn to a stronger claim that the DP analysis holds even when determiners
are not overtly present. In languages with articles, a limited class of expressions are
sometimes allowed to appear as arguments with no article or other preceding modifier,














‘I eat/am eating potatoes.’ (Longobardi, 1994, 613)
(10) a. John arrived.
b. Dinosaurs are extinct.
4See (Adger, 2003, Ch. 10) for a textbook account of cyclical movements.
52
One might wonder why we need to consider not only a complex phrase (e.g., the wine), but
also a ‘bare’ expression (e.g., wine) to be a projection of a determiner. In what follows
I present some reasons to believe that every argument in languages with articles has a
determiner projection.
In Italian and other Romance languages, the distribution of bare mass and plural
nouns is restricted in a peculiar way, which can be accounted for by the presence of a
determiner head. For example, Italian bare nouns are allowed in postverbal positions but





































































Giuseppe Longobardi (1994) claims that the contrast is due to a general constraint that
applies to any phonologically empty item such as a trace of movement and an unpro-
nounced head as in the case in hand. The constraint is called a ‘lexical government re-
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quirement’. For our purposes, suffice it to say that the requirement forces unpronounced
items to appear after the related verbs such as in object position. Otherwise the whole
unit that contains an unpronounced item would be deemed illicit. Given the DP analysis,
the bare nouns acqua (‘water’) and marocchini (‘Moroccans’) in (11a-c) and (12a-c) are
the projections of unpronounced determiner heads. Let us assume that there is an empty
determiner head ømass/pl in Italian that takes mass and plural terms as its complements.
Bare mass and plural nouns are thereby subject to the lexical government requirement,
which weeds out (11a) and (12a) as illicit constructions.
So far we have discussed why bare plural and mass terms can be seen as DPs. What
about proper names? In Italian a proper name such as Gianni may appear on its own with
no article in front. What makes us believe that it also has a determiner projection? The
following examples strongly suggest that not only mass and plural nouns, but also proper
names are projected by determiners. First observe, in Italian, any adjectives, possessive
or not, cannot appear before determiners (13a-b), whereas they may be used prenominally




















































Now consider (14b), where the lack of an article makes the sentence unacceptable, but
the mere lack of an article is not the only cause of the unacceptability because (14c) is
acceptable. Longobardi hypothesizes that the DP analysis is correct for all arguments of
sentences: every argument must be introduced by a determiner. Then he claims that the
name Gianni in (14c) obeys the requirement by moving into the determiner position. The





On the other hand, Mio Gianni in (14b) is not introduced by a determiner, which is why
it cannot be an argument of the sentence.
To corroborate this hypothesis, Longobardi also points out that the possessive ad-
jective mio in (14c) has no special phonetic status, unlike that of (14d), which has a
contrastive accent, as noted in capital letters. In fact a postnominal possessive usually
has a contrastive accent in Italian. This contrast suggests that mio in (14c) is not in the
canonical postnominal position, but in the prenominal position just as (14a). Thus, the
structure (15) is also motivated on an independent ground.
Here I introduced the DP analysis and illustrated how it plays the roles in the anal-
yses of the nominal domain. I also presented some evidence that shows even bare nouns
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have determiner projections in Italian. The discussion thus far, of course, falls short of
proving that English proper names also must be headed by determiners.
One motivation for the wider application of the DP analysis is that determiner heads
and their properties provide a disciplined explanation for the attested cross-linguistic dis-
tributional variations of proper names among languages with and without articles. The
next subsection proposes an overall picture of the syntax of proper names across lan-
guages, which essentially relies on the DP analysis.
3.2.2 Proper names
I claim that there is at least one semantic rule that is inherently available to all human
language users. Let us call it the ‘definiteness’ rule, which can be seen as an instruction
to identify a single object under some conditions. The definiteness rule provides the basis
for the semantics of proper names, definite descriptions, and bare mass and plural terms.
I will explore the semantic details of the definiteness rule and its variants in Chapter 4 and
5.
I speculate that the definiteness rule is a linguistic analog of a basic constant in
human cognition. It might have its roots in pointing capacity (Diessel, 2006; Tomasello,
2008), which creates a triadic relation between the pointer, the pointee, and the device
for pointing (e.g., an index finger, lips, etc). I see no reason to deny that the device for
pointing can be linguistic. The direction of an index finger is a hint to identify the intended
pointee. The presuppositional content of a demonstrative, for example, also provides hints
to identify an object.
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The definiteness rule is a semantic constant available to any language. Different
languages employ it in different ways. Japanese never lexicalizes it as an article, overtly
or covertly. There is no instance in which a proper or common noun is preceded by an
article. Children do not have to figure out which silent word corresponds to the definite-
ness rule because there is no such silent word. Competent Japanese speakers simply apply
the definiteness rule whenever necessary. The singular and bound uses of proper names
in Japanese are constituted by proper nouns (and optionally their qualitative modifiers),
without any additional structure, as in (16a-b). The referential force of a proper name











Some languages lexicalize the definiteness operation as a definite article and apply
it indiscriminately to proper and common nouns. In such languages proper names are the
projections of definite articles that take proper nouns as their complements. For example,
Greek seems to belong to this group of languages. In a Greek sentence (17a) the proper
noun Topsy must be supported by a definite article, and hence the DP analysis is most


















aghapai . . .
In addition to a definite article, English, Italian, and many other languages contain
another determiner expression whose meaning is based on the definiteness operation. The
determiner expression is a variant of the definite article, which specifically selects a proper
name as its complement. I represent the determiner for proper names as ø  because it
contains no phonetic information, and thereby never gets pronounced. With respect to
English, the empty determiner ø  is different from the overt definite article the in two
important ways. First, its presuppositional content is uniqueness, not maximality that
the regular definite article needs to encode. If ø  has the same semantic profile as the
definite article, then Maries and the Maries would behave in the same way, which is not
the case. An articleless pluralized proper name behaves differently from a plural definite
description.5
Second, the empty determiner ø  somehow distinguishes itself from the definite
article so that it does not select a non-metalinguistic common noun as its complement.
The DP [ø  cat], which is pronounced as ‘Cat’, does not have the same meaning as the cat.
ø  should be combined only with a metalinguistic predicate. There are several different
ways to implement the distinction. One option is to do so semantically by adding a
presuppositional content to ø  that only takes a metalinguistic predicate as its argument.
5I will discuss the semantics of definite descriptions and mass and plural terms in Chapters 4 and 5
respectively. To preview and avoid the terminological confusion, I want to note that ø  encodes the type-
shifting function iota in Montague’s and Barbara Partee’s sense. The plural version of iota, analogous to
what Richard Sharvy (1980) calls ‘mu’, is encoded by the English definite article. A bare plural in argument
position is not headed by ø , but by another empty determiner that selects a mass or plural term.
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Formally speaking, we can stipulate that ø  is defined only over a certain set of functions
of type 〈e, t〉.
Alternatively we could add a syntactic feature to the set of our primitives, such
as [uPROPER], which is checked by [PROPER]. The empty determiner ø  has the feature
[uPROPER], and only proper names have [PROPER]. Thus, a non-metalinguistic noun such
as cow cannot be combined with ø . Competent speakers are capable of distinguishing
proper nouns from common nouns fairly easily. It is not implausible to assume that there
is such a feature as [PROPER].
At any rate, in English, Italian and similar languages, the singular and bound uses






loved . . .
The emerging picture can be summarized as follows. There are two different lan-
guage groups, those with articles (English, French, Greek, etc) and those without articles
(Japanese, Chinese, Hindi, etc). Proper nouns themselves have no variation across lan-
guages: they are all metalinguistic predicates that have the feature [N]. Languages with
articles lexicalize the definiteness operation as a definite article and as an empty definite
determiner ø , each of which has the feature [uN]. The singular and bound uses of proper
names in those languages with articles are analyzed as DPs, headed by a definite article
or ø . Languages without articles allow NPs to be arguments of sentences, without being
introduced by determiners. The singular and bound uses of names in articleless languages
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are constituted by proper nouns.6
Now I turn to more details of the proposal. There are some distributional differences
between English and Italian proper names. As noted earlier the adjective-proper noun
sequence is prohibited in Italian, but seems accepted in English, whereas a proper name
cannot be fronted in English unlike Italian. Compare (19a-b) and (20a-b).
(19) a. Old John came in.
b. *John old came in. (Longobardi, 1994, 628)
(20) a. *Mio Gianni ha finalmente telefonato.
b. Gianni Mio ha finalmente telefonato. (Longobardi, 1994, 623)
The DP analysis together with the Minimalist syntactic framework can account for this
distributional difference in terms of the strengths of features. Following the spirit of Lon-
gobardi (1994), I assume that the unchecked feature [uN] associated with the determiner
head ø  always requires N-to-D movement, so the N-raising of a proper noun invariably
occurs in the singular and bound uses of a proper name both in English and Italian. Ad-
ditionally, [uN] in Italian is a ‘strong’ feature, as opposed to the ‘weak’ [uN] in English,
which causes N-raising before Spell-Out. Since the moved unit prior to Spell-Out is rele-
vant to pronunciation, we can observe the movement as in (20b). On the other hand, since
N-raising takes place after Spell-Out in English, we do not hear its consequence.
6I am here suggesting that there is some fundamental syntactic difference between languages with ar-
ticles and those without articles. The former are DP languages, where the DP analysis universally holds,
and the latter are NP languages, where argumenthood does not require a determiner projection. For the
DP/NP parameter and other differences between DP languages and NP languages, see (Bošković, 2008,
2009, pear). See also (Takahashi, 2011) for the motivations to consider Japanese to be an NP language.
However, I should repeat that the lack of determiner projections is not necessary for my semantic theory of
proper names and other bare nominals. If nominal arguments in Japanese and other articleless languages
turn out to have a determiner layer, then I would simply apply my analysis of DP languages to languages
without articles.
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Anticipating the discussions in Chapter 5, I want to mention a few things about
plural and mass terms. Consider the following.
(21) Penguin arrived.
(21) sounds odd if the predicate penguin is construed to apply to individual penguins.
The grammatical subject penguin in (21) lacks any overt marking, which would have led
to a different interpretation—for example, if the predicate is pluralized (penguins), then
the sentence would probably mean that some penguins arrived. Since every argument
in English must be introduced by a determiner, the remained interpretive options are to
either interpret penguin with ø  or with another silent determiner that selects a mass or
plural noun. If the interpreter considers penguin to be introduced by ø , then the noun is
treated as a metalinguistic predicate to satisfy the presupposition of ø . As a result (21)
would mean that the person known as ‘Penguin’ arrived, which seems an option available
to all analogous examples. If the argument in (21) is understood as the projection of
the mass/plural determiner, then it would be interpreted as saying that some amount of
penguin meet arrived. See Chapter 5 for more discussions on bare plural and mass terms.
Now I list several independent facts that count in favor of the proposal.
Restrictive relative clauses
The direct evidence for the presuppositional content of ø  comes from the following ex-
amples, which mislead Longobardi to posit expletive articles.7
7Longobardi’s own semantic view of proper names seems to be a Millian analysis. Although an argu-
mental name must be introduced by a determiner head because of the general requirement of argumenthood,

































‘(Nice) Gianni that I used to know no longer exists’.
(Longobardi, 1994, 657)
An articleless proper name such as the one in (22b) cannot be modified by a restrictive
relative clause, unlike a proper name introduced by a definite article as in (22a). The
proposed content of ø  implies that it cannot take an extra heavy predicate as its argument
because it always requires the combined predicate to be metalinguistic, and we would not
be able to reanalyze a large predicate including a relative clause as something metalin-
guistic. If the modifier of a proper noun is simple enough, as in
(23) Old John arrived,
then we would be able to impose a metalinguistic interpretation on the adjective and to
take the predicate old John as singling out someone who can be appropriately called ‘old
John’. However, if the modifier is complex and clearly attributing a non-metalinguistic
property to an individual, we would have to use a regular definite article instead of ø  in
order to fulfill its presupposition. We have already seen the same pattern in English in
Chapter 2.
(24) a. The late Wittgenstein is more influential.
b. The joking Woody Allen is funny.
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The proper nouns in (24a-b) are headed by the definite article, not the empty determiner
ø . Thus, when the modifier of a name (an adjective or restrictive relative clause) is non-
metalinguistic, the overt definite article must be present.
Furthermore, as already noted in Chapter 1, Japanese proper names are freely mod-

















‘Gianni has changed. The kind Gianni that we used to know no longer exists.’
This makes a sharp contrast to the Italian and English cases above, which supports my
position that a Japanese name in argument position is not introduced by a null determiner.8
Catalan
The phonetic property of the determiner ø  (or the lack thereof) seems to be a mere acci-
dent. No problem would arise if it were pronounced in some way or other. Catalan seems
such a language, many varieties of which distinguish two types of definite articles: one of
them en is exclusively used with a personal proper noun as follows:
(26) a. el gos
the dog
b. en Pere
the Peter (Longobardi, 1994, 656)
8There is another possibility in which Japanese is a DP language and a covert determiner equivalent to
the definite article is always present in bare nominal arguments. So Japanese could be a covert version of
Modern Greek. I will present an argument against the view that Japanese has a covert determiner equivalent
to the definite article in Chapter 5.
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However, the article for personal names cannot be used with a plural personal name or a
restrictive relative clause as in (27a) and (28a). The ordinary definite article must be used
with a pluralized name and restrictive relative clause as in (27b) and (28b); we have seen
the same pattern in English and Italian above.
(27) a. *ens (dos) Peres
the (two) Peters
b. els (dos) Peres
the (two) Peters (Longobardi, 1994, 656)
(28) a. *En Joan que coneixia ja no existeix.
‘The Joan that I used to know no longer exists’.
b. El Joan que coneixia ja no existeix.
‘The Joan that I used to know no longer exists’. (Longobardi, 1994, 657)
The proposed analysis has a simple explanation for all these facts by encoding a
selective property in the article en as its presupposition. The article en is basically an overt
counterpart of ø , which needs to be combined with a personal metalinguistic predicate
with uniqueness.
Non-argumental uses
A DP projection is presumably selected by the related verb of a clause. A verb has the
feature [uD], which is the reason for the generalization that an argument is introduced by
a category D in languages with articles. If so, then a proper noun would not be dominated
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‘He disguised himself as old Cameresi’. (Longobardi, 1994, 626-7)
In vocative constructions both adjective initial and adjective final forms are permitted
(29a-b), unlike in argument positions as we observed above. The adjective initial form is
also permitted in a place where a mere predicate is expected to appear as in (30a).
Modified uses
By considering proper nouns belonging to the category N, we can costlessly explain the
modified uses of proper names, repeated below.
(31) a. Every Tyler I know studied in Princeton.
b. A Tyler joined the club today.
c. George Wallace is a Napoleon.
d. The Tyler who joined the club today studied in Princeton.
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e. Some Tylers are smart; some are not.
f. There are two Tylers in the department.
g. I know every Tyler in the department.
h. That Tyler is different from this one. (a-g, after Burge, 1973)
Quantifiers, number words, articles, and demonstratives can be seen as either determiners
or functional expressions that have the feature [uN]; they can be combined with any NP
whether it is constituted by a proper or common noun.
Noun-incorporation
Likewise, the proposal explains why names pattern with common nouns in allowing noun-
incorporation whereas genuine referential expressions such as demonstratives do not:
(32) a. Stalin-hater, Reagan-bating
b. I’m going tree-chopping; He’s a dog-lover.
c. *I’m going that tree chopping; *I was it-chopping (Higginbotham, 1988)
The facts naturally follow from the thesis that proper nouns are predicative expressions
belonging to the category N.
3.3 The Metalinguistic Theory of Names
I have discussed the structural aspect of the predicate thesis about proper names. Now
I like to turn to its semantic aspect. Burge (1973) proposes that a proper name itself
is a predicate in its own right, not a singular referring expression. The name Tyler is
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true of any object just in case the object is a Tyler (Burge, 1973, 435). I will argue that
Burge’s view is essentially correct, whatever semantic framework one adopts, and further
elaborate his view by specifying what we should mean by ‘being a Tyler’.
I will defend the ‘metalinguistic’ or ‘quotation’ theory of proper names as the anal-
ysis of the lexical meaning of a proper noun. To the first approximation, the lexical
meaning of a proper noun is the property of standing in a naming relation to the sound
type specified by the phonological properties of the noun. The metalinguistic theory has
been developed and defended in various places.9 However, many authors dismiss the
metalinguistic theory based on either Kripke’s brief objections to a metalinguistic quan-
tificational descriptivism, or on the problems that are not stemmed from the metalinguistic
theory. After presenting the metalinguistic theory, I will examine the criticisms expressed
by Kripke and others.
3.3.1 The theory
For simplicity’s sake, I assume for now that our semantic theory for English is an exten-
sional truth theory, within which Burge laid out his predicate thesis of proper names. But
the metalinguistic theory of names can be employed in any semantic framework insofar
as a semantic theory can handle common nouns.
The lexical meaning of the proper noun Tyler can be described as follows:
(33) For any object x, Tyler is true of x if and only if x bears /tajler/
Following Ora Matushansky (2008), I use phonetic symbols to express a phonological
9See (Katz, 1994, 2001; Bach, 2002; Matushansky, 2008). Russell also suggests that such a metalin-
guistic property, e.g, ‘being called ‘Romulus”, might be the only description the speakers usually associate
with a name (Russell, 1918, 77–92).
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string or sound type (e.g. ‘/tajler/’, ‘/ælis/’). I also use ‘bearing’ to stand for the naming
relation one can stand in to a certain sound type.
A few remarks are in order. By focusing on a spoken language, I ignore the potential
issues surrounding orthography. Do Cate and Kate have the same name? Are ‘Cate’ and
‘Kate’ one name or two? I am not sure if we have any coherent set of facts with respect
to speakers’ judgments that are theoretically tractable.
No such problem arises for the sound of a linguistic token. Of course, each token
or occurrence of a word has distinct acoustic properties. But competent speakers have
no difficulty in judging if one occurrence of a word shares the same sound with another
occurrence of a word. ‘Alfred’ and ‘Alfred’ have the same sound. So do ‘has’ and ‘has’.
The bearing relation is a man-made relation in which one or more objects stand in
to a certain sound type—one of many man-made properties and relations we can exploit
to construct the meanings of natural language expressions. As is clear from (33), the noun
Tyler is a predicate applicable to one or more objects, semantically on a par with other
nouns, not a singular referring expression.
A common misconception about the metalinguistic theory is to regard it as claiming
a name to be synonymous with a different construction such as ‘being called NAME’ and
‘being named NAME’. The complex construction being called ‘Tyler’ is only roughly
coextensive with Tyler. Perhaps Tyler in question is never called by his name. In a
different circumstance, Tyler might go by ‘Tyler’ for a random reason, without having
been named ‘Tyler’. There are a number of phrases that paraphrase the predicate Tyler,
but none of them is really coextensive with the proper noun. The noun dog is not perfectly
synonymous with any complex predicate such as being a four-legged domestic mammal,
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having hairs, usually carnivorous ... etc. The bearing relation is sui generis, and referred
to as a primitive notion in our metalanguage, just as ‘... is a dog’ is a primitive notion
in our metalanguage. That does not mean that the bearing relation is an irreducible,
fundamental notion in our scientific theory. At a different level of explanation, we can
investigate the bearing relation. Animal sciences study what underlies something being
a dog, but semantics does not. Similarly, semantics does not specify the necessary and
sufficient conditions for something to bear a certain name.10
Another misconception is that the metalinguistic theory has to treat proper names
as ‘token-reflexives’ in Hans Reichenbach’s sense (1947, § 50). One might consider (33)
to imply that the meaning of a proper name must be specified in terms of the name itself.
This misconception might have fostered the idea that the metalinguistic theory is circular.
It is clear from (33), however, that the lexical meaning of a proper noun has no reference
to an occurrence of a word. The right hand side of (33) contains a reference to a sound
type, not a use of a name itself.
The first half of this chapter discusses the syntactic differences between proper and
other nouns. Once we set aside the minor distributional differences, it is hard to find any
structural difference in the meanings of proper and common nouns. The lexical meaning
described in (33) is no more complex than that for accountant:
(34) For any object x, accountant is true of x if and only if x is an accountant
Understanding under what conditions one would count as an accountant is as equally easy
or difficult as understanding under what conditions one would count as bearing the sound
10Matushansky (2008) falls into this trap and claims that a proper noun expresses a different relational
property depending on a context (e.g., ‘being called such-and-such’, ‘being nicknamed so-and-so’, etc).
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/tajler/. A single introduction of one’s name or her occupation might give us enough
justification to use either one of the nouns to describe the individual. At the same time
the extensions of both nouns can be vague if we consider complex contexts of use.
Although the detailed investigation of the bearing relation itself must be conducted
in the fields of sociology or anthropology, we now grasp some aspects of the relation
because philosophers have spent a good amount of time in discussing its nature by think-
ing of the relation to be the key to understanding the notion of reference and, perhaps
ultimately, Brentano’s problem.
A widely used method to create a bearing relation is baptism or ostensive naming
ceremony (Kripke, 1980). People declare that a baby is named ‘Tyler’. Most actual Tylers
today seem to have gone through such naming ceremonies in some way or other. The
relation between an infant and the sound /tajler/ can be perpetuated through a number
of linguistic activities. Tylers today can be referred to with a use of the noun Tyler in
a sentential clause because speakers are aware of the established relation, which makes
Tyler to be true of them.
Another method of establishing a bearing relation between one or more objects and
a sound type is a descriptive naming ceremony. For example, one could leave a will
dictating that her first grandchild be named ‘Tyler’ (let us say that the person has three
daughters, and none of them is yet to conceive a baby). Once the first child was born, we
have enough reason to use something that has the sound /tajler/ to call the child.
It is sometimes said that there must exist a ‘causal-historical chain’ between an os-
tensive or descriptive naming ceremony and each use of a proper name. The proposed
lexical meaning suggests that the alleged causal-historical chain is not necessary for de-
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termining whether a given proper noun is true of a certain object. As long as the speaker
recognizes a bearing relation between an object and a sound, the speaker would use the
sound to refer to the object that she wants to talk about. The natural language meaning
(33) does not require for any sort of causal history to be present.
An alleged causal chain is not necessary for a speaker to recognize a bearing re-
lation. I do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for a bearing relation, but
such a relation seems possible as long as the members of a speech community collectively
construct it via conventional acts, whatever the conventions turn out to be. An ostensive
naming event and a series of successive uses form just one possible conventional way
to establish the association between an object and a sound type. There could be many
others, which perhaps involve no causal-historical chain between an expression and an
individual.11
For example, the Akan language, one of the major languages spoken in Ghana,
includes personal proper nouns that can be used purely descriptively with no preceding
naming event (Agyekum, 2006). A ‘day name’ is given to everyone according to the day
of a week in which the individual was born. Crucially, even a foreign visitor is not spared
from this naming convention, so the reader also has an Akan day name regardless of her
personal connection to the west African country. For example, if you are a male who was
born on Friday, then your Akan name is ‘Kofi’—just as Kofi Annan.12
The Akan example suggests that a bearing relation is constructed based on highly
complex yet contingent social facts. I consider it to be analogous to other man-made
11Of course, any bearing relation is based on complex socio-anthropological facts. Causal and historical
facts cannot be separated from any man-made relation. In that sense the meaning of a proper noun is
‘causally and historically’ fixed.
12Naho Orita informed me about these Akan facts (p.c.).
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properties and relations, for which we have vocabulary, such as accountant and married.
Proper nouns are not essentially different from such predicates.
3.3.2 Criticisms
Chapter 4 and 5 will explain how speakers of different languages use proper names to
refer to particular objects. Here I want to discuss the criticisms of the metalinguistic
theory, and why they are baseless.
Kripke
In Naming and Necessity Kripke criticizes a metalinguistic form of quantificational de-
scriptivism, not the metalinguistic theory as a theory of the lexical meaning of a proper
noun, so the reader should expect that his critiques would not apply to the analysis of
proper names that I am developing because my analysis is not a variant of quantificational
descriptivism as I sketched in Chapter 1. However, it is worth looking at his critiques to
remove any misconception of the metalinguistic theory.
Kripke raises two objections to William Kneale’s metalinguistic form of descrip-
tivism, according to which the descriptive content of a proper name is the property of
being called with the very name, not any cluster of the properties associated with the ref-
erent of the name. For example, the proper name Socrates can be seen as synonymous
with the description the individual called ‘Socrates’.13
The first objection is that Kneale’s descriptivism is circular. Kripke states a reason-
able condition to which any theory of reference needs to be subject.
13This is perhaps equivalent to Russell’s 1918 analysis of proper names.
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(C) For any successful theory [of reference], the account must not be circular. The
properties which are used in the votes must not themselves involve the notion of
reference in a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.
(Kripke, 1980, 68)
Kripke claims that Kneale’s metalinguistic descriptivism violates the condition of non-
circularity (C) because the description the individual called ‘Socrates’ is not informative
enough for us to tell what the referent of the name Socrates is. We would not be able to
know to whom the speaker is referring by calling the individual ‘Socrates’. To identify
the referent of the name, we would need to appeal to speaker’s reference or its ilk, so
Kneale’s descriptivism involves the notion of reference in an ineliminable way.
I am not sure how good this circularity objection is. Whether the objection is suc-
cessful, however, it is clear that Kripke is accusing Kneale’s analysis of failing to provide
a theory of reference. That is, he is targeting Kneale’s theory of reference, not the met-
alinguistic theory of proper nouns as the theory of their lexical meaning. No objection
has been raised against the metalinguistic treatment of the lexical meaning of a proper
noun. I will blame the referentiality of the singular use of a proper name on a seman-
tic operation, whose modes of appearance might differ across languages. Proper nouns
themselves have nothing to do with a theory of reference, or they are no more relevant to
the notion of reference than other nouns such as dog and car. By saying this car or the
dog, speakers can refer to particular objects. Likewise, speakers use proper nouns to refer
to particular objects. Kripke’s noncircularity objection is irrelevant to the metalinguistic
theory of proper nouns presented above.
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The second objection Kripke raises against Kneale’s descriptivism is that the anal-
ysis is too general in its applicability. Kripke rightly points out that a metalinguistic
content can be found in any expression, which is not surprising at all given most words
are pronounceable. He claims that a metalinguistic analysis could apply to many other
expressions besides proper names. For example, Kripke claims that the meaning of the
term horse could also be analyzed as ‘the things called ‘horses”. If the metalinguistic
theory is applicable to all natural language expressions or, at least, to all nouns, then it
would not be the right analysis of the meaning of a proper noun.
However, it is easy to see why the metalinguistic theory fails to apply to common
nouns, at least in the form specified above. Suppose that English speakers’ semantic
knowledge about horse could be metalinguistically described as follows:
(35) For any object x, horse is true of x if and only if x bears /‘hȯrs/
Under the supposition that (35) is correct, I could be a horse without ceasing to be a
human because I could have been named by the sound /‘hȯrs/. In other words, in some
circumstances, I would not have to be a horse for the predicate horse to apply to me.
However, that is not possible. For me to be a horse, I would have to cease to be a human
(even if we put aside the question whether ‘I’ could really be a horse at all). That is, while
I have to be a horse for the predicate horse to apply to me, having a bearing relation to
/‘hȯrs/ is not sufficient for me to be a horse. Therefore, (35) is not the correct analysis
of the lexical meaning of horse. Even if Kripke’s second objection undermines Kneale’s
descriptivism, it does not undermine the metalinguistic theory of names presented above.
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Begriffsschrift
Many authors rely on Kripke’s objections discussed above when they dismiss the metalin-
guistic theory of names. Some also mention in passing that the metalinguistic theory of
proper names is inadequate because it is equivalent to Frege’s discarded view on names
in his Begriffsschrift.14
No critic has yet fully developed and discussed this line of objection, and it is diffi-
cult to accurately assess its implications. All authors who mention the objection seem to
be assuming that the metalinguistic theory of names is a metalinguistic variation of quan-
tificational descriptivism. According Russell’s or Kneale’s metalinguistic descriptivism,
the true identity statement
(36) Cicero is identical to Tully.
asserts that there exists one object that is uniquely called ‘Cicero’, which is also iden-
tical to an object that is uniquely called ‘Tully’. Arguably this content of the statement
resembles Frege’s view on the identity relation in Begriffsschrift, according to which ‘=’
expresses the relation between signs of objects. The content is not very informative for
those who have no idea about who or what ‘Cicero’ or ‘Tully’ is. By taking (36) to be
true, all one would know is that there is at most one object to which the two signs ‘Cicero’
and ‘Tully’ apply, which falls short of the cognitive value of (36).
Russell’s or Kneale’s metalinguistic descriptivism is not adequate because the de-
scriptive contents they associate with proper names are too coarse-grained to provide the
cognitive values of some of their uses. This is, however, hardly a criticism, if we consider
14See (Soames, 2002, 41-2); Section 6 “Two Special Description Theories and Some Non-Millian, Non-
Descriptive Alternatives” in (Braun, 2006); (Richard, 2006, 706-7, n.3) and (Cumming, 2008, n.22).
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their analyses to be the analyses of natural language. Their metalinguistic contents might
be too coarse-grained for the adequate individuation of the thought of language users; but
they could be adequate as an analysis of what is linguistically conveyed. Furthermore,
Millianism and variabilism, of course, do not associate with proper names the senses that
are fine-grained enough to account for the cognitive value of utterances—they associate
none. The cognitive value is explained at a different level than at a theory of natural lan-
guage meaning. It is not clear to me why Russell and Kneale should not adopt a similar
strategy.
At any rate Burge’s, Elbourne’s, and my analyses of proper names are not quantifi-
cational. We all take proper names to be complex singular referring expressions. Identity
statements are identifying two objects as one, not concerned with two signs or symbols.
Therefore, the objection in question is not warranted. We will discuss both individual and
theoretical identity statements later in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. But one thing worth
emphasizing here is that the metalinguistic theory of proper names is not the theory of the
singular use of a proper name. In a true identity statement, such as (36), the subject name
is not just an occurrence of a proper noun. A proper noun in (36) is situated in a particular
position in the overall clause. The semantics of complex noun phrases in general explains
the relation between such a formal feature of a proper name and its interpretation. The
metalinguistic theory of names only explains the predicative contents of names.
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3.4 Summary
In this chapter I have first proposed a syntactic analysis of proper names based on the
DP analysis of sentential arguments. In English and English-like languages the singular
and bound uses of proper names are complex nominal expressions headed by either a
definite article or a silent determiner that is semantically similar to the definite article.
As for Japanese, proper names in argument positions are identified as NPs, not having
an isomorphic structure to English. We have already seen some preliminary evidence for
treating Japanese proper names differently than English and Italian (restrictive relative
clauses). We will also see an independent argument against the view that Japanese bare
NPs have a semantically significant silent projection in Chapter 5.
I have second presented and defended the metalinguistic theory of names as an
analysis of the lexical meaning of a proper noun. I have argued that the theory is coherent
and the common objections are based on the misconceptions of the theory.
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Chapter 4
The Semantics of Definite Descriptions and Proper Names
The last chapter discussed the syntax of proper names and their lexical meaning. I have
argued that the singular and bound uses of proper names in English are complex phrases
constituted by one or more predicative proper nouns and a determiner head. I have also de-
fended the metalinguistic view of names as an analysis of the lexical meaning of a proper
noun. The current chapter presents a situation semantic analysis of definite descriptions,
which also applies to both singular and bound uses of proper names in English, building
on the syntactic and lexical proposals in the previous chapter. The core of my seman-
tic analysis of proper names resides in implicit domain restriction via situations and the
treatment of definite descriptions as singular referring expressions.
4.1 Situation Semantics
4.1.1 Introduction
This section introduces a situation semantic framework, on the basis of which I will de-
velop an analysis of proper names and other bare nominals. I construe situation semantics
as a modification of possible world semantics. Possible world semantics is a fruitful the-
oretical framework that allows us to formalize not only our modal talk and reasoning
(Kripke, 1963), but also other aspects of natural language such as propositional attitude
reports (Hintikka, 1969). Within possible world semantics, our metalanguage includes
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reference to possible worlds. For example, the truth of necessarily φ might be understood
as the truths of φ in all ‘possible worlds’ that are in some sense accessible from the ‘actual
world’. I will have a few words about how to think of these uses of possible and actual
worlds in our theory of natural language (Section 4.1.3).
Now, assuming that the possible worlds apparatus is useful in natural language
semantics, we might also want to have our theory refer to ‘situations’, which indeed
subsume all possible and actual worlds. There are two motivations for this move. The
first motivation is that the introduction of situations achieves greater empirical coverage
with a relatively small modification to possible world semantics. The scope of possible
application of situation semantics is very broad, including not only more fine-grained
analyses of attitude reports and counterfactual conditionals, but also other independent
phenomena such as tense, aspect, nominalizations, etc (Kratzer, 2007). I will mostly focus
on the use of situations in the explanation of nominal phrase interpretations. I suggest
that the move is justified by connecting and explaining a wide range of heterogeneous
phenomena in a disciplined way.1
The second motivation for introducing situation semantics is that possible world
semantics might be inherently deficient, not merely that its scope is limited. For example,
sets of possible worlds might not be good candidates for the objects of propositional atti-
tudes. We might want to introduce fine-grained situations to define or model the objects
of our psychological attitudes.2 Thus, we have some independent reasons to develop a
1I am also, perhaps naı̈vely, open to the possibility that we will be able to argue that a situation semantic
framework provides a deeper explanation by connecting it to our cognition and perception of events, scenes,
and situations.
2A better treatment of propositional attitude reports is also one reason for why some theorists have
developed an alternative semantic framework based on structured Russellian propositions (Soames, 1985,




The particular semantic system that I will present here is an intensional version of Irene
Heim and Angelika Kratzer’s (1998) semantic system, which follows the tradition of
Montague (1974). Within this kind of semantic system, both object-language expressions
and entities in a domain are categorized in terms of types.
(1) Semantic types
a. e is a type.
b. t is a type.
c. s is a type.
d. If α and β are types, then 〈α, β〉 is a type.
e. Nothing else is a type.
For example, singular-referring expressions are of type 〈e〉, and the referents of such
expressions are also of type 〈e〉. Let us use the label ‘intensional’ for any expression
or entity of a type that includes ‘s’. Some intensional expressions are associated with
intensional entities as their semantic values.
This also suggests that situation semantics is not the only semantic framework available when we theorize a
variety of linguistic phenomena including the uses of proper names. I will not discuss the structured entities
view of propositions in this dissertation. However, such an alternative view of propositions might as well
be compatible with the bare bone of my analysis of proper names.
3For another example of the limit of possible world semantics, Kratzer questions the notion of compara-
tive overall similarity of possible worlds. Kratzer (1989) argues that both Stalnaker’s and Lewis’s analyses
of counterfactual conditionals based on comparative overall similarity among worlds cannot account for
some intuitively clear cases of counterfactual conditional such as the following.
(a) If a different animal had escaped instead, it might have been a gazelle. (Kratzer, 1989, 626)
Based on the examples like (a), Kratzer motivates a situation-based semantic theory.
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Correlatively, a domain of discourse includes possible and actual situations. I adopt
and modify some of the definitions from (Kratzer, 1989).
(2) Semantic domains
a. S is the set of all situations.
b. De is the set of all particulars.
c. Dt = {F, T}
d. The entire domain D includes all the entities above: D = S ∪De ∪Dt
e. If α and β are semantic types, then D〈α,β〉 is the set of all functions from Dα
to Dβ .
A few terminological remarks are in order. I assume the ‘entity’ to be the most general
category of things. By ‘particular’ I understand a non-repeatable and non-multirealizable
entity, such as the philosopher Leibniz and a chocolate éclair. My kindle is a particular,
which is distinct from your kindle. I interchangeably use ‘particular’ and ‘individual’.
I construe situations to be particulars, so the sets S and De are not mutually exclusive.
But distinguishing S from the rest of entities is important for a situation semantics. We
can now think of a domain specific metalanguage variables s, s′, s′′, ..., which range over
situations.4
Now I want to introduce some of the characteristics of situations. The domain
is partially ordered by a mereological ‘part-of’ relation ‘v’, which satisfies at least the
following conditions:
(3) Mereological ordering
4Perhaps things like ‘tropes’ are also particulars, but do not fall under the category of individuals. But
such a notion plays no role in my analysis of bare nominals.
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a. For any s ∈ S, there is a unique s′ ∈ S such that s v s′ and for any s′′ ∈ S,
if s′ v s′′, then s′′ = s′
That is, for any situation, there is a largest situation that contains it.
b. For any x ∈ De, there is a unique s′ ∈ S such that x v s′ and for any s′′ ∈ S,
if s′ v s′′, then s′′ = s′
That is, for any object, there is a largest situation that contains it.
(4) There is a subset of S (call it ‘W ’) such that it contains all and only maximal
elements with respect to v. I will use w,w′, w′′, ... to refer to an element in W .
W is the set of worlds.
In intuitive terms, a world contains a number of things that exist in that world. Situations
and entities are parts of worlds, and they stand in a mereological relation to one another.
There seems to be no difficulty in considering a world to be a big individual. I can talk
about the world just as I can talk about my brother. Likewise, if a situation is part of a
world, then there is no difficulty in considering a situation to be an individual as well—
the right arm of my brother is an individual that we can talk about. A world is a large
individual, consisting of numerous other individuals, such as galaxies, planets, apples,
and electrons. We also ordinarily think that such individuals as planets inhabit in the
world. I take the part-whole relation to be primitive, which also paraphrases our ordinary
locution of ‘α is in β’. A galaxy is in a world by being part of it. A situation is also in
a world by being part of it. A galaxy consists of many other individuals (such as stars);
So does a situation. In light of this, a world is the biggest situation. A situation is a world
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just in case there is no other situation of which it is a part.5
The semantic system assigns semantic values to simple and complex natural lan-
guage expressions, some of which are intensional. Crucially, I appeal to the following
intensional semantic values:
(5) Intensional semantic values
a. The semantic value of an utterance of a sentence with respect to variable
assignment g is a function of type 〈s, t〉. Call such a function a ‘proposition’.
b. The semantic value of a one-place predicate is a function of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉.
By (5a) propositions are now defined as (partial) functions from situations to truth-values.
For example, the proposition expressed by a use of (6) assigns Truth to any situation in
which Obama is a Democrat, and False to every other situation.
(6) Obama is a Democrat.
This kind of function defined over situations plays the roles that a proposition is supposed
to play, at least, as equally well as the kind of function defined over possible worlds. The
set of situations includes the set of possible worlds as defined by (3-4). The proposition
for (6) gives Truth to any worlds where Obama is a Democrat, and False to those where
Obama is not.
(5b) represents the basic semantic type of predication. We might want to see a
predicate as something that yields a truth-value when its arguments are saturated. Now,
given that a sentential semantic value is a proposition with intensional type 〈s, t〉, the type
frame 〈e, . . . 〈s, t〉〉 seems appropriate to provide the semantic value of a given predicate
5David Lewis (1983) also suggests that we take a world to be an individual. I am not, however, singling
out his position as the correct interpretation of ‘possible worlds’. See Section 4.1.3.
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because it would yield a proposition when its arguments are saturated. For example, the
semantic value of dog can be expressed as follows:
(7) J dog Kg = λx . λs . x is a dog in s
An interpretation function J . . . K is relativized to a variable assignment g. And the ‘is in’
locution should be understood in the mereological sense expressed by ‘v’, which partially
orders the entities in the domain. For example, if Snoopy is in the domain, then Snoopy’s
tail is part of Snoopy (i.e., ‘Snoopy’s tail v Snoopy’). Similarly, the spatiotemporal
region that coincides with Snoopy’s house includes Snoopy as its part when Snoopy is in
the house.
This particular form of situation semantics explores the idea that the object-language
itself quantifies over intensional entities such as worlds, times, and situations, not merely
its semantics is relativized to those entities (Cresswell, 1990; Ogihara, 1996; Percus,
2000; King, 2003; Kusumoto, 2005; Keshet, 2008; Schwarz, 2009; Elbourne, tion). That
is why D includes S, whose elements can be denoted by some constituents of utterances.
I posit object-language expressions that denote situations, which contribute to the inter-
pretations of utterances in a variety of ways. I will call them ‘situation pronouns’ and let
them appear as ‘s1’, ‘s2’, . . . within the object-language. As I noted italicized ‘s’, ‘s′’,
. . . are metalanguage variables over situations. Predicative expressions, i.e., nouns, verbs,
and adjectives sometimes coexist with an object-language situation pronoun si, and its
semantic contribution to the semantic value of the entire utterance shifts depending on the
semantic value of the coexisting situation pronoun.
Here is the list of the composition rules:
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(8) Composition rules
a. Functional Application (FA)
If α is a branching node and β and γ are its daughters, then, for any assign-
ment g, α is in the domain of J Kg if both β and γ are, and JβKg is a function
whose domain contains JγKg. In that case, JαKg = JβKg(JγKg).
b. Intensional Predicate Modification (IPM)
If α is a branching node and β and γ are its daughters, then, for any assign-
ment g, α is in the domain of J Kg if both β and γ are, and JβKg and JγKg are
of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉. In that case, JαKg = λx . λs.JβKg(x)(s) & JγKg(x)(s).6
c. Pronouns and Traces (PT)
If α is a pronoun or a trace, g is a variable assignment, and i is in the domain
of g, then JαiKg = g(i).
For ease of presentation, let g(ζi) stand for what g assigns to any expression
ζ with index i.
d. Predicate Abstraction (PA)
For any index i and assignment g, Jλi αKg = λx . JαKg
[x/i]
(x)
e. Situation Binding (SB)
For any index i and assignment g, Js-PROi αKg = λs . JαKg
[s/i]
(s)
A few comments are in order. A variable assignment g is a partial function from
variable symbols to anything in De ∪ S. There are several classes of object-language
expressions that receive their semantic values from assignments. That is, the Pronouns
6By ‘JβKg(x)(s) ∧ JγKg(x)(s)’ I mean both JβKg and JγKg return T with respect to x and s.
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and Traces rule is put to use to determine the semantic values of some expressions. I
assume that a context of utterance somehow determines a set of assignments that respect
the speaker’s intention about which entity is referred to with which expression in the
utterance. The interpreter uses one of such assignments to determine the semantic value
of the whole utterance.
I am also simplifying g to a little extent here. First, since the focus of the current
work excludes indexical expressions such as here and I, I ignore how they get their se-
mantic values. As discussed by Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995, Section 6.5),
the current system can accommodate indexicals by making several designated positions
in a sequence of entities, which is determined by an assignment function. We can say that
an instance of I always gets the first element of an assignment sequence as its value, and
that every sequence chosen by a context of utterance has the speaker of the utterance as
its first element.7 Second, a sequence also has designated positions for situations because
situation pronouns are domain specific, and cannot denote ordinary objects.
The Predicate Abstraction rule is sometimes put to use to interpret a trace of an
evacuated quantificational phrase. Suppose that α contains a trace ti that is co-indexed
with the node λi, which is assumed to be created as a result of the movement of a quan-
tificational phrase. JαKgx/i indicates the semantic value of α with respect to the modified
assignment, which is the same as g except that it assigns x to g(i).
The Situation Binding rule is a variant of Predicate Abstraction. Situation Binding
allows a proposition to have a situation variable that ranges over situations. The basic
7I will introduce an indexical expression to account for the bound or co-varying interpretations of nom-
inal expressions later in Section 4.2.3.
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idea can be expressed as follows. A situation pronoun in a sentence is either bound or
free. On the one hand, a bound pronoun results in a quantificationally bound situation
variable in the logical form of the sentence containing that pronoun. Situation Binding is
an interpretive procedure that creates a situation variable from a bound situation pronoun.
On the other hand, a free pronoun results in a referring term in the logical form.
Following a suggestion made by Kai von Fintel and Heim (2011, Section 8.2.6), I
posit two different kinds of situation pronouns: s-PROi and si. The former s-PROi is anal-
ogous to PRO discussed by Heim and Kratzer (1998, Chapter 8), whose roles are (i) to fill
an argument of a predicate, (ii) evacuate to leave a trace with the index i behind, and (iii)
triggers Situation Binding. The latter si is analogous to an overt (im)personal pronoun,
whose value is determined by a variable assignment. Pronouns and Traces applies to si,
but not to s-PROi, which is analogous to λi for Predicate Abstraction.
Now we have both s-PROi and si. Which sort of situation pronoun appears where?
I stipulate that the VP of a sentential clause always takes a s-PROi to saturate its situation
argument slot. For example, the syntactic structure of Every student left includes two
situation pronouns, one of which is an occurrence of s-PRO. The occurrence of s-PRO











This stipulation has two roles. One is to prevent the semantic system from over-
generating unattested readings by constraining the distribution of the indices of situation
pronouns. Once we permit syntactically represented indices to appear multiple times in
a syntactic structure as in (9), we should be cautious about not allowing a series of in-
dices that leads to an impossible reading. Binding theory deals with this problem with
respect to overt pronouns. Orin Percus (2000) has extended the discussion concerning
the index distribution to covert cases, and proposed a general constraint that governs the
distribution of such indices. Ezra Keshet (2008, 2010) has also put forward a different
formulation of the general constraint based on economy considerations. The introduction
of s-PROi aims at achieving the essentially same results as the proposed constraints over
situation pronouns. Which particular formulation of the constraint we should adopt is an
orthogonal problem that I will not settle here. I adopt the current stipulation for s-PROi
because it makes a use of Situation Binding parallel with a use of Predicate Abstraction.
The other role of the stipulation is to account for the interaction between nominals
within a sentence. For example, if the situation pronoun in a DP is coindexed with an
instance of s-PRO, then it is turned into a variable over situations by Situation Binding.
It is then possible to bind the variable inside the DP. This procedure allows us to relate
two independent nominals and leads to the explanation of the bound interpretations of
complex nominals, including those of proper names. We will see the details of how this
mechanism works later (Section 4.2.3).
As an illustration of the presented semantic system, consider the following sim-
plified syntax and semantics of It is a dog. I ignore its tense, copula, and the indefinite
article. The pronoun bears some index on LF as in (10):
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(10) it12 (is a) dog.
a. J dog Kg = λx . λs . x is a dog in s (Lexical meaning)
b. J it12 Kg = g(it12) (PT)
c. J it12 dog Kg = λs . g(it12) is a dog in s (FA, a, b)
d. J [ s2 [ it12 dog ]] Kg = T iff g(it12) is a dog in g(s2) (PT, FA, c)
e. J s-PRO2 [ s2 [ it12 dog ]] Kg = λs . g(it12) is a dog in s (SB, d)
The utterance expresses, under assignment g, the set of the situations in which g(it12),
which stands for the contextual denotation of the pronoun, is a dog. In this example,
s-PROi and SB have no substantial role to play. They only vacuously saturate and then
abstract away a situation argument. But we will see more complex cases where they
perform the critical functions.
4.1.3 Ontological implications of possible and actual worlds/situations
Our semantic theory refers to possible and actual situations as theoretical primitives, and
no further reduction is provided within the semantic theory. The theoretical reference to
possible and actual situations is justified to the same extent as the reference to possible
and actual worlds is justified. Here I like to make a few remarks about the use of possible
and actual worlds in semantic theory.
First of all, a possible world/situation semantic framework seems compatible with
any philosophical view of possible worlds. And it matters not how we cash out the refer-
ence to possible worlds and the objects therein.
Let us see two major views about possible worlds to make sure that they are com-
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patible with the semantic system presented above. First, the system is compatible with
modal realism in Lewis’s (1986) sense. Kratzer and others who use a situation seman-
tic framework such as Elbourne suggest that their semantic theories ultimately rely on
Lewis’s counterpart theory. This suggestion, once fully developed, might lead to an en-
dorsement of a Lewisian multiverse theory of possible worlds because the counterpart
theory and Lewis’s modal realism seem to jointly work to provide a comprehensive pic-
ture of modality. On the multiverse understanding of possible worlds, the ‘actual world’
is the concrete world in which we live, and the other equally concrete worlds that happen
to miss us are ‘possible worlds’. ‘Actual situations’ are any situations that are parts of the
actual world. ‘Possible situations’ are parts of possible worlds. The knowledge or cog-
nitive scientific conception of semantic theory is fully compatible with such a genuinely
realistic view of possible worlds. Statements in semantic theory describe the stable men-
tal states of competent speakers. If the statements contain reference to concrete possible
worlds and individuals, then the speakers’ mental states are somehow related to concrete
possible worlds and individuals. Or competent speakers can be said to implicitly take for
granted the existence of the other worlds as well as the existence of the actual world.
Second, the introduced semantic system is compatible with any non-multiverse
account of possible worlds. For example, following the suggestion made by Stalnaker
(1976, 1986), we might consider a possible world to be a way the world might have been.
Ways the world might have been can be understood as the comprehensive properties of
the world, only one of which is instantiated. Possible worlds are uninstantiated properties
that reside in the actual world—a single reality. In the light of this, possible situations can
be understood as partial properties of the world that specify only some or other aspect of
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the world. On this interpretation of possible worlds, a situation semantics does not refer to
concrete possible worlds or individuals, but to some abstract aspects of realities. It could
have snowed here today is true, not because there is a concrete possible world in which it
is snowing here today, but because there is an uninstantiated property of the world such
that, if instantiated, then it were snowing here today. Any occurrence of ‘possible/actual
world’ and ‘possible/actual situation’ in our semantic theory is in principle paraphrasable
in accordance with the suggested understanding of possible situations.8
One might suspect, however, we cannot remain neutral on the interpretation of the
possible world locution when we start discussing one important aspect of our linguistic
activities, namely, our talk about things that do not exist. I will discuss the seemingly
non-referring definite descriptions and proper names in Section 4.6.
4.2 Situation Pronouns and the Interpretations Complex Nominals
It is natural to ask why we want to have the complicated system presented above. Why
do we want to crowd a tree with s’s and numerals? In this section I argue that our com-
pensation is large enough to cover any expense we bear. I take advantage of the presented
situation semantic system to account for a variety of interpretations we find in the uses of
complex nominals. First, I look at the phenomena traditionally called ‘domain restriction’
in the literature (4.2.1). Second, I look at the cases where the interpretations of nominal
8Considering Emmon Bach’s (1986) ‘natural language metaphysics’ does not appear to me very useful
at this point, although Kratzer (1989) advises the reader understand her use of counterparts in Bach’s sense.
The overall structure of our metalanguage tells us that we need the quantification over what we might call
‘worlds’, ‘times’, ‘situations’, ‘events’, or what have you. So competent speakers implicitly take for granted
the existence of what theorists might call ‘worlds’, ‘events’, etc in virtue of being competent speakers. But
our semantic theory does not tell us what they are.
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phrases are independent from the interpretations of the rest of clauses (4.2.2).
To preview what is to come, the unbound use of a situation pronoun explains why
the interpretations of some DPs can be independent from the interpretations of the embed-
ding main clauses. In other words, the situation mechanism of domain restriction explains
why some uses of DPs are rigid designators, which is one important aspect of the singular
use of a proper name. Another important aspect of the singular use of a proper name,
i.e., its nondescriptiveness will be explained by adopting a singular-referential analysis of
definite descriptions (Section 4.3)
4.2.1 Implicit domain restriction
What is intuitively said by an utterance generally changes depending on the context of
utterance. Nominal expressions also seem to be context-sensitive in a variety of cases.
Here is an example involving a quantificational DP (Stanley, 2002). Suppose Hannah
throws a small party with a moderate number of bottles of beer. Observing that one of her
guests is looking for an unopened beer, Hannah utters,
(11) Every bottle is empty,
through which she intends to communicate that every bottle in her house is empty, i.e.,
(12) [∀x : x is a bottle ∧ x is in Hannah’s house](x is empty)
The guest has no difficulty in understanding what she intends to communicate. If the
semantic value of (11) used in this context is equivalent to
(13) [∀x : x is a bottle](x is empty),
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then it is different from what Hannah communicates to the audience. She by no means
intends to make a false assertion that everything in existence that satisfies the predicate
bottle satisfies the predicate empty, which is the content of (13). How is the sentence (11)
used to communicate (12) rather than (13)? The semantic contribution of the quantifica-
tional phrase every bottle seems to be modified by adding a conjunct. Where does the
conjunct come from? What is the mechanism that partially contributes to what is intu-
itively said by the speaker? In another context of utterance, a speaker would employ (11)
to communicate radically different information. Hannah could have intended to convey
that every bottle in John’s apartment, not in her house, was empty. How does a context
influence what the speaker communicates through the use of (11)? The quantificational
phrase, every bottle, like many other nominal expressions, is context-sensitive.
Largely there are two approaches to the problem of domain restriction: indexical-
ism and contextualism.9 According to the indexicalist approach, the mandatory saturation
of some hypothesized variables determines the implicit domain. By contrast, the contex-
tualist approach hypothesizes an optional cognitive process that applies to the customary
content of an NP to create an altered content. In the current work, I adopt the indexicalist
approach to the problem of domain restriction.10
Both linguists and philosophers have developed indexicalist theories of domain re-
striction.1112 As an example, I introduce Jason Stanley’s theory of nominal restriction,
9The terminology of ‘indexicalism vs. contextualism’ stems from Recanati (2004, Ch.4).
10For a contextualist account of an on-the-fly content construction, see (Carston, 2002; Wilson and
Carston, 2007).
11See (von Fintel, 1994; Stanley and Szabó, 2000; Stanley, 2000, 2002b, 2005; Martı́, 2003; Giannaki-
dou, 2004; Etxeberria and Giannakidou, 2010).
12Jon Barwise and John Perry (1983) propose a situation-based approach to domain restriction. Their
proposal can also be seen as indexicalism because we can consider their resource situation parameters to be
variables of some sort. There are two major differences between their proposal and the situation semantic
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according to which every NP is associated with a complex unpronounced variable ‘f(i)’
whose interpretation contextually determines the set of salient objects.13 The domain re-
striction variables are object-language expressions that require saturation. An NP selects
a complex variable as its sister as is seen in the following LF:
(14) [ every [ bottle f(i) ]]
Both f and i receives their values from contexts of utterances. In the above scenario, the
semantic values of the variables f and i determine the set of the objects in Hannah’s house.
The contents of bottle and f(i) compositionally determine the appropriately restricted set
of bottles, i.e., what is within the restrictor of (12). Thus, according to the indexicalist
approach to implicit domain restriction, some object-language expressions are deictically
used to provide the restricted DP interpretations. Such deictic uses of object-language
expressions are analogous to deictic pronouns in that they are semantically treated as
unbound variables.
Covert object-language expressions for implicit domain restriction such as f(i) are
also similar to bound pronouns.
(15) Every senator thinks they should be president.
Just as the occurrence of they in (15) can be semantically understood as an individual
variable bound by a restricted quantifier, domain restriction expressions can be seen as
account that I will present later. Soames (1986) has critical discussions of Barwise and Perry’s treatment
of incomplete definite descriptions, which seems to me quite conclusive. However, my situation semantic
account is immune to Soames’s criticisms of Barwise and Perry’s. See (Soames, 1986, fn.17). One of the
major differences is captured by the following statement of Soames: ‘[t]he lesson here is that contextual
supplementation works at the level of constituents of sentences or utterances, rather than the level of the
sentences or utterances themselves. (342)’. The situation pronoun system clearly allows such a contextual
influence at the sub-sentential level. Also see (Elbourne, 2008, Section 2) for a related discussion.
13Indexicalist theorists are in disagreement about where exactly such a context-sensitive variable appears
as a constituent of a syntactic structure.
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bound variables. Consider the examples below:
(16) Everyone answered every question. (Stanley, 2002b, 368)
(17) In most of his classes, John failed three Frenchmen. (Stanley, 2002b, 368)
(18) Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam. (Heim, 1991)
We have seen Stanley’s proposal that every question in (16) is associated with a covert
expression that can be understood as an unbound variable denoting a contextually salient
set of objects. (16) indeed has a reading in which everyone answered all the questions that
are relevant in the context. (16) also has another reading, according to which each person
answered all the questions that were particularly prepared for that person. This reading
is theoretically expected if it is possible that a domain restriction pronoun is bound by
the preceding quantificational phrase. The semantic contribution of the lower DP every
question depends on the person picked out by the individual variable introduced by the
higher DP everyone. Stanley and also Luisa Martı́ (2003) argue that domain restriction
variables must be complex because of such bound or co-varying interpretations. Suppose
that the higher every-DP binds the variable i associated with the lower every-DP. Also
suppose that the value of f is a function from an individual to the questions that the
individual has. Then, for each of the people who answered the questions, the lower DP
every question would pick out the set of the questions that the very person has.
Likewise, on the most natural reading of (18), the predicate student in (18) is re-
lationally understood. That is, it should not be about all students even in the relevant
context, but about the students of the class selected by the preceding phrase one class.
This would be also expected if we assume student to be associated with f(x), where x
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co-varies with the value for the preceding one class. In other words, no student in (18)
signifies ‘none of the students of x (where x is a class)’. To corroborate this point, we can
think of a construction in which one class is not preceding student as in (19), which does
not have the same meaning as (18) above.
(19) No student passed the exam because only one class was so bad.
At this point one might rightly point out that the attested bound or co-varying in-
terpretations do not directly support the existence of syntactically represented indices. It
could be argued that an alternative pragmatic approach accounts for the same range of
data with fewer theoretical assumptions. In reply, the indexical theorist might search for
direct syntactic evidence, such as weak-cross over effects, as in (Chierchia, 1995, 225-7).
By adopting the indexicalist approach in this dissertation, I do not intend to settle this
debate once and for all. Rather my intention is to sharpen our understanding of the prob-
lem by examining what complexity an adequate account needs to contain within itself to
explain the observed readings.
In the section below (4.2.3) I will present a situation semantic account of domain
restriction proposed by Florian Schwarz (2009) with some modifications. On his account,
domain restriction variables are simple situation pronouns, which have no less expressive
power than the sketched theory of domain restriction based on complex variables. I will
discuss the unbound and bound uses of situation pronouns in turn.
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4.2.2 Independent interpretations of complex nominals
We have seen that the interpretations of nominal expressions are often contextually re-
stricted. They are sensitive to the contexts of utterance and also to the interpretations of
preceding complex nominals. It is furthermore important to realize that nominal expres-
sions are sometimes insensitive to the interpretations of the rest of the sentences in which
they appear. This point has been well discussed in connection with the temporal interpre-
tations of complex nominals (Enç, 1981; Musan, 1997, a.o.). For example, (20) would
be a straightforward contradiction if those fleeing individuals are incarcerated at the same
time.
(20) Many fugitives are now in jail. (Musan, 1997, 3)
(20) instead intuitively says that those who were once fugitives are in jail when the speaker
utters (20), which is not explicitly stated on the surface of the sentence. The sentence
contains a reference to the present moment, i.e., are now, but we somehow ignore the
cue in interpreting the complex nominal many fugitives, which seems to pick out the
individuals that were fugitives some time prior to the utterance time.
We can observe the same pattern fairly consistently across the uses of so-called
‘strong’ determiners, such as most and every (Musan, 1997, 58-9).14
(21) All rich men were obnoxious children. (Enç, 1981, 58)
(22) In the seventies, most professors were young. (after Musan 1997).
(23) Every fugitive is now in jail. (Enç, 1981, 65)
(24) John’s murderer is not yet a murderer. (Musan, 1997, 54)
14The distinction between the ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ determiners originates in (Milsark, 1974).
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(25) The murderer was a little boy when he lost his teddy bear. (Musan, 1997, 131)
All the above have a reading in which the subject nominal is interpreted independently
from the temporal interpretation of the main clause. For example, (22) has a reading in
which most of the professors today used to be young back in the seventies. The subject
most professors selects most present professors, not those who were professors in the
seventies. We can again disregard the explicit cues about the timing, i.e., were and in the
seventies when we interpret the nominal expression.
The independence of nominal interpretations is not peculiar to the temporal domain.
Complex nominals can be independently interpreted with respect to the modal domain as
well.
(26) Someone in this room could be outside. (after Keshet 2008)
(27) Every fugitive could be in jail.
By uttering (26) I am not claiming that it is possible that there is an individual who is
inside and outside of the room at the same time (i.e., ‘3∃x(Rx ∧ ¬Rx)’). The phrase
someone in this room is not counterfactually understood on the natural reading of (26).
(26) seems concerned with those who are actually in this room.
Philosophers refer to this characteristic of modal independence as ‘rigidity’ and
often discuss it in connection with proper names and definite descriptions.
(28) It was possible that Jones’s murderer ended up not killing Jones.
[While pointing at Smith; Smith is the murderer.]
(29) Smith could have not killed Jones.
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For example, although (28) is concerned with a counterfactual possibility, but the descrip-
tive content of the definite description is not evaluated with a counterfactual circumstance.
The description picks out the actual murderer of Jones. The semantic system with situ-
ation pronouns accounts for these independent interpretations of complex nominals with
respect to modal cases.15
4.2.3 Situation pronouns in use
Deictic situation pronouns
Now I want to discuss the cases where situation pronouns are unbound and receive their
interpretations via variable assignments. But, first, I like to note why we want to talk
about situations when we are concerned with implicit domain restriction and temporally
or modally independent interpretations of complex nominals. Every situation can be seen
as associated with a set of individuals because it contains individuals as its parts. Then we
can use a situation to represent a restricted discourse domain.16 Suppose that a complex
nominal is somehow associated with a particular situation. Then the complex nominal
can be interpreted against a certain discourse domain fixed by the situation. Since the
semantic system presented in Section 4.1 includes situation pronouns that denote situa-
tions, constituents of sentences are now able to encode enough information about shifting
15Since a situation is a spatiotemporal region, a situation semantics should be able to handle both tem-
poral and modal domains at the same time. I need to, however, leave the discussion on temporal aspects of
natural language for another occasion.
16Barwise and Perry (1983) propose that we use situations as circumstances of evaluation to realize this
idea. But their proposal would not work because a sentence may contain more than one context-sensitive
DP and has to be evaluated with respect to more than one restricted domain, as pointed out by Soames
(1986). What we need is a way to represent multiple discourse domains at the sub-sentential level. Situation
pronouns do exactly that job.
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domains.
How exactly is a nominal associated with a situation? There exist a number of syn-
tactic and semantic possibilities that compositionally realize this basic idea. For concrete-
ness, following Schwarz (2009, 2011), I assume that some determiners take a situation
pronoun as one of its arguments.17 For example, consider the universal quantificational
determiner every, which can be seen as mainly specifying the relation between two pred-
icates or properties (Barwise and Cooper, 1981). The sentence every cat is cute basically
means that everything that counts as a cat also counts as a cute thing. We introduce a
situation into this basic meaning by creating a situation argument slot that the quantifier
every needs to saturate. More specifically, the lexical meaning of every can be expressed
as follows:
(30) J every Kg = λF〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs′ . [∀x : F (x)(s)][∃s′′ : s′′ v s′](G(x)(s′′))
So Every F is G is true with respect to a situation s′ just in case everything that is F in a
certain situation s is G in s′.18









A determiner head is first combined with a nominal predicate, and then with a situation
17To the first approximation, the strong determiners, such as most and every can have the interpretations
independent from the matrix clauses (Musan, 1997). The strong determiners are the good candidates for a
class of expressions that have a situation argument slot.
18The existential quantification introduced by the entry will play a role in accounting for the bound
readings of DPs. This is also one of the major differences I have from Schwarz’s particular system. See
Section 4.2.3.
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pronoun si. I do not know what syntactic status a situation pronoun should be assigned. I
leave the question open by noting two different possibilities as in (31).
The syntactic and semantic detail of this treatment of determiners is not identical to
Schwarz’s or Elbourne’s (in preparation) treatment of determiners. (31) is in agreement
with Schwarz’s and Elbourne’s proposals in that a situation pronoun is not a sister of
an NP.19 However, they treat situation pronouns as sisters of determiners, being the first
argument of a determiner as in (32). By contrast, I treat a situation pronoun as a specifier






Semantically, as in (30), I let a determiner be saturated with a property first to form an
individual concept of some sort, which creates a standard restricted quantifier once com-
bined with a situation. Overall, the determiner every is just an expression that creates a
restricted quantifier. There is no difference as a whole between my account and Schwarz’s
or Elbourne’s.
The reason for making my account slightly divert from Schwarz’s and Elbourne’s is
my working hypothesis that Japanese descriptions have no determiner head, which I will
discuss and defend in Chapter 5. Without a determiner head, a situation pronoun would
lose its landing site if (32) is the correct configuration. English definite descriptions (e.g.,
the ebook) have the same structure as (32), where the definite article is the determiner
head. Japanese descriptions, however, have no overt article. In Chapter 3 I have already
19Elbourne (2008) also presents an argument for treating a situation pronoun as a complement of a
determiner head rather than a sister of NP based on the lack of bound reading in Saxon genitives. But he
also reports that the data are very subtle, and that there is a counterexample to his argument (p.c.).
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discussed the possibility that Japanese is indeed an NP language where an argument lacks
a determiner layer. If there is no covert determiner projection inside a description in
Japanese, then the structure like (32) is not applicable to Japanese. Thus, I assume (31)
to be on the right track so that the existence of a determiner is not a prerequisite for a
situation pronoun. I will argue that the semantic value of a Japanese NP gets type-shifted
to be equivalent to an English definite description. A situation pronoun can be combined
with an English the-NP or type-shifted Japanese NP. (31) permits a parallel analysis of
Japanese descriptions as we will see in Chapter 5.
Consider the sentence (11) Every bottle is empty again, upon which the interpreter
can impose a structure like (33a) below. Following Elbourne (2008) and Schwarz (2009),
I assume that a situation pronoun is not a sister of a predicate. A predicate is of type
〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, and cannot be combined with a situation argument immediately. (33a) contains
two explicit situation pronouns: one is an occurrence of s-PRO and the other is an ordinary
situation pronoun. I am assuming that verbs project a structure that includes an instance of
s-PRO.20 In (33a) s3 is created by the movement of s-PRO3. On the other hand, s8 is there
because the quantifier requires a situation argument, not merely because the meaning of
the noun bottle is intensional.
(33) a. s-PRO3 [ s3 [ [s8[ every bottle ]] is empty ]]
b. J (33a) Ka = λs . [∀x :bottle(x)(a(s8))][∃s′ : s′ v s](empty(x)(s′))
(See Appendix A for derivation)
The situation pronoun s8 is unbound and receives its interpretation via an assignment
20This is the same assumption made by Percus (2000, 186).
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function. Recall that a predicate such as bottle is not merely true of bottles, but true of bot-
tles that is in some or other situation. The constituent of the logical form ‘bottle(x)(a(s8))’
in (33b) must be understood in that sense. The LF (33a) expresses under an assignment,
say a, the proposition that gives Truth to any situation in which every bottle in a(s8) is
empty. So the utterance is not about any bottle. It is about the bottles in a particular
situation denoted by a(s8).
It is worth mentioning that the phrase every bottle in this context can be seen as a
rigid designator because its semantic value does not shift even if it is embedded inside
a modal expression. The value to the coexisting situation pronoun, i.e., a(s8), remains
the same whether the DP is inside or outside a modal expression, assuming that a modal
expression does not change a variable assignment. When we evaluate the proposition
with respect a counterfactual circumstance, the bottles to be considered are the bottles in
a(s8), i.e., the actual bottles in the relevant situation, not any other bottle which happens
to be in a counterfactual circumstance. Generally speaking, a use of a complex nominal
phrase becomes a rigid designator when the coexisting situation pronoun is unbound.
Consequently, the proposed treatment of DPs addresses the independent interpreta-
tions of complex nominals presented in Section 4.2.2. Consider again (26) Someone in
this room could be outside, whose underlying structure is roughly stated as (34a):
(34) a. possibly [ s7 [ someone in this room ]] is outside
b. There is a possible situation such that some x in this room in g(s7) is outside
in that situation
The complex nominal coexists with a situation pronoun, and the modal expression ap-
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pears as a sentential operator. (34b) represents the proposition expressed by (34a) with
respect to g. The value g(s7) is invariant across any circumstances of evaluation. Thus,
assuming that the speaker is talking about the actual world, the phrase [ s7 [ someone in
this room ]] rigidly quantifies over those who are actually in the demonstrated room. We
will see further discussions on the interactions between situation pronouns and modal or
propositional attitude expressions later in Section 4.3.2.
The introduction of situation pronouns inside nominal phrases solves at least two
problems at once. First, it accounts for implicit domain restriction, i.e., the context-
dependent semantic contributions of DPs. Second, it accounts for why some uses of nom-
inal phrases, including proper names, definite descriptions, and quantificational phrases,
are rigid designators.21
Bound situation pronouns
I have discussed the cases where situation pronouns are not bound and contextually denote
particular situations. Situation pronouns can also be bound in a variety of ways. Here I
will focus on the cases where the values of the coexisting situation pronouns interact with
the interpretations of other DPs, which results in the bound or co-varying interpretations
of DPs. But how could a DP bind a situation pronoun existing in another structurally
lower DP? On Stanley’s complex-variable account, i is a variable over individuals. So i
21Of course, I do not pretend that this is the end of our theorization of deictic pronouns. We need to
supplement a theory of pronoun resolution, which is anyway required to account for our understanding
of (im)personal pronouns. The pronoun it12 above could denote a variety of objects depending on the
contexts of utterance. Its denotation could be an object that the speaker is momentarily perceiving. It could
be an object perceived in past, an imaginary object, or an object mentioned earlier in conversation. The
situation pronoun s8 could also denote various situations. One of the possible denotations is Hannah’s
house in the scenario, which would compositionally yield the appropriate interpretation. I will provide
some metalinguistic considerations on the choice of the denoted situation later in 4.3.2.
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can be bound by a regular quantifier over individuals such as every, which is how f(i)
and the individual variable x in the higher DP co-shift their values. How could a situation
pronoun s and an individual variable x shift their values together?
Kratzer (2004) suggests that the semantics of quantifiers includes quantification
over situations and ‘matching functions’ discussed by Susan Rothstein (1995). Rothstein
(1995) introduces the notion of matching function to account for adverbial quantifica-
tional phrases such as those within the brackets below:
(35) a. [Every time the bell rings], Mary opens the door.
b. I met a friend [every time I went to the bakery].
For (35a) to be true, Mary must open the door each time when the bell rings. There must
be at least as many door-opening events as there are bell-ringing events. That means (35a)
cannot be represented as follows:
(36) ∀e(e is a bell-ringing→ ∃e′(e′ is Mary’s opening of the door))
For (36) allows the possibility that a single opening of the door by Mary corresponds to
all bell-ringing events.
It is interesting to compare (35a) with (37), whose logical form might be very sim-
ilar to (36).
(37) Every girl saw a film
The difference between (35a-b) and (37) is that (37) has two readings, not one; (37) has
both collective and distributive readings, whereas (35a-b) only permits something corre-
sponding to the distributive reading. A use of (37) is compatible with the circumstance in
which all the girls together watched a single film, while (35a) excludes such a collective
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reading where one and the same door-opening is paired with multiple bell-ringings. Sim-
ilarly, the natural reading of (35b) is that I met a friend at least as many times as I went to
the bakery. Thus, the logical form of (35a-b) must be different from (36).
What piece of information is missing from (36)? There has to be some way to
encode distributivity on the logical form. Rothstein proposes that we can relate two events
by introducing a certain adverbial phrase. The adverbial phrase is a predicate of the lower
event variable, but it is also bound by the higher universal quantifier. The logical form of
(35a) includes what she calls a ‘matching function’ M :
(38) ∀e(e is a bell-ringing→ ∃e′((e′ is Mary’s opening of the door) ∧M(e′) = e))
whereM maps one event onto another, never onto more than one event. In other words,M
relates each bell-ringing event to a particular response Mary made to that event. For (38)
to be true, Mary must open the door at least once for each bell-ringing event. Otherwise,
M would have to map one and the same door-opening event onto multiple bell-ringing
events. Suppose that there are two bell-ringings ea and eb, but there is only one Mary’s
opening of the door e1. If the instantiation of (38) with respect to ea and e1 is true, then
that of (38) with respect to eb and e1 would be false. For now it holds that M(e1) = ea,
and thereby, M(e1) 6= eb.
According to Rothstein, a matching function M is the semantic value of an empty
preposition, which takes the preposed adverbial phrase as its complement as below.
(39) [every time the bell rings]1 Mary opens the door [ PREP [ t1 ] ]
Here PREP is a syntactic item whose meaning is M , the exact content of which is de-
termined by a context. The distributive reading based on a matching function is thereby
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mandatory for any sentence that contains an adverbial quantifier analogous to (35a-b).
Rothstein compositionally derives the logical form (38) based on the structure (39). What
is important for us is that a matching function can relate a quantificational phrase to an
independent clause without the former directly binding the latter.
Now let us turn to the co-varying interpretations of complex nominals, by which I
mean the sentences like those below.
(16) Everyone answered every question.
(40) Every farmer who bought a donkey vaccinated the donkey.
A matching function might be helpful here because it connects two independent phrases
without requiring one phrase to directly bind the other. Perhaps a matching function can
connect the subject and object of the sentences. The sentences (16) and (40), however,
contain no preposition nor adverbial quantifier, which we saw in Rothstein’s examples.
Where could a matching function come from?
Kratzer’s answer is to integrate a matching function into the lexical entry for every
so that a matching function is introduced at the logical form.22 But I think that is prob-
lematic. (40) is analogous to (37), which permits both collective and distributive readings
unlike Rothstein’s examples. As we discussed the parallel cases in Section 4.2.3, (40) has
a reading in which all farmers vaccinated one and the same contextually salient donkey.
22We can easily realize Kratzer’s suggestion within our system.
(a) J every Kg = λF〈e,〈s,t〉〉.λs.λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉.λs′ . [∀x : F (x)(s)][∃s′′ : s′′ v s′∧M(s′′) = x](G(x)(s′′))
Based on this lexical entry for every, we can derive the bound interpretation of (16) as follows:
(b) [s4 Every one ] answered [ s1 every question ]
(c) λs . [∀x :person(x)(g(s4))][∃s′ : s′ v s ∧M(s′) = x][∀y :question(y)(s′)](answered(x)(y)(s′))
This is also more or less what is presented in (Schwarz, 2009).
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We are not forced to have the other distributive reading in which each farmer is paired
with a different donkey. Thus, we do not always have to have a constituent in a logical
form that represents a matching function M . However, as long as we encode a match-
ing function into the lexical meaning of a quantifier, a matching function is mandatorily
present at the logical form. Schwarz suggests that a matching function in every is some-
times semantically vacuous. This is certainly possible because a context of utterance can
change the meaning of every accordingly. Then, however, we would be claiming that ev-
ery itself is a context-sensitive indexical expression, which seems to be counterintuitive.
Fortunately, there is an alternative way to represent a matching function in the sentences
like (16) and (40).
I want to suggest that the bound readings of (16) and (40) are triggered by some
independent constituent of a sentence, which is similar to each.
(41) Everyone each/M answered every question.
(42) Every farmer who bought a donkey each/M vaccinated the donkey.
Syntactically, I assume that M is combined with a VP or somewhere below the







Semantically, I propose the following lexical semantic value for M, which treats it as an
indexical:
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(44) a. J M Kg = λx . λs .M(s) = x
where M is a value that g assigns to M.23
b. M(s) = x is true if and only if s contains the participants of an instance of a
contextually determined kind of event, where x is one of its participants, and
s excludes the participants of other instances of the same kind of event.
The expression M is a predicate of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, which is adjoined to the main VP.
What M does is modify the main predicate by imposing some restriction on it. The clause
M(s) = x holds just in case the situation s fulfills a certain condition with respect to the
individual x. I suggest that the condition is understood in terms of events as in (44b).
Let us consider (16), which I assume to be implicitly understood as having the
structure (41). Given the lexical entry (44), we can obtain something like the following
as the proposition expressed by (16) with respect to g.
(45) λs . [∀x : person(x)(g(s1))][∃s′ : s′ v s][∀y : question(y)(s′)](answered(x)(y)(s′)∧
M(s′) = x)
See Appendix A for the derivational details. But the result can be easily conceived be-
cause M is merely another predicate of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, which can be added to the content
of the main VP via Intensional Predicate Modification. What would be the role of its
semantic value, i.e., M given a certain context? Suppose that there are three philosophy
graduate students who took a qualifying exam at the same time. Each was assigned three
different questions with no overlap, which focus on her areas of specialization. All three
answered all three assigned questions. In this contextM(s′) = x holds just in case s′ only
23So, strictly speaking, M should be written as g(M). But I use M for simplicity.
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includes the participants of an event of taking a qualifying exam at that time, where x is
its one of participants. s′ includes the participants of the event other than x, i.e., the exam
x answered. Crucially, for each student x, there is a distinct situation to which M applies.
One student’s taking her qualifying exam is a distinct event from another student’s doing
so. Thus, the questions on the exam in s′ are the questions assigned to x. (45) is the
proposition that, for each person in a certain situation s1, there is a situation such that it
contains the questions assigned to that person, and the person answered every question in
it.
I have presented an indexicalist theory of domain restriction within the situation
semantic framework. The matching indexical M connects two separate DPs at the level
of semantic composition. Appendix B shows further evidence in favor of the existence
of situation pronouns. However, I am open to the possibility that a contextualist theory
will be developed to account for all the data discussed in this chapter and Appendix B
without multiplying object-language pronouns. For example, Recanati (2004) uses situa-
tion indices not as object-language pronouns, but as variables at some level of linguistic
representation. At any rate I have at least shown what kind of complexity an analysis of
complex nominals should include within itself to account for the co-varying interpreta-
tions.
We have already accumulated a great deal of resources to account for the uses of
proper names by discussing the general properties of situation pronouns and their roles in
complex nominal interpretations. We can now account for implicit domain restriction or
the context-dependence of complex nominals, which in turn explains why the speaker can
talk about this particular Mary, not any other Mary in the world. We can also account for
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how a complex nominal can be used as a rigid designator, which is, of course, one aspect
of the singular use of a proper name. The introduction of matching functions is heading
toward the exposition of the bound use of a proper name. I will come to these issues later
in this chapter. Before doing so, I like to discuss what a definite description is because I
basically identify the singular and bound uses of a proper name with a use of a definite
description.
4.3 The Presuppositional Analysis of Definite Descriptions
I adopt a so-called Fregean-Strawsonian analysis of definite descriptions, which treats
descriptions as singular referring expressions with presuppositional content. I initially
introduce it extensionally with no reference to situations. I will then incorporate it into
the presented situation system to accommodate a broader range of cases.
4.3.1 The analysis without situations
(46) is a theoretical statement of what competent English speakers know about definite
descriptions. Recall that the singular and bound use of a proper name in English is a DP
headed by an unpronounced determiner ø . I claim that the lexical meanings for the and
ø  are nearly identical.
(46) J the/ø  F Kg =

 x(Fx) if there is one and only one F ;
undefined otherwise
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‘ x(Fx)’ is a metalanguage logical name for the element of a singleton set determined
by F .24 In other words, ‘ x(Fx)’ is a complete symbol in our metalanguage that de-
notes an object that F is true of, not an abbreviation of something else, as opposed to
Russell’s (1905) theory of descriptions, in which there is no constituent in the logical
form of an utterance that corresponds to a definite description. According to Russell,
a(n) (in)definite description is an incomplete term for which only a contextual definition
is appropriate. Subsequent authors who endorse a Russellian quantificational analysis of
definite descriptions attribute some constituent in logical form to descriptions. Stephen
Neale (1990), for example, claims that a definite description corresponds to a restricted
quantifier of the form ‘[the x: F (x)]’. In model theoretic terms, a Russellian analysis can
also assign to a definite description a property of properties (a characteristic function of
sets) as its semantic value. In this light whether a definite description is analyzed as a
complete symbol or not is probably not an important question. The essential difference
between a Fregean-Strawsonian analysis of definite descriptions and a Russellian analy-
sis is that the former attributes no scope to a definite description because it is a referring
expression, whereas the latter attributes scopal properties to descriptions. I will discuss
the alleged scopal properties of definite descriptions in Section 4.4.25
24So the term ‘F ’ is loosely used as both object-language and metalanguage expressions. I permit such
a loose locution when no confusion arises.
25There is another difference between Fregean-Strawsonian and Russellian analyses if we adopt a struc-
tured propositions view of the semantic values of utterances. The former analysis considers the semantic
value of an utterance that contains a definite description ‘object-dependent’ because the existence of the
sentential semantic value depends on the existence of the object that is the semantic value of the description
(Neale, 1990, 15-19). By contrast, the latter treats the semantic value of the utterance as being ‘object-
independent’ or ‘general’ because the definite description signifies a relation between two properties or
sets; whether there is a unique object that have the properties has nothing to do with the existence of the
sentential semantic value.
Although many philosophical concerns arise at this juncture, I mentioned this difference just to put it
aside. Russell’s own epistemological constraints might provide substantial advantages to Russellian anal-
yses because one might think that we can barely get acquainted with an object-dependent proposition, and
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According to (46), the semantic value of a description the F is nothing but a par-
ticular individual. As long as ‘ x(Fx)’ felicitously appears, there is a single F . Thus, it
holds that, for any F and G,
(47) G( x(Fx))→ ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y = x)).
It also entails that, whenever it is that G( x(Fx)), (48) holds, which is equivalent to
Russell’s theory of descriptions, when the description takes scope over any element in G
or it has its ‘primary occurrence’ in Russell’s terms.
(48) ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y = x) ∧Gx)
The semantic value of an utterance that contains a definite description corresponds to
‘Gx’ while the rest of (48) corresponds to the presupposition of the definite description.
Thus a definite description is analyzed not as a quantificational phrase, but as a singular
referring phrase.26
Furthermore, I suggest that the lexical knowledge of the definite article the pertain-
ing to the meaning is captured by the following:
that the former analysis requires always requires object-dependent propositions. However, first of all, it is
not very clear what range of objects we have direct acquaintance with, if we do not agree with the later
Russell’s sense-datum position. We might as well have direct acquaintance with many different objects that
we refer to with definite descriptions.
Second, the distinction between object-dependent and independent propositions seems to disappear if we
define a proposition in terms of sets of truth-supporting circumstances.
Last, as I will argue below, the standard Russellian analysis is descriptively inadequate. It will be shown
that a Russellian quantificational analysis generates many more readings than actually observed; the analy-
sis fails as an empirical theory that account for some aspect of human natural language, whether it is con-
ceptually desirable. Epistemological considerations might be useful when we have more than one equally
adequate theory of descriptions.
26I consider a quantificational phrase to be able to take different scopes with respect to other opera-
tors. A quantificational determiner, such as every, is an expression that specifies the relations between two
predicates. See Elbourne (2005, 99, fn.7) for a related point. Assuming that Russell analyzes definite de-
scriptions as quantificational phrases, the rule (46) is non-Russellian. Heim (1991) precisely formulates and
defends the rule (46). Also see Heim and Kratzer (1998); Elbourne (2005); Glanzberg (2009) for further
arguments in favor of the analysis.
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(49) J the Kg = λF〈e,t〉 : ∃!x(F (x)) .  x(Fx) (Extensional version)
The semantic value of the is the function defined only over singleton sets or their charac-
teristic functions. That is, the can be felicitously combined only with a predicate that is
true of just one thing. Thus, the semantics of the definite article is structurally different
from that of quantifiers presented earlier.
This kind of lexical meaning leads to a presupposition, which I understand in Stal-
nakerian terms in the sense that presuppositions are properties of the speakers’ mental
states (Stalnaker, 1972, 1973, 1975). As far as a speaker is performing a speech act, the
speaker assumes her utterance to have a semantic value. However, if any constituent of
the utterance is valueless, then the whole would also be valueless. Therefore, a speaker of
an utterance also assumes the facts that allow every constituent of the utterance to have a
semantic value. As for a use of the definite article the, the user must be assuming that the
combined predicate determines a singleton set. Otherwise, the value of the description
would be undefined, making the user’s utterance valueless.27
From the interpreter’s viewpoint, semantic knowledge like (52) allows an inter-
preter to assume that a speaker is in a certain mental state, namely, that the speaker makes
a certain assumption about the world. A sincere use of the F allows an interpreter to
attribute a belief equivalent to the Russell’s uniqueness condition to the speaker, which is
the presupposition of the description. Interpreting others is, to say the very least, a com-
plex task, sometimes involving linguistic capacities, and sometimes not. There are several
different ways to attribute mental states to others. For example, people have an innate abil-
27I used the term ‘Stalnakerian’ because I will not appeal to the notion of intersubjective ‘common
ground’ and that of the subtler propositional attitude ‘accepting’ unlike Stalnaker himself. Such notions
would play no explanatory role at least for the cases we discuss in this chapter.
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ity to attribute various beliefs and desires to others (‘theory of mind’ or ‘mindreading’),
whatever systems underly the ability.28 Facial expression recognition is another capacity
that enables us to attribute an emotional state to others, whose underpinnings are probably
not rule-based. It is not surprising if we find a use of some lexical entry leads to a belief
attribution.29
Notice that the presuppositional content of a definite description should be ulti-
mately analyzed as context-sensitive because the interpretations of complex nominals
shift relative to situations, and, since the definite article is a strong determiner, we can
expect it to have a situation argument slot. It is hard for the interpreter to tell if the se-
mantic value is really undefined even when the interpreter knows that there is no F or
are more than one F in the non-relativized sense of the term F . On many occasions,
the attribution of the belief that there is a unique F in the relevant situation can keep the
speaker more or less rational because the interpreter can change her own belief or choose
an appropriate situation.
Suppose I said to you the following:
(50) I need to pick up my brother at the airport.
Following (46), you would attribute to me the belief that there is one and only one brother
in some relevant situation, and based on the derivation of the meaning, you would think
28See (Nichols and Stich, 2003; Goldman, 2006; Carruthers, 2011) for competing pictures of mental state
attributions.
29Strawson’s (1950) remarks can be seen as being on the same line, ‘if a man seriously uttered the
sentence [“The king of France is wise”], his uttering it would in some sense be evidence that he believed
that there was a king of France’ (298, emphasis in original); ‘one of the conventional functions of the definite
article is to act as a signal that a unique reference is being made — a signal, not a disguised assertion’ (299,
emphasis in original).
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that I said that I need to pick up that person.30 The rule (46) always applies to recognized
tokens of the F . Whether you in fact know if I have a brother does not affect the applica-
tion of such basic semantic knowledge. If you do not know that I have a brother, and take
me to be a credible person, then you would entertain a situation that contains exactly one
brother of mine. This is how the phenomenon sometimes called ‘accommodation’ takes
place. There is no need to develop new linguistic notions and rules other than the basic
understanding of our psychology.
I have been relying on an intuitive understanding of the notion of relevant situation.
Now I want to incorporate our situation semantic system into the presented analysis of
definite descriptions.
4.3.2 The analysis with situations
Let us now revise the presented analysis of definite descriptions within our situation se-
mantic framework. The following rules for definite descriptions are basically parallel to
our treatment of quantificational determiners in Section 4.2.3. A situation pronoun is the
second argument of a definite article.
(51) J si the F Kg =

 x(F (x)(g(si))) if there is one and only one F in g(si);
undefined otherwise
(52) J the Kg = λF〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs : ∃!x(F (x)(s)) .  x(F (x)(s)) (Situation version)
30It is also worth noting that there is no implication that I have only one brother here. The uniqueness








For example, (53) denotes with respect to g the unique rainy day in a certain situation
denoted by g(s7). Below I will apply this situation-based analysis to a variety of uses
of definite descriptions, which have been extensively discussed in the philosophical and
linguistic literature. I will again separate and discuss the two distinct uses of situation
pronouns in turn, i.e., the unbound and bound uses.
Deictic situation pronouns
I have assumed that a variable assignment provides what is necessary for deriving what
the speaker intends to say. For example, the semantic value of a personal pronoun, say,
g(him11) is an element on some sequence determined by a variable assignment. But
nothing within the semantic system guarantees that the element is the very individual that
the utterer intends to talk about with the expression him. I have simply assumed that the
variable assignment is suitably restricted so that it reflects the speaker’s intention. One
might wonder how exactly the interpreter figures out which variable assignment is suitable
for understanding the utterance. This is, however, a metasemantic question concerning
pronoun resolution, which I cannot address in the current work. I take the same attitude
toward situation pronouns. The presented semantic system can adequately specify the
semantic contributions of deictic situation pronouns. How exactly agents resolve the
pronominal ambiguities is not a question solvable within a first-order semantic theory.
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However, one might have been alarmed by my casual remarks such as ‘g(s6) denotes
Hannah’s house’, ‘g(s1) is the relevant situation’, and so forth. We are now dealing with
unpronounced pronouns unlike the familiar she and it. Can we treat situation and personal
pronouns in a completely parallel fashion? What is the ‘relevant situation’ denoted by a
certain situation pronoun? How is it possible that a speaker ‘uses’ an unpronounced
expression?
To address these questions, I propose that we conform to the following general-
ization in interpreting a use of a definite description that contains an unbound situation
variable.
(S) Metasemantic generalization
For any situation pronoun ‘s’ that remains unbound in a definite description, as-
sign ‘s’ the situation intended by the speaker.
I make a plausible assumption that we normally have some insight into the speaker’s
knowledge and attention state. The interpreter is able to infer the intended referent or
what the speaker has in mind based on behavioral cues and other information. Our use
of a personal pronoun illustrates what I mean by ‘the intended referent’. When a speaker
uses, for example, he to talk about a particular individual, the speaker is in some cog-
nitive state that is somehow related to the referent of the use of he. There are several
different cognitive states that the speaker can be in. The referent might be in the focus of
attention by being the object of visual perception. Or perhaps the referent is temporarily
represented in short term memory; the speaker has activated or recalled a percept of the
referent. The speaker is not always in such an epistemically privileged position. The
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speaker might just entertain or imagine the referent of a use of he.
(54) Someone hit my car. He might still be around. I parked here only for a few
minutes.
Although the speaker of (54) has never met the referent of the pronoun he, the speaker
is capable of thinking about the referent with the use of he. The speaker represents the
referent of a use of a linguistic sign in some way or other. By ‘the intended referent’, I
mean an individual that is represented by the speaker in some such way.
A situation is an individual that can be intended by the speaker, just as a male person
is an individual that can be intended by the speaker. Of course, being a referent of an overt
expression such as he must be different from being a referent of a covert expression, which
is something, by definition, no speaker is aware of. A speaker does not literally ‘intend’
anything by ‘using’ something she is never aware of.
I suggest that the intended situation is the background of what the speaker intends
to talk about. By means of an example I can best illustrate the point. Consider a typical
‘incomplete definite description’ in Strawson’s (1950) sense, which might also be seen as
an instance of ‘the referential use’, following the terminology by Keith Donnellan (1966).
Suppose that (55) is used to comment on a particular table right in front of the speaker.
(55) [ s5 the table ] is covered with books.
In this scenario the table is in focus of the speaker’s current attention or very re-
cently presented to the speaker’s consciousness. I want to point out that, in addition, the
speaker represents where the table is situated as the background of her visual perception.
This is a familiar Kantian theme. Objects never appear in isolation with settings. It seems
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to me highly unlikely that, when I see a table in a room, I see absolutely nothing else but
a table; at least at the sub-personal level, I must be seeing the floor on which the table is
located, the further corner of the room, etc. The situation represented as the background
of the speaker’s referent is the intended situation.
Following (S), the semantic value of s5 in this particular context of utterance is
the situation that includes the table. The background situation would not be too large to
include some other table. If the background scene included more than one table, then
the speaker would be representing more than one table, which would make her use of the
description infelicitous. The description [ s5 the table ] denotes a unique individual that is
in the background situation and counts as a table. There is only one such thing. Thus, the
description in this context successfully denotes a unique object. The background situation
provides enough restriction to uniquely identify a table.31
31Neale (1990, 95) characterizes various attempts to solve the problem of incomplete descriptions with
two labels: the explicit and implicit approaches to the problem of incompleteness. According to the explicit
approach, incomplete descriptions are ‘elliptical’, and contexts provide the ‘complete’ descriptive contents,
i.e., uniquely designating descriptions. According to the implicit approach, the context of utterance delimits
the domain of quantification so that the descriptive content as it is uniquely designates an object.
I think that these two labels are too broad and underspecified to carve the logical space. But they help us
locate where my own analysis stands in comparison with other analyses. My analysis has the characteristics
of both explicit and implicit approaches. Neale might call it the ‘hybrid approach’ (Neale, 2005). On
my own account, an incomplete description is elliptical in two senses. First, I claim that every definite
description syntactically includes an unpronounced contextual variable, ranging over situations. Such a
variable is elliptical in the sense that it never appears on the surface syntax. Variables demand interpretation
just as much as other expressions. So, second, the descriptive content is also elliptical in the sense that it
always means more than its surface form suggests.
My analysis also takes the implicit approach. What the contextual variable in a description does is restrict
the domain of quantification. The important point for us is that such restriction is the only role that a variable
can play. Though it may be unbound or bound, a variable always denotes a situation in which a restricted
number of things exist. My analysis is not susceptible to the problems with the earlier attempts on the
explicit approach, such as (Sellars, 1954), because it never introduces an arbitrary reference-fixing content.
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More cases
I want to discuss more cases that involve (S), where a definite description denotes a unique
object. Strawson’s example we have just seen is a case where the speaker’s referent is
present in front of the speaker.
A second case I want to consider is also an incomplete description, but does not
involve an immediate object and a scene that the speaker is currently perceiving. The
speaker’s referent is not perceptually available to the interpreter. To supplement the nom-
inal predicate, the interpreter uses what the the speaker recalls or entertains as the relevant
background scene.
(56) I’ve just been to a wedding. [ s2 The bride ] wore blue. (Lyons, 1999, 7)
(57) [Nurse entering operating theatre]
I wonder who [ s1 the anaesthetist ] is today. (Lyons, 1999, 7)
(58) My neighbor has a dog. [ s7 The dog ] kept me awake last night.
The predicate bride in the description in (56) is not uniquely identifying without restric-
tion. But a bride always appears in a certain setting. The speaker must be representing
some background scene in which the speaker conceives of the foreground object, the
bride. The audience has no difficulty in hypothesizing which scene it is that the speaker is
entertaining because the speaker has mentioned something that corresponds to the back-
ground situation, i.e., the wedding she has just been to. The intended situation, the value
of s2, in this context of utterance is the situation that is as large as the mentioned wedding.
Assuming that a regular wedding includes only a pair of bride and groom, the definite de-
scription in (56) successfully denotes the bride that the speaker means to talk about. Many
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anaphoric uses of definite descriptions fall under this type of situation use. Likewise, as
for (58), when the antecedent sentence is understood, the interpreter can infer that the
speaker represents some background situation in which the neighbor has a dog. Everyone
has a dog in some spatiotemporal region. The description the dog can thereby be under-
stood as denoting the unique dog in that situation, i.e., no other but the neighbor’s one.
(57) is the case in which the intended situation is not explicitly stated, but it can be easily
inferred based on shared knowledge.
A third case is where the intended situation is much larger than the previous ones.
Suppose that (59) and (60) are used ‘attributively’ in the sense of (Donnellan, 1966) with-
out knowing which individual fulfills the descriptive content.
(59) [ s1 The murderer of Smith ] is insane.
(60) [ s3 The president of Trinidad and Tobago ] is probably rich.
The intended situation in this type of case is basically the same as the previous one, the
entertained background scene. Additionally I suggest that the intended situation can be
as large as a possible world or its temporal slice.
First of all, notice that there has to be some intended situation for either description
because the nominal predicates are probably not uniquely identifying. The former case
the murderer of Smith could be used to describe an imaginary scenario without referring to
any actual individual; the president of Trinidad and Tobago could also be concerned with
some former or future president, not the current one. The speakers of these descriptions
must be representing something that provides the restriction. My claim is, of course, that
situations as parts of possible worlds provide the restricted domains.
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By uttering (59) the speaker expresses a certain attitude toward the world she lives
in. The speaker takes a certain fact to hold in the actual world or the world to contain
such a fact, namely, that whoever killed Smith is insane. She does not know who and
where the murderer is at the point of utterance. But she believes that the world she lives
in contains a part in which there is a unique murderer of Smith. The interpreter can
infer that the speaker is representing such a situation/world in uttering (59). The intended
situation that belongs to the descriptive content is such an actual situation that includes the
unique murderer. The occurrence of the description denotes, thereby, whoever is counted
as having murdered Smith in such a situation in the actual world, i.e., the actual murderer
of Smith. As for (60), without further contextual information, the speaker is most likely
to be talking about the current president of Trinidad and Tobago. The intended situation
is a temporal slice of the actual world that includes the utterance time, but does not go
beyond much further. The nominal predicate president of Trinidad and Tobago uniquely
identifies an individual who is in that slice.
We have discussed the cases in which definite descriptions successfully denote in-
dividuals. The speakers in those cases are not much misinformed and the intended sit-
uations provide the appropriately restricted domains, in which the nominal predicates of
descriptions determine singleton sets. We first started off with a small situation that is
immediately and mutually available to both speaker and interpreter. Then we moved up
to larger situations. At least for these cases where descriptions are not infelicitous, Don-
nellan’s referential and attributive distinction is not encoded in either semantics or syntax.
The semantic analysis of definite descriptions is always the same. But the speaker’s men-
tal states and relation to the denoted situation and individual can vary from context to
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context.
Bound situation pronouns—de re/de dicto and beyond
As we have seen in Section 4.2.3, a DP can be bound by a preceding expression (e.g., the
coexisting situation pronoun can be bound by an existential quantification introduced by
every). That is, we can sometimes ‘quantify into’ a nominal expression. Since a definite
description is a DP that contains a situation pronoun, it can also be bound by a preceding
expression.32
First, let me informally present an example. A use of (61) today has two readings.
(61) The president of the United States could be female.
In one reading (61) means that Barack Obama is female in some counterfactual scenario,
whereas the other reading makes an obvious point that a female person could be the US
president today were the history different. The proposed analysis of definite descriptions
indeed makes two readings possible, not because a definite description take two differ-
ent scopes with respect to a modal expression could, but because the situation pronoun
inside the description can either remain unbound or bound by could. The two distinct
interpretations of (61) can be paraphrased as follows:
(62) a. There is some situation/world s in which the US president in the contextually
salient situation, i.e., Obama, is female.
b. There is some situation/world s in which the US president in s is female.
The truth-conditions of (62a) and (62b) are different. The former may or may not be true
32Kripke (2005, 236) points out that Russell already has an example of a quantified description: If u is a
unit class, the u is a u (Russell, 1905, 46). My strategy is to allow all descriptions to be bound.
124
depending on how we understand the term female and the sociological/psychological/biological
natures of humans. The latter is a plain truth, and such a world even seems very close to
the actual world.
Now I want to formally introduce the relevant lexical entries. I will discuss both
modal expressions and attitude verbs. This aspect of the analysis is worth dwelling on
because it will be crucial to answering Kripke’s objections to descriptivism and solve
Frege’s puzzle later in this chapter.
(63) J necessarily Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λs . [∀w : w is accessible from s ](p(w))
(64) J possibly Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λs . [∃w : w is accessible from s ](p(w))
(65) J believe Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λx . λs . [∀w : w is compatible with x’s belief in s ](p(w))
For simplicity, I assume that modal expressions such as could are sentential adverbs like
possibly that take propositions as their arguments. They do not shift a world parameter
because there is no such thing in our semantic system. But the outcomes are equivalent
to the systems whose interpretation functions are relativized to world parameters. I also
assume a simple Hintikka style analysis of propositional attitude verbs.
First, consider (66), which is in fact ambiguous given our semantic system and
syntactic assumptions.
(66) The number of planets is necessarily even.
We have defined the meanings of ordinary words in intensional terms. A predicate be
even demands to be saturated by not only an ordinary individual argument, but also by a
situation argument because of its lexical property.
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(67) Jbe evenKg = λx . λs . x is even in s
As a result be even has to be combined with not only the subject of the sentence, but also
a situation pronoun as follows: [ s-PROi [SUBJ be even ]] (it gets an s-PROi because it is
the main verb). But the subject also contains a predicate that demands equal privileges.
This means that the sentence should have two situation pronouns, whose indices create
an ambiguity.
The interpreter imposes either (68a) or (68b) on the utterance of (66).
(68) a. necessarily s-PRO1 s1 [ [ s4 the number of planets ] is even ] (contra-indexed)
b. necessarily s-PRO1 s1 [ [ s1 the number of planets ] is even ] (co-indexed)
(68a) is the case where the situation pronoun in the description is unbound and contex-
tually receives its interpretation. The description in (68a) is thereby a rigid designator
because its semantic value, i.e., the number of planets in a certain situation, is the same in
any circumstance of evaluation. If the speaker intends to talk about the number of planets
in the actual world today, i.e., 8, then the embedded part of (68a) yields a proposition that
is true in all possible worlds. Thus, (66) is true when understood as (68a).
By contrast, the description in (68b) is not a rigid designator because it has no fixed
semantic value with respect to the circumstances of evaluation against which we evaluate
the proposition expressed by the embedded clause containing the description. Due to Sit-
uation Binding invoked by s-PRO1, the situation pronoun inside the description becomes
a variable over situations bound by a universal quantification introduced by necessarily.
For some worlds w, the number of planets in w is even; the number of planets in the rest
of the worlds are odd, assuming zero is an even number. Therefore, the embedded clause
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of (68b) yields a contingent proposition. Thus, (66) is false when understood as (68b).
What is sometimes noted as the de re and de dicto distinction is now accounted
for in syntactic-semantic terms. Notice, however, that this ‘quantifying-in’ approach gen-
uinely replaces Russell’s scope approach to the ambiguities of definite descriptions, not
merely substitutes the de re/dicto distinction. The bindability of a situation pronoun is not
a dual distinction, which would be useless when we consider more than one scope-taking
expression as Kripke (1977, 2005) repeatedly emphasizes.
(69) The number of planets might have been necessarily even. (Kripke, 1977)
Russell’s quantificational analysis allows the description in (69) to have three different
scopes as follows:
(70) a. [ x(Fx)]32(x is even)
b. 3 [ x(Fx)]2(x is even)
c. 32 [ x(Fx)](x is even)
(69) seems to have a true reading, and (70b) correctly describes that reading. The pre-
sented analysis of definite descriptions also creates a three-way ambiguity depending on
which operator binds the coexisting situation pronoun, as schematically represented be-
low.
(71) a. 32( x(F (x)(s)) is even)
b. 3w 2( x(F (x)(w)) is even)
c. 32w( x(F (x)(w)) is even)
(71a) is the case where the situation pronoun inside the definite description is not bound by
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any preceding modal expression. (71a) corresponds to Russell’s outermost scope reading
(70a). (71b) is the case where the pronoun is bound by the existential quantification
introduced by the possibility modal might have been, which is equivalent to Russell’s
intermediate scope reading (70b). (70b) is true because, in some world (like ours), eight
is the number of planets and eight is necessarily an even number. Similarly, (71c) is
the case where the necessity modal binds the situation pronoun in the description, and it
corresponds to Russell’s inner scope reading (70c).
Diagonal propositions
Before turning to propositional attitude reports, I want to note that the strategy I am
exploring here is as useful as the introduction of ‘propositional concept’ and ‘diagonal
proposition’ proposed by Stalnaker (1978, 1987). Let us one more time look at the bound
use of a situation pronoun in (68b). The embedded clause of (68b), repeated below as
(72), yields the proposition (73).
(72) s-PRO1 s1 [ [ s1 the number of planets ] is even ]
(73) λs . the number of planets in s is even in s
(73) is the proposition that is true at w if and only if the number of planets in w is an
even number in w. Which number we want to consider depends on which circumstance
of evaluation we are considering. This proposition is in fact equivalent to Stalnaker’s
diagonal proposition.
The general goal of Stalnaker (1987) is to characterize that P in x believes that P
within a possible world semantic framework without creating any puzzling consequence.
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A puzzling consequence, for example, is the following. If Hesperus is Hesperus and
Hesperus is Venus are necessarily equivalent and mean the same thing, then one should
either believe or disbelieve both of them at the same time. But it is easy for us to come up
with a circumstance in which one believes that Hesperus is Hesperus while disbelieving
that Hesperus is Venus. Thus, something must be wrong here. There are a number of
different reactions to this kind of puzzle. One reaction is, for example, to define ‘mean-
ing’ in terms of something other than truth-conditions. Then Hesperus is Hesperus and
Hesperus is Venus would not mean the same thing, even if they are necessarily equivalent,
and one would not have to believe both at a single time. Another reaction is to reconsider
our conception of believing. There are some advantages and challenges in any of such
reactions.
Stalnaker has proposed a different strategy. He agrees with Millian theorists in that
Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Venus contain two coreferential names and thereby
semantically express one and the same metaphysical identity statement concerning a sin-
gle object. Stalnaker, however, denies that Hesperus is Hesperus and Hesperus is Venus
are always necessarily equivalent.
I will question the second assumption, that sentences that appear to be neces-
sarily equivalent really are, in the relevant context, equivalent. There is, I will
suggest, more complexity and flexibility—and more context-dependence—in
the relationship between sentences or sentential complements and the propo-
sitions they express or denote. Sentences necessarily equivalent in one con-
text may be only contingently equivalent in another.
129
(Stalnaker, 1987, 118)
I interpret Stalnaker’s passage to suggest that some use of Hesperus is Venus is necessarily
true, as Kripke points out, but some other use is merely contingently true.
With this strategy in place, Stalnaker has to overcome two problems: ‘What con-
tingent proposition does a sentence like Hesperus is Venus express in some relevant con-
text?’; ‘How does a sentence express such a proposition?’. Stalnaker fully answered the
first ‘what’ problem, but failed to adequately answer the second ‘how’ problem. The
semantic proposal presented in this chapter solves both problems.
The ‘what’ problem is solved by introducing a ‘diagonal proposition’. In Stal-
naker’s terms, a ‘propositional concept’ is a function from possible worlds to proposi-
tions. In other words, a propositional concept takes a pair of circumstances of evaluation
to determine a truth-value. We evaluate a propositional concept in two steps, with two
circumstances of evaluation. A first circumstance of evaluation determines a proposi-
tion, which then can be evaluated against a second circumstance of evaluation to yield a
truth-value. A diagonal proposition is a propositional concept that takes the same world
twice to determine a truth value. That is, we use one and the same world in both steps of
evaluating a propositional concept.
According to Stalnaker, Hesperus is Venus is associated with a propositional con-
cept, which gives a necessarily true proposition with respect to the actual world, and a
necessarily false proposition with respect to some other world. Both Hesperus and Venus
are rigid designators, so the proposition expressed must be necessarily true, if true at all,
and necessarily false otherwise. The propositional concept can be represented by (74),
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where the vertical series of possible worlds are used for the first step of evaluating the






The horizontal rows of (74) ensure Stalnaker’s claim that some use of Hesperus is Venus
is necessarily true or false. For example, with respect to w (on the vertical series), the
propositional concept determines the proposition that is true with respect all possible
worlds (on the horizontal series).
Now, if we look at (74) diagonally from the upper-left, then we can find a con-
tingent series of truth-values (T, F, ...) with respect to each possible world (w, w′, ...).
That is, the propositional concept (74) determines a proposition that is only contingently
true. Stalnaker claims that this ‘diagonal’ proposition is the contingent proposition that a
speaker asserts when she says Hesperus is Venus, and also the proposition that a subject
believes when she believes that Hesperus is Venus. Since this is a contingent proposition,
by asserting it, the speaker is non-trivially excluding a certain possibility. And by believ-
ing the proposition, the subject non-trivially delineates what kind of world she believes to
live in.
What kind of world does the diagonal proposition determined by (74) delineate?
On Stalnaker’s view, it can be described in the following way (Stalnaker, 1987). It is
the world where Venus appears as the first bright star in the evening, and gets the name
Hesperus. Some other planet, like Mars, could have appeared as the first bright star in the
evening, and have gotten the name Hesperus. The proposition excludes such a possibility.
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With respect to w, Hesperus is the name of Venus, so Hesperus is Venus is of course true.
With respect to w′, Hesperus is the name of Mars, so Hesperus is Venus is not true. The
diagonal proposition excludes such a possibility. By believing that Hesperus is Venus,
the subject believes to live in a world like w, not like w′. Thus, the diagonal proposition
determined by (74) seems to capture our intuitions about what the subject believes when
she believes that Hesperus is Venus.
We have seen Stalnaker’s solution to the problem ‘What is the contingent proposi-
tion a use of Hesperus is Venus expresses?’. The diagonal proposition determined by (74)
is indeed a contingent proposition. But the question as to ‘how’ remains challenging for
him. Stalnaker suggests that the name Hesperus sometimes behaves as if it is a non-rigid
designator, which changes its referent across possible worlds. The suggestion directly
contradicts with the Millian analysis of proper names as long as it is taken to be a seman-
tic suggestion. It is unclear how exactly we can produce the right kind of propositional
concept while retaining the Millian analysis of proper names. Stalnaker also claims that
this kind of diagonalization is a Gricean pragmatic effort that a conversational participant
performs to make sense of a semantically trivial utterance. He says that ‘[u]nder certain
conditions, the content of an assertion is not the proposition determined by the ordinary
semantical rules, but instead the diagonal proposition of the propositional concept deter-
mined’ (Stalnaker, 1987, 124). So we also have to figure out under what conditions we
start using a diagonal proposition, not an ordinary horizontal proposition.
I am not sure if we can consistently develop Stalnaker’s story about how to obtain
a diagonal proposition. It is clear that, however, we do not need such an additional story
because the semantic system we have developed introduces a diagonal proposition as a
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product of a regular semantic composition. As we saw in (72), a definite description,
which contains a situation pronoun, can introduce a non-rigid designator to the logical
form because the pronoun can be quantificationally bound. And argumental proper names
such as Hesperus in Hesperus is Venus are definite descriptions. Thus, in virtue of con-
taining a situation pronoun, an argumental proper name can be a non-rigid designator,
which Stalnaker’s diagonal propositions need to have. Therefore, the proposed semantics
can account for the content of assertion and also attitude attribution without adding any
new theoretical component.
Attitude reports
I want to now turn to the uses of definite descriptions with attitude verbs. As I will point
out in Section 4.4, a Russellian quantificational analysis is problematic when a definite
description is embedded within an attitude verb such as ‘wonder’ and ‘hope’. For, in a
propositional attitude construction, there seems to be no narrow scope reading of a definite
description, which is expected from the quantificational treatment of definite descriptions.
For example, the narrow scope reading of (75) would imply that a part of what George IV
wondered is whether there is one and only one author of Waverley.
(75) George IV wondered whether the author of Waverley is Scott.
(75) does not seem to have such a reading as discussed in (Heim, 1991; Elbourne, 2005,
2010; Kripke, 2005).
But worse yet, Kripke (2005) points out that the wide scope reading of (75) also has
an undesirable outcome. To avoid the complexity of wonder, which might be analyzed
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as want to know, let us consider a different, but analogous George IV believes that the
author of Waverley is Scott. Here is a paraphrase of its wide scope reading.
(76) There is an x such that x alone wrote Waverley, and George IV believes that x =
Scott.
Given the semantics of believe, (76) is true in the actual world if and only if there actually
is exactly one x such that x wrote Waverley, and in all possible worlds that are compatible
with what George IV actually believes, x = Scott. Now Kripke asks who an x is such that
the person alone wrote Waverley in the actual world. That is of course Scott. And Scott
is Scott in all possible worlds. Then the rightmost variable x is nothing but Scott. So (76)
is true if and only if Scott is Scott in all of George IV’s belief worlds; it is trivially true as
long as George IV is minimally rational. However, of course, we are not attributing such a
trivial belief to ‘the first gentleman of Europe’, as Russell found it very disturbing. Thus,
Russell’s theory is problematic with respect to both narrow and wide scope readings of a
definite description in an attitude context.
By contrast, the current proposal can handle both cases. My analysis treats definite
descriptions as nondescriptive singular referring expressions, where descriptive contents
become presuppositions. It achieves the effect of outermost scope without actually scop-
ing out a description from where it base-generates. It also allows a definite description
to be non-rigid by quantifying-in. When the coexisting situation pronoun is co-indexed
with the s-PRO for the main verb of the embedded clause, the embedded clause expresses
a contingent diagonal proposition as follows:
(77) George IV believes λs [the unique author of Waverley in s] is Scott in s.
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Who wrote Waverley presumably changes from world to world. In some worlds Scott
is the author; someone else wrote it in different worlds.33 Our metalanguage expression
‘[the unique author of Waverley in s]’ changes what it denotes depending on the value
of s. Thus, the description the author of Waverley is not a rigid designator. (77) is true
if and only if in all George’s belief worlds, Scott alone wrote Waverley, which is not
trivially true. Likewise, when George wondered whether Scott is the author of Waverley,
George’s belief worlds contain both worlds where Scott alone wrote Waverley and those
where someone else did it. George wants to know in which group of worlds he lives in.
Notice that we can also attribute a trivial belief or an interest in the law of identity
to George IV, if we construe the coexisting situation pronoun to be unbound. The results
would be equivalent to Russell’s wide scope readings. I believe that (75) has such a
reading, if it is used in a metaphysical conversation.
4.4 Interlude—Quantification and Inevitable Scope
Here I want to present some considerations on scopes that count against a Russellian
quantificational analysis of definite descriptions. Any quantificational treatment of defi-
nite descriptions entails a variety of scopal properties. When a sentence contains multiple
occurrences of quantifiers, its interpretation changes depending on the order of applica-
tions of the rules we have for the quantifiers, as we can observe in a familiar example like
(78a). Quantifiers also interact with other operators such as negation as in (78b-c).
(78) a. Some philosophy book is read by every linguist.
33One might suggest that a novel is similar to a person, and that no novel can be Waverley unless Scott
gave birth to it. Then we can use a different example such as the tallest five year old boy in the place of the
author of Waverley.
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b. It is not the case that some philosophy book is readable.
c. Some philosophy book is not readable.
The order of applying quantificational rules is sometimes overt as in (78b-c): (78b) denies
that there is a sequence made out of the domain of which the predicates ‘x is a philosophy
book’ and ‘x is readable’ are both true; (78c) asserts that there is a sequence such that ‘x
is a philosophy book’ is true of, but ‘x is readable’ is not.
The contrast between (78b) and (78c) suggests that syntactic structure leads us to
apply our semantic rules in different orders. So I assume that, insofar as there are two
interpretations available to a use of (78a), there are also two structurally distinct represen-
tations, something like (79a-b), available to the interpreter at the sub-personal level:
(79) a. ... some ... every ...
b. ... every ... some ...
In other words, the availability of (79a-b) is a necessary condition for a use of (78a) to be
interpreted in two different ways. I think that people today use the term ‘scope’ to refer to
such a structural relation between quantifiers, logical connectives, operators and so forth.
For example, in (79a), some takes wider scope over every.34
It follows that, if the availability of multiple structures is interfered with for what-
ever reason, multiple interpretations would not be available to the interpreter of the utter-
ance. For example, the multiple structural representations such as:
(80) a. ... a ... every ...
b. ... every ... a ...
34We could, and perhaps we should define the notion of scope in broad terms, covering all words and
phrases in general (Neale, 2005).
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are both available when interpreting a use of (81a), whereas they are not available with
respect to (81b-c):
(81) a. A doctor will interview every new patient.
b. A doctor will examine the possibility that we give every new patient a tran-
quilizer.
c. A doctor should worry if we sedate every new patient. (Reinhart, 1997, 336)
(80b) is not available to the interpreter of (81b-c) presumably because there are some syn-
tactic constraints (generally called ‘island’ constraints) that prevent the quantificational
phrase every new patient from taking widest scope as in the structural representation
(80b).
To summarize, quantificational phrases can stand in structural scope relations to
other expressions, in accordance with syntactic constraints. Multiple scope positions
sometimes yield multiple interpretations (sometimes because there can be vacuous scopes).
If there is no more than one scope possibility, then there is no more than one interpretation
as long as scope is concerned. If there are no more than two scope possibilities, then there
are no more than two interpretations, and so on.
What is important for us is that a Russellian quantificational analysis of definite
descriptions is committed to this whole package of the scope mechanism. Where some
F or every F permits multiple scopes, the F would permit multiple scopes; where some
F or every F does not, the F would not, at least other things being equal. This commit-
ment can be a virtue of the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, which is exactly
what Russell advertised for, and the reason why Kripke (1977) emphasized that the scope
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relation cannot be reduced to any two-way distinction. However, the commitment is at
the same time the reason why the Russellian analysis overgenerates and undergenerates
interpretations: we do not actually have interpretations that we should have according to
the quantificational analysis, and we have interpretations that we should not have.
Negation
First, let us consider how definite descriptions interact with negations.
(82) The present king of France isn’t bald.
According to a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions, the definite description in (82)
takes wide or narrow scope with respect to the negation (corresponding to the ‘primary’
and ‘secondary’ occurrence in Russell’s terminology). When it takes wide scope, the rule
for the definite article the is put to use first, and a use of (82) is taken to mean that there
is one and only one sequence such that ‘x is a present king of France’ is true of and ‘x is
bald’ is not true of. So the use of (82) today is false when the definite description takes
scope over the negation because there is no king of France.
On the other hand, when the definite description in (82) takes narrow scope, a use
of the sentence is interpreted as saying that there is no unique sequence such that both ‘x
is a present king of France’ and ‘x is bald’ are true of. Now the use is true because of the
same fact: there is no king of France today. It s unclear whether our intuitions concerning
(82) are compatible with these theoretical predictions.
Likewise, the Russellian analysis predicts the existence of two possible interpreta-
tions for each of the following pair:
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(83) a. The Japanese emperor isn’t bald.
b. The best student in my logic class isn’t bald.
(84) a. [the x : Fx]¬(Gx)
b. ¬[the x : Fx](Gx)
(84a) and (84b) represent the wide and narrow scope readings respectively. However,
as Heim (1991) points out, the narrow scope readings of (83a-b), i.e., (84b), are really
difficult to obtain. You could hardly mean that there is not exactly one emperor in Japan
who is bald by uttering (83a).
One might argue that one of the interpretations is strongly preferred for some other
reason, and there indeed are two interpretations all the time, and hence, the Russellian
analysis remains intact. Perhaps, the negations in (83a-b) are structurally entrapped some-
how, and cannot take scope over a definite description. Negations exhibit such a property
in relation to other quantifiers as shown in the following:
(85) Some philosophy book is not readable.
You could hardly mean by uttering (87) that there is no philosophy book that is readable.
This line of reasoning does not work for two reasons. First, it defeats an alleged
virtue of the Russellian analysis of definite descriptions with respect to negative existen-
tials. According to Russell, the use of (86) today is true because the definite description
can take narrow scope—the negation takes scope over it. If the negation cannot take scope
over a definite description, then it cannot have a true reading. It would be judged false
because the description has wide scope and entails that there is exactly one French king
today.
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(86) The present king of France doesn’t exist.
Second, Heim (1991) points out that other quantificational phrases have a narrow
scope reading when preceded by negation as in (87a-c).
(87) a. I’m not buying every expensive car at the dealer.
b. I’m not having breakfast with every Dutch prince.
c. It’s not the case that every professor is bald.
For example, (87a) means that the speaker is denying that she buys all expensive cars at
the dealer (88a), whereas it is hardly used to claim that she buys no expensive car at the
dealer (88b).
(88) a. ¬ [∀x : car x](I am buying x)
b. [∀x : car x]¬(I am buying x)
By contrast, even when a negation overtly takes scope over a definite description,
the narrow reading of the definite description is strongly disfavored:
(89) a. I’m not buying the most expensive car at the dealer.
b. I’m not having breakfast with the king of France.
c. It’s not the case that the Japanese emperor is bald.
(89a) is hardly used to deny the conjunction that there is exactly one most expensive car
at the dealer and I am buying it, i.e., to assert that either there is not exactly one such car
or I am not buying it. If a definite description is a quantificational expression like every
car, then it should be studied why they interact differently with negation.35
35This objection can be undermined if something like the following is felicitous.
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We have observed some instances of overgeneration: the Russellian analysis pre-
dicts, by virtue of its very quantificational nature, more scope interactions with the nega-
tion than there actually are. Of course, one could entertain that some of the predicted
readings are suppressed by different mechanisms, which are currently unknown and need
further investigations.
Attitude verbs
Let us see a few more examples of overgeneration, produced by Heim (1991) and empha-
sized by Elbourne (2005, 109-112):
(90) a. Hans wants the banshee in his attic to be quiet tonight.
b. Hans wonders whether the banshee in his attic will be quiet tonight.
According to the Russellian analysis, the descriptions in (90a-b) can take narrow scope
with respect to the psychology verbs want and wonder, whose interpretations can be para-
phrased as follows:
(91) a. Hans wants there to be exactly one banshee in his attic, and for it to be quiet
tonight.
b. Hans wonders whether the following is the case: there is exactly one banshee
in his attic and that banshee will be quiet tonight.
The uses of (90a-b) do not seem to have the interpretations (91a-b), which are generated
by the Russellian analysis.
(a) I’m not buying the most expensive car at the dealer. Because five cars got the same price.
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One might argue that the descriptions in (90) always take wide scopes for some
unknown reason. The obligatory wide-scope taking cannot be right because we can ob-
serve no parallelism with respect to other quantificational expressions. The following
structurally analogous sentence that contains an every-DP has a narrow scope reading:
(92) Some professor wants every graduate student to publish a paper.
Even if such an unexplained stipulation could be somehow justified, the move
would not help Russellians. For Elbourne (2005) shows that there are several construc-
tions in which descriptions cannot have wide scopes, though they appear to have them,
which are the cases of undergeneration.
As I mentioned earlier, the existence of multiple scope relations is a necessary con-
dition for multiple interpretations. So if any syntactic constraint excludes a wide scope
position of a quantificational phrase, then it should not have a wide scope reading, which
is in fact verified by the following example containing an every-DP in a coordinated struc-
ture:
(93) One man wants every banshee to be quiet and the party to go ahead.
(Elbourne, 2005, 111)
If the quantificational phrase every banshee can take both wide and narrow scope with
respect to the other phrase one man, then (93) should have two readings, which can be
represented as follows:
(94) a. [one x : man x][∀y : banshee y](xRy)
b. [∀y : banshee y][one x : man x](xRy)
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However, (93) does not have the reading corresponding to (94b). The every-phrase is
entrapped inside the coordinated structure and cannot take scope over the one-phrase.
The Russellian analysis makes the exact same prediction with respect to a definite
description because descriptions are quantificational phrases like every-DPs. However,
the prediction is not born out. Consider the following example:
(95) Hans wants the banshee in his attic to be quiet and the party to go ahead.
(Elbourne, 2005, 111)
The definite description the banshee in (95) should not have a wide scope interpretation,
according to the Russellian analysis. However, (95) does have a wide scope reading.
We can reproduce Elbourne’s point by using other island constructions.
(96) a. Some student cannot hide her desire that every teacher will praise her.
b. Immanuel cannot hide his desire that the teacher will praise him.
With respect to (96a), there cannot be a scope relation in which the every-DP takes a
scope over the some-DP because it is inside a relative clause. That is why (96a) does
not have the reading that, for each teacher, there is at least one student who cannot hide
her desire that that teacher will praise her. Likewise, (96b) should not have a wide scope
reading, if the quantificational analysis of definite descriptions were correct. However,
it seems to have the wide scope reading. Moreover, the predicted narrow scope reading
seems lacking in a use of (96b): Immanuel does not seem to desire there to be one and
only one teacher.
Perhaps, psychological verbs are special, and the narrow scopes of definite descrip-
tions do not create any problematic readings, contrary to the appearance of the para-
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phrased sentences (91a-b). However, we have more cases that present difficulties to Rus-
sellians.36
Modal adverbs
The quantificational approach to definite descriptions gives the description in (97) two
scope possibilities.
(97) Necessarily, the winner of a lottery is male.
Let us consider its narrow scope interpretation, i.e.,
(98) 2 [the x : Fx](Gx).
When someone asserts (97), according to the Russellian analysis, there are two different
ways to falsify the assertion. One is to show that it is possible that there is not exactly
one winner (perhaps none, perhaps two). The other is to show that it is possible that the
winner of a lottery is female. So the following pair of conversation should be equally
acceptable:
(99) a. Necessarily, the winner of a lottery is male. —That’s so wrong! Because
there could be two winners.
b. Necessarily, the winner of a lottery is male. —That’s so wrong! Because the
winner could be female.
However, (99a) does not sound as good as (99b). Again, there could be some unknown
reason for why we overwhelmingly prefer one method of verification over the other. But
36See (Kaplan, 2005; Neale, 2007) for an attempt to defuse the presented worry about psychology verbs.
For a rejoinder to Kaplan and Neale, see (Elbourne, 2010).
144
we do not know what that would look like. By contrast, the presuppositional analysis of
definite descriptions does not include uniqueness as part of the asserted content of (97),
which explains why directly denying the uniqueness assertion as in (99a) would sound
unnatural.
4.5 Proper Names
Now I want to apply the analysis of definite descriptions developed in Section 4.3 to the
singular and bound uses of a proper name. As I defended in Chapter 3, the singular and
bound uses of proper names in English are structurally analogous to definite descriptions.
They are headed by ø  in the place of the definite article. I argue that they are also semanti-
cally analogous to definite descriptions. All of what I have said thus far straightforwardly
applies to the singular and bound uses of proper names. Since I am suggesting that a name
is a definite description, one might worry that I am putting forward a yet another form of
descriptivism. So, first, I will go over why Kripke’s arguments against descriptivism do
not apply to my analysis of proper names. Second, I will look at the bound use of a proper
name. Third, I will turn to the uses of proper names that are sometimes called ‘descriptive
names’. Fourth, I will discus identity statements and belief reports. Fifth, at the end of the




The proposed semantics of complex nominals applies to the singular use of a proper name
together with a plausible assumption that the covert determiner ø  encodes the analogous
semantic content as the definite article the. As discussed in Chapter 2, I semantically
distinguish the and ø . The former takes both singular and plural nominal predicates
whereas the latter only takes singular ones. I will modify the lexical definition of the in
Chapter 5 so that we can also account for plural definite descriptions. The lexical meaning
of ø  is identical to that of the specified in this chapter except for the condition that it needs
to be combined with a metalinguistic predicate.
(100) J ø  Kg = λF〈e,〈s,t〉〉 : F is metalinguistic . λs : ∃!x(F (x)(s)) .  x(F (x)(s))
Since ø  is a non-quantificational determiner whose output is a particular individual, it
can be seen as a covert demonstrative head.
For example, consider the singular use of Aristotle, whose LF can be expressed as
follows:
(101) [ s8 [ ø  Aristotle ]]
where s8 is an unbound situation pronoun. The pronoun s8 receives its semantic value
from a variable assignment. If the situation denoted by s8 is small enough, then the con-
tent of (101) singles out an object, who stands in a naming relation to /ærestätl/. (101)
can be a rigid designator because the semantic value of the description remains the same
whichever circumstance we use to evaluate the sentential semantic value, insofar as s8
remains unbound. Also notice that (101) is nondescriptive because its descriptive content
is part of the presupposition that the user makes, which is irrelevant when we evaluate
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the proposition expressed. Therefore, all of this very much suggests that the proposed
analysis of proper names is immune to any argument against the traditional form of de-
scriptivism. But we can also confirm the suggestion by looking at the details.
Now I want to show that the proposed analysis of proper names answers Kripke’s ar-
guments against classical descriptivism. Following (Salmon, 1982) and (Soames, 2002),
I assume that there are mainly three kinds of arguments against descriptivism in Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity. The modal argument depends on the observations that the modal
properties of the sentences that contain proper names are different from the modal prop-
erties of those that contain definite descriptions. Although the sentence Aristotle was a
philosopher expresses a contingent truth, The last great philosopher of antiquity was a
philosopher expresses a necessary truth. According to descriptivism, however, the two
sentences must mean the same thing.
The epistemological argument relies on the similar observations with respect to the
epistemological properties of the sentences including names. The sentence Aristotle was
a philosopher is knowable a posteriori whereas The last great philosopher of antiquity
was a philosopher is knowable a priori. The descriptivists, again, would have to claim
that the two sentences are epistemologically equivalent.
The semantical argument is designed to show that the descriptive content associated
with a proper name by speakers sometimes fails to designate what the name is supposed
to designate, i.e., its referent. Suppose that all competent speakers of English associate
the logician who proved the Incompleteness Theorem with the name Gödel, and that an
unknown logician, Schmidt, had in fact proved the Incompleteness Theorem. Then every
sentence that contains the name Gödel uttered by a speaker of English would be about
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Schmidt because the descriptive content associated with the name picks out Schmidt
rather than Gödel according to descriptivism. However, no one would even notice that
the utterance is about Schmidt rather than Gödel.
First of all, consider the modal argument against descriptivism. Kripke claims that
descriptivism makes an incorrect prediction that a contingent statement such as,
(102) Aristotle is called ‘Aristotle’,
expresses a necessary truth. Since descriptivism analyzes a name as having a certain de-
scriptive content, whatever it is, the predicate that has the same content makes a sentence
necessarily true. This problem does not apply to my analysis of proper names. Certainly,
the sentence (102) contains two instances of the same predicate, assuming that the proper
noun Aristotle were to express the equivalent content as ‘is called ‘Aristotle”.37 How-
ever, on the proposed semantics, the two instances of the same predicate in (102) come
with two situation pronouns that may or may not bear the same index. (102) is thereby
structurally ambiguous in, at least, two ways:
(103) a. s-PRO1 s1 [ [ s2 ø  Aristotle ] is-called-‘Aristotle’ ] (contra-indexed)
b. s-PRO1 s1 [ [ s1 ø  Aristotle ] is-called-‘Aristotle’ ] (co-indexed)
In (103a) the situation pronoun inside the description s2 is unbound and an assignment
function provides a situation as its semantic value. Suppose that the assignment function g
assigns to s2 a situation in the actual world. The LF (103a) yields a contingent proposition
with respect to g: the one that is true with respect to any possible situation s if and only if
37This assumption is unlikely to be the case given the considerations we had in Chapter 3. But I use
(102) for its simplicity.
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(104) the unique object x, such that x is called ‘Aristotle’ in g(s2), is called ‘Aristotle’
in s
The proposition (104) is true in some situations and false in the others. For g(s2) and
the value of s need not be identical, and something that is called ‘Aristotle’ in a certain
situation may not be called ‘Aristotle’ in a different situation. Therefore, the sentence
(102) can be contingent.
Also note that (103b) captures the de dicto reading of (102). There is a sense in
which (102) is necessarily true. Someone whose name is ‘Aristotle’ must be called ‘Aris-
totle’. The proposition expressed by the LF representation (103b) is necessarily true
because anything that is called in a certain way in a certain situation is called in the same
way in the same situation. Therefore, my analysis of names is flexible enough to produce
such de dicto readings.
The solution to the epistemological argument has the same structure. The propo-
sition (104) is not knowable a priori. To learn that someone who is called ‘Aristotle’
in a certain situation is also called ‘Aristotle’ in some other situation s is significant and
amplifies one’s knowledge.
Since a deictic situation pronoun provides a restricted domain, the proposed anal-
ysis can also answer the semantical arguments. Kripke points out that some of the de-
scriptive contents that classical descriptivism associates with names fail to pick out the
referents of the names. For example, if speakers associate with the name Feynman the de-
scriptive content ‘being a famous American physicist’, then the descriptive content would
apply to a number of objects. And, hence, the descriptive content would fail to pick out
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the referent of the name, i.e., Richard Feynman. However, the new analysis does not as-
sociate what classical descriptivism associates with the name. According to the proposed
analysis, the descriptive content of, and hence the presuppositional content of Feynman
used in an argument position is ‘being an object whose name is ‘Feynman’ in the relevant
situation’. Therefore, the name Feynman can be used to uniquely refer to an individual,
regardless of the speakers’ knowledge about physics.
The proposed analysis is also applicable to the Gödel case. The singular proper
name Gödel denotes a unique person, who is called ‘Gödel’ in a particular situation.
Schmidt is never called ‘Gödel’ in the scenario. Therefore, the name Gödel cannot pick
out Schmidt in the standard Gödel case.
4.5.2 The bound use of a proper name
Here I discuss the bound use of a proper name, which is represented by the following
sentences:
(105) Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius takes
only Gerontius to the Rare Names Convention. (Elbourne, 2005, 181)
(106) Every time John goes to see a performance of Hamlet, he falls in love with Ophe-
lia. (That is, he falls in love with ‘the actress who plays the part of Ophelia at that
play’.). (Geurts, 1997, 322)
(107) If a child is christened ‘Bambi’, then Disney will sue Bambi’s parents.
(Geurts, 1997, 321)
150
The current chapter has developed a situation-based account of the bound interpretations
of complex nominals, which can apply to these cases. First of all, notice that we can
easily come up with a completely parallel use of a definite description for each case.
(108) Every woman who has a husband called John and a lover called Gerontius takes
the lover to the Rare Names Convention.
(109) Every time John goes to see a performance of Hamlet, he falls in love with the
actress playing Ophelia.
(110) If a child is named ‘Bambi’, then Disney will sue the child’s parents.
These are the typical examples of the donkey anaphoric use of a definite descriptions. A
number of proposals have been made to account for donkey anaphoric definite descrip-
tions as well as donkey pronouns (Neale, 1990, Ch. 5). For present purposes, I need
to only note that a systematic analysis of (108-110) has been proposed, and we can ap-
ply any successful account of donkey anaphoric definite descriptions to the bound use
of a proper name because, on our semantic proposal, the bound use of a proper name is
a donkey anaphoric definite description. Within a situation semantic framework, Heim
(1990), Elbourne (2005), and Schwarz (2009) have presented a compositional semantics
that can deal with donkey anaphoric definite descriptions. We could use any one of their
particular formulations to implement the basic idea that some uses of proper names are
complex nominals that can be bound and interact with other complex nominals. Below
I present my own formulation of the situation semantic analysis of anaphoric definite
descriptions.38
38Here I focus on laying out my own analysis, and will not compare it with the extant analyses. For
further considerations on conditionals within a situation semantics, see Appendix C.
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(108) is the typical co-varying construction that we discussed in Section 4.2.3. (105)
should be understood in the exact same manner. The second occurrence of Gerontius in
(105) is a DP headed by ø , which includes a situation pronoun. One way to index the
situation pronoun creates a situation variable whose value co-varies with the value of
the individual variable introduced by the quantificational phrase every woman who has a
husband called John and a lover called Gerontius. Because of a matching function M ,
indirectly though, the DP Gerontius below is quantified in by the every-phrase above. It
is not a rigid designator, but denotes a unique individual whose name is ‘Gerontius’ in
each relevant situation for each woman. The proposition that can be expressed by a use
of (105) is something like the following:
(111) λs . [∀x : woman ... (x)(g(s1))][∃s′ : s′ v s](x takes   y(Gerontius(y)(s′)) to
RNC in s′ ∧M(s′) = x)
The matching function M here specifies a situation that includes all participants of a
state of having a relation for each x. In each such situation we can find exactly one
individual named ‘Gerontius’, who is also a lover of one woman in the context. That is
why ‘  y(Gerontius(y)(s′))’ is defined for each such s′.
Both (106) and (109) are also analyzed in the same way, where the DP Ophelia
or the actress playing Ophelia is (indirectly) bound by the preceding adverbial quantifi-
cational phrase. We consider a different situation for each time in which John goes to
see Hamlet. Each such situation contains a performance of Hamlet that John goes to
watch. Anyone who takes part in the performance is in that situation. There is exactly
one individual who performs Ophelia in each situation, who is also called ‘Ophelia’ in
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that situation. Thus, the DPs Ophelia and the actress playing Ophelia denote a unique
individual with respect to each performance of Hamlet that John goes to see.
Let us now turn to (107) and (110), where there seems to be no quantificational
expression that quantifies in the relevant DP. How can a proper name or a definite de-
scription be bound in these cases? The conditional form in English if ... (then) ... can be
indeed understood as introducing a quantification that binds an embedded DP. Since an
utterance has a proposition as its semantic value, not a truth-value, within our system, if
cannot be seen as a mere truth-function. I assume that if is analogous to a kind of adver-
bial phrase we saw earlier such as every time the bell rings. I want to extend Rothstein’s
analysis of such adverbial phrases to the expressions if and when(ever), among which we
find a similarity:
(112) When(ever)/if/everytime it rains, I bring an umbrella.
Following Rothstein, I assume that (112) has a structure like the following:
(113) [when(ever)/if/everytime it rains]s1 I bring an umbrella PREP [ s1 ]
where PREP is an unpronounced preposition, which introduces the adverbial phrase un-
der consideration. The adverbial phrase every time it rains is preposed to leave a trace
ranging over situations. PREP also signifies a contextually determined matching function,
which explains the coherency we observe between the antecedent and consequent. More
specifically, I suggest the following lexical meanings for if and PREP:
(114) J if Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λqcon〈s,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . [∀s′ : s′ v s ∧ p(s′)][∃s′′ : s′′ v s](qcon(s′′)(s′))
(115) J PREP Kg = λs . λs′ .M(s′) = s
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qcon in (114) is the semantic value of the consequent of a conditional, which is not a mere
proposition, but takes two situations to give a truth-value. This is because the meaning of
a consequent contains a matching function that has two situation argument slots, not one.
Given these lexical meanings, we can obtain the following proposition for (113):
(116) λs . [∀s′ : s′ v s∧ it rains in s′][∃s′′ : s′′ v s]( I bring an umbrella in s′′) ∧
M(s′′) = s′)
(See Appendix A)
whereM(s′′) = s′ holds just in case the two situations contain only a series of two related
events. For a use of (112) to be true, I need to respond to each raining event; my bringing
of an umbrella ten years ago does not compensate for my failing to act on the precipitation
today. The nature of the relation between a pair of events seems to vary from context to
context. In many contexts, however, a causal relation suffices to capture the speaker’s
intention. That is why If you strike a match, it lights appears to be true, whereas If the
Sun rises in the East, then Spinoza ground lenses for living to be false. Suppose that
M(s′′) = s′ contextually means that s′′ includes an event that is causally or explanatorily
related to an event in s′. Then we can paraphrase the derived proposition as follows.
For any situation in which it rains, there is some situation in which I bring an umbrella
because of the raining, which seems compatible with our intuitions about a use of (112).
Returning to (107) and (110), it is now easy to see why we can talk about a unique
child named ‘Bambi’ in each of many different situations. The DPs Bambi and the child
therein are bound by the existential quantification introduced by the conditional construc-
tion. The two situations picked out by the antecedent and consequent are intimately re-
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lated via the matching function M . When we consider a situation in which a child is
named ‘Bambi’, we look for nothing but a situation that contains a causally related law-
suit. Any other Bambis or children named ‘Bambi’ are irrelevant as long as this particular
naming event is concerned. In the situation that only contains the causally related law-
suit filed by Disney, there is exactly one child named ‘Bambi’, who is also the very child
which triggered Disney’s action. Thus, the DPs Bambi and the child in (107) and (110)
denote the unique child with respect to every situation chosen by the antecedent.39
4.5.3 Descriptive names
There are at least two different manners in which we name objects. We can ‘ostensively’
name an object by choosing a sound type in the presence of the very object. Or we
can ‘descriptively’ name an object by stipulating a connection between a sound type and
an object that has the bundle of properties that we have in mind. It is often said that
the referents of such ‘descriptive names’ are fixed by descriptions. I have in mind as
descriptive names ‘Neptune’, ‘Vulcan’, ‘Deep Throat’, ‘Jack the ripper’, ‘Newman 1’,
‘Julius’ and so forth.
My main claim here is that we should distinguish the study of our linguistic knowl-
edge pertaining to meaning and our general anthropological interests in human activities.
I argue that the proposed semantic analysis of proper names is capable of accounting
for our intuitions concerning descriptive names without introducing any new theoretical
apparatus. However, some of the phenomena we associate with ‘naming’ might remain
39For simplicity, I ignore the problem of minimal situations in this example. See Appendix C for more
discussion on minimal situations.
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unexplained within semantic theory—a different type of inquiry, anthropology, sociology,
etc might as well be required to provide an explanation at a different level of science.
Consider Gareth Evans’s example of a descriptive name. Under the supposition of
(D), what would (117) mean on the proposed analysis?
(D) Let us use ‘Julius’ to refer to whoever invented the zip. (Evans, 1979, 181)
(117) Julius invented the zip. (Evans, 1979, 193)
On my analysis, the occurrence of Julius has a structure something like [ s1 [ø  Julius ]],
and the overall semantic value of (117) is a set of situations in which the unique object
whose name is ‘Julius’ in a certain situation invented the zip. So (117) expresses a contin-
gent proposition. But now we operate under (D), which allows us to refer to the inventor
of the zip with the DP [ s1 [ø  Julius ]]. (D) makes the proper noun Julius true of the
inventor of the zip while we pretend that (D) is effective.40 A regular speaker of English
already possesses the lexical entry for the predicate Julius, and hence no special linguistic
knowledge is involved to figure out the meaning of (117). The speaker’s intended referent
of s1 is a situation that contains the inventor of the zip, whom we decided to call ‘Julius’.
Thus, the DP [ s1 [ø  Julius ]] can denote Julius, the inventor of the zip. Also we suppose
that Julius is identical to the inventor of the zip in the situation denoted by s1. Therefore,
we consider (117) to be vacuously true because of the supposition.
The DP [ s1 [ø  Julius ]], of course, does not have to mean the inventor of the zip
even when we suppose (D), which goes along with our intuitions. The following remark
40As Robin Jeshion (2004) emphasizes, Evans’s example is an artificial one and he does not go through
the necessary conventional conditions in order to introduce a descriptive name to people’s common knowl-
edge.
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would perfectly make sense in a philosophy of language class:
(118) Let’s discuss Evans’s case. Imagine we use the name ‘Julius’ to refer to the person
who invented the zipper. Oh, by the way, my brother in law is also Julius. But I
know he is a school teacher and didn’t invent the zip. So forget about him. Okay,
now, suppose I say Julius invented the zip. ...
If an occurrence of Julius could not mean many different Juliuses when we assume (D),
then (118) would be hard to make sense. The speaker can explicitly indicate a shift of an
intended referent by saying well, by the way, etc.
4.5.4 Frege’s puzzle
Consider identity statements like (119). According to Millians such as Salmon and
Soames, the semantic values of the following sentences are one and the same.
(119) a. Hesperus is Phosphorus.
b. Hesperus is Hesperus.
According to some Millian theorists, they both express a Russellian structured proposition
whose constituents are the planet Venus, taken twice, and the identity relation. However,
the sentences are clearly different in several respects. For example, Frege points out that
they have different epistemic properties.
The proposed analysis of proper names has in fact two different resources to ac-
count for the differences between (119a) and (119b). Before discussing how so, I want
to mention that I consider the sentences like (119a-b) to express identity statements. I as-
sume that both occurrences of proper names Hesperus and Phosphorus are DPs, to which
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the proposed analysis applies, and the copula be signifies the identity relation between
two objects in the domain of discourse.41
One resource available to my analysis of proper names is presuppositional content.
In understanding (119a-b), the interpreters would make two different belief attributions
to the speakers because of the difference in the presuppositions of (119a) and (119b).
Suppose that the speaker asserts an identity of two objects by uttering (119a). On
the proposed analysis of proper names, the utterance is interpreted to express the set of
situations in which the unique object named ‘Hesperus’ in a certain situation is identical
41It is not easy to uncover the linguistic structure of these phenomenologically simple sentences. We
need to address two tough questions. First, what are the syntax and the semantics of the copula be? Second,
what are the syntax and the semantics of the second occurrence of a name?
Here is a possible answer to the two questions available to the predicate view of proper names, which
I do not adopt. The interpretation of the copula be is predicational; it is not be of identity. The second
occurrences of a proper name in (119a-b) are not DPs, but NPs. They are neither referential singular terms
nor definite descriptions, but unsaturated individual-level predicates analogous to American and tall. The
logical form of (119a) is isomorphic with that of:
(a) The president is American.
This analysis easily accounts for the difference in the cognitive values of (119a) and (119b). The former
sentence attributes a different property to Hesperus than the latter.
The analysis has several disadvantages. First, under the analysis, a proper noun is more similar to an
adjective than a common noun, occurring with no indefinite article. Yet a proper noun can also occupy the
post-copula position with an article:
(b) Henry is a James.
The use of an indefinite proper noun seems different from a bare occurrence of a proper noun. What makes
the difference between the two?
Second, the analysis has no application to other cases of identity statement. A definite description may
appear in the post-copula position to form an identity statement, which in any case requires another sort of
explanation.
(c) Robert’s brother is Rachel’s husband.
A third and the most important point is that the analysis, in fact, does not solve Frege’s puzzle at all. We
can present Frege’s original question in terms of different constructions:
(d) (i) Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same.
(ii) Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical.
(iii) Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus.
It is possible that the underlying syntactic structure of an English sentence of the form NAME is NAME
turns out to be unsuitable for expressing a genuine identity statement. However, Frege’s puzzle is concerned
with the logical form of identity statements, which can be expressed in some or other way through natural
language.
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to the unique object named ‘Phosphorus’ in another. So if the utterance is true, then it
is true in all counterfactual circumstances where Venus exists. Similarly, the proposition
expressed by (119b) would be exactly the same as long as the relevant situations are
appropriately chosen so that the value of both DPs Hesperus is nothing but Venus. So
there is no difference between the semantic values of (119a) and (119b) uttered in the
same context.
In interpreting the utterance of (119a), however, the interpreter attributes to the
speaker the belief that there is a unique object named ‘Hesperus’ in a certain situation,
and that there is a unique object named ‘Phosphorus’ in another. The intended situation
for Hesperus is probably a spacetime in the evening hours, whereas that for Phosphorus
is a spacetime in the morning hours. Believing that there is exactly one thing named
‘Hesperus’ in the former situation is clearly different from believing that there is exactly
one thing named ‘Phosphorus’ in the latter.
By contrast, suppose that the speaker utters (119b) to illuminate a law in logic,
(not as a Paderewski-type utterance—which could also be accounted for on the proposed
analysis). The situations associated with the two DPs are identical. The semantic value
of the utterance would be the same as that of (119a) in the former scenario: the set of
situations where Venus is identical to itself. However, the interpreter can only attribute
to the speaker the belief that there is a unique object named ‘Hesperus’ in the situation.
Anything about the name ‘Phosphorus’, or indeed any other statement about the speaker
would be an extrapolation by the interpreter based on other knowledge about the context,
the speaker, and the world in general—it has nothing to do with semantic knowledge that
the speaker and interpreter possess.
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Therefore, the interpretations of (119a) and (119b) involve different pieces of se-
mantic knowledge, and lead to different outcomes, although the semantic values of the
utterances may sometimes be identical—the exact same circumstance makes them to be
the case.
The other resource available to us is diagonal propositions. As we saw earlier in
Section 4.3.2, (119a) or even (119b) does not have to express a necessary proposition
within our semantic system. Each predicate in (119a) requires a situation argument, and
thereby its underlying structure contains three situation pronouns. Suppose that the two
DPs in (119a) are contra-indexed, and the former Hesperus is co-indexed with s-PRO of
the main verb (This is analogous to Hesperus is Venus in Section 4.3.2). Then the DP
Hesperus is not a rigid designator, which changes its value relative to circumstances of
evaluation. The proposition expressed by the use of (119a) is a diagonal proposition:
(120) λs . the unique object, whose name is ‘Hesperus’ in s = the unique object, whose
name is ‘Phosphorus’ in the relevant situation
That is, it is the set of situations in which Phosphorus is the object that is uniquely named
‘Hesperus’. In other words, (120) is true in such a situation that Phosphorus is uniquely
named ‘Hesperus’ in that situation. In some worlds, including ours, Venus, i.e., Phospho-
rus is called ‘Hesperus’, and thereby (120) is true in such worlds because they include the
situations that make (120) true. But Venus or Phosphorus is not called ‘Hesperus’ in some
other worlds. Venus could orbit the Sun at a longer distance than it actually does, and we
could not observe it clearly in the evening. Perhaps Mars could be clearly viewed in the
evening in such a circumstance. (120) is false in such worlds because Mars is the seman-
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tic value of the DP Hesperus, and Mars is not Venus in all possible worlds. Thus, (120)
is a contingent truth. Therefore, accepting and asserting such a contingent proposition
would be genuinely significant.
This in turn explains our uses of proper names embedded within attitude verbs. My
treatment of attitude reports that contain proper names is exactly the same as the treatment
of the George IV case in Section 4.3.2.
(121) Mary believes/hopes/wonders that/whether Hesperus is Phosphorus.
Since the embedded clause can be understood as expressing a diagonal proposition, which
is contingent, believing, hoping, or wondering about such a proposition is significant.
4.6 Empty Names and Descriptions
I have thus far circumvented a certain class of names and descriptions that are used to
talk about things that we ordinarily consider nonexistent. We often talk about nonexis-
tent objects with a variety of intentions. We tell a fictional story, produce a false report,
propose an inaccurate scientific theory, describe an unfulfilled plan, design a new thing,
and the list seems open-ended. Both proper names and definite descriptions frequently
appear in such creative activities. For example, we sometimes use the following expres-
sions with no genuine intention to have our hands on what they literally seem to express:
Pegasus, Hamlet, Vulcan, the largest prime number, the present king of France, the effec-
tive greenhouse-gas cap measure, the fountain of youth, the imagined double spy, etc. I
will use the label ‘empty’ as a blanket term to cover all of such expressions.
Nonexistent objects and empty expressions raise a host of interesting questions.
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How can we think about what does not exist? In what sense does the mind ‘represent’
something when one of the relata seems to be missing? How can we meaningfully talk
about what does not exist? What role do empty expressions play in a theory of language?
Are empty expressions syntactically and semantically on a par with their non-empty coun-
terparts? The reader might have thought that I need to address at least some such questions
that are primarily concerned with empty expressions. For example, how does the analysis
of proper names proposed in this chapter account for the abundant use of empty expres-
sions? Before turning to my own answer to that question, I want to emphasize that any
theorist of nominal expressions needs to confront the problem of nonexistence. The prob-
lem is not inherent in the predicate thesis of proper names, which I have been pursuing in
this dissertation.
First, consider traditional descriptivism. One might think that I am making a set-
back when I discarded Russell’s quantificational view of definite descriptions and proper
names. Since I deny that a definite description contributes any quantificational force to
the logical form of the entire utterance in which it appears, I cannot adopt Russell’s ex-
planation for why we judge the following negative existentials to be true.
(122) a. The present king of France doesn’t exist.
b. Pegasus doesn’t exist.
According to Russell, (122a-b) are true because the negation correctly denies the existen-
tial quantification introduced by a definite description, which might appear to be precisely
the reason why descriptivism excels in the domain of fictitious discourse. But the problem
of nonexistence runs much deeper. Russell’s descriptivism needs some intricate assump-
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tion to account for why the following examples are judged true.
(123) a. The fountain of youth is a legendary spring that restores the youth of anyone
who drinks of its waters. (Wiki)
b. Hamlet is a prince of Denmark.
c. Pegasus is a winged white horse.
On Russell’s analysis, each definite description implies the existence of an object iden-
tified by the associated description. Since nothing fulfills the associated description, the
utterances above must be judged false. The discrepancy between the theoretical predic-
tion and our intuitive judgments does not necessarily refute descriptivism; it invites the
descriptivist theorists to say more about the uses of empty expressions.
Second, it has been widely recognized that the uses of empty names, such as those
in (122b) and (123b-c), pose a difficulty for the Millian thesis of proper names. What
predictions the Millian theorist makes about (122b) and (123b-c) depend on the details
of a particular proposal. Perhaps, the semantic value of Pegasus is undefined, and any
sentence in which it appears has an undefined sentential value, which is inconsistent with
our intuitive judgements. For example, we would easily assent to a use of (123c). The
Millian theorist is then required to somehow remove the apparent inconsistency.
The predicate thesis of proper names shares the same fate as the Millian thesis.
Although a predicative proper name itself is not a referring expression, an argumental use
of a proper name is a complex phrase contributing an object to the proposition expressed
by the entire utterance. But then how can a complex phrase contribute what does not
exist? Wherever the Millian theorist faces a difficulty, the predicate theorist suffers from
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the same problem.
Therefore, empty expressions and the surrounding questions concerning nonexis-
tent objects cannot help us tease apart the competing theses about proper names.
Having said that, however, in what follows I want to present a possible solution to
the problem of nonexistence within the presented situation semantic framework in order
to see how we can address the problem of nonexistence on a situation semantic approach.
4.6.1 Empty expressions can denote abstracta
The solution I want to adopt to the problem of nonexistence is the position sometimes
called ‘creationism’ about creatures of fiction, myth, and imagination (Kripke, 1973; van
Inwagen, 1977; Salmon, 1998; Thomasson, 1999; Caplan, 2004). Creatures of fiction,
myth, or imagination are abstract entities created by some acts of real people; they are not
very much similar to concrete humans, animals, places, etc, but rather similar to artificial
entities such as money, contracts, plots, designs, stories, etc. I assume that the domain of
discourse includes such artificial entities as well as mid-size ordinary entities: individual
variables range over all of them.42
It is in general difficult to tell precisely where and when abstract entities exist. But
it is also clear that artificial abstracta are not completely beyond spacetime. It seems
counterintuitive to think that the character Hamlet had existed long before Shakespeare
wrote the play Hamlet, just as it seems counterintuitive to think that the Chinese Renminbi
(yuan) had existed long before the departure of the first human being from Africa. Thus, I
42A non-reductive theory of social and artificial entities also seems possible (Searle, 1994; Thomasson,
1999). Of course, since the domain of discourse is not a reflected theory of the world, whether such a theory
succeeds does not affect my assumption here.
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assume that there is some spacetime, i.e., situation, that contains an artificial abstractum,
which also nicely fits with my first assumption that artificial abstracta are individuals in
the domain.
A variety of nominal expressions are suitable for talking about artificial abstracta.
I clam that the subjects of the sentences below have a certain fictional character as their
semantic value, assuming the sentences to be used in an appropriate context.
(124) a. Pierre Bezukhov is the central character in War and Peace.
b. The main character Tolstoy developed in War and Peace is well discussed by
critics.
c. This character/he [Pierre Bezukhov] is one of the best known character in the
Russian literature.
The abstractum denoted by all subjects in (124a-c) is a fictional character created and
named ‘Pierre Bezukhov’ by Tolstoy. We are all familiar with abstracta that have names:
the Peace of Westphalia, Confucianism, etc. So the fictional character here is truly pred-
icated of by the nominal expressions in (124). It is named ‘Pierre Bezukhov’ by Tolstoy,
and appears as the main character in War and Peace. Given an actual context, the uses of
(124a-c) express true propositions just as Obama is a Democrat does so.
Some uses of the sentences (124a-c) have, in some sense, an ‘external’ or ‘real’
perspective. They seem to be about the actual or real world. However, empty names also
appear in sentences that seem to be rather about fictional or hypothetical worlds. The
sentences below can be said to have an ‘internal’ or ‘fictitious’ perspective.
(125) a. Pierre Bezukhov/the principal character of War and Peace is a son of a wealthy
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count.
b. Hamlet is a prince of Denmark.
c. Pegasus is a winged white horse.
Structurally speaking, (125a-c) are analogous to (124a-c), whose subjects denote an arti-
ficial abstract object, not a concrete human being or animal. Then the uses of sentences
should be judged false because a Danish prince, for example, is not an abstract object.
I think that (125a-c) are indeed false if we suspend the internal perspective, and employ
them to describe the actual world. If you are a top-official in the White House, arrang-
ing presidential meetings with any member of a royal family, you would not advise that
Obama meet Hamlet by claiming (125b). You cannot assert (125b) when you are talking
about the actual Danish royals. A straightforward explanation for this is that (125b) is
false with respect to the actual world.
However, as long as our stance is an internal one, we take (125a-c) to be true.
How could that be the case? Following Amie Thomasson (1999), I suggest that we often
consider (125a-c) to be the shorthands for the following sentences.
(126) a. In War and Peace Pierre Bezukhov/the principal character is a son of a
wealthy count.
b. Hamlet is a prince of Denmark according to the Shakespeare’s longest play.
c. Pegasus is a winged white horse in Greek mythology.
Construed in this way, (125a-c) are not about the actual world, but rather about a story or
a mythology. Some uses of (125a-c) can be judged true as long as some uses of (126a-c)
can be judged true.
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How can some uses of (126a-c) be judged true? I assume that the semantics of in
here and according to is analogous to that of believe, repeated below, which introduces
a universal quantification over a set of possible worlds compatible with someone’s belief
state.
(127) J believe Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λx . λs . [∀w : w is compatible with x’s belief in s ](p(w))
We can generalize the compatibility relation to non-animate objects as well. A book, a
report, a map, etc can be seen as being compatible or incompatible with a set of possible
worlds depending on its information state. The lexical meaning for according to can be
expressed as follows:
(128) J according to Kg = λx . λp〈s,t〉 . λs . [∀w : w is compatible with x’s information
state in s ](p(w))
Now, given this semantic value of according to, the embedded clause is bound by
a universal quantification introduced by according to. (126c), for example, expresses a
proposition that, for every world that is compatible with Greek mythology, the object
named ‘Pegasus’ in the relevant situation is a winged white horse in that world. (126c)
is not telling us about what the fictitious creature we call ‘Pegasus’ looks like in the
actual world. It is not a statement from an external perspective. It rather tells us that
Greek mythology represents the fictitious creature as a winged horse, whatever it is in the
actual world. The DP Pegasus in this context is a rigid designator, which nondescriptively
denotes an object. Whether the denoted object is a concrete or an abstract object has
nothing to do with its property in a counterfactual circumstance. Although the creature
Pegasus is a piece of imagination, not a horse with flesh and blood in the actual world,
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the mythology treats it as a horse with wings.
One might consider this result counterintuitive. I am claiming that an abstract entity
in the actual world can be a concrete human being or an animal in another world. I do
not think of this outcome to be counterintuitive. Consider the opposite direction. Namely,
can a concrete entity be an abstract entity? I think it can. Imagine that Spanish Inquisitors
accuse me of being Satanic for whatever reasons. Spanish Inquisitors think that I am evil
spirits. That means, in the Inquisitors’ belief worlds, I am evil spirits, not an ordinary
human being. Assuming that spirits are at least aspatial, I am an aspatial being in some
counterfactual circumstance. A concrete human can be an aspatial thing. Then, there
seems to be nothing wrong for an aspatial thing, such as a fictional character, to be a
concrete thing in a different circumstance.43
We have seen that some definite descriptions denote abstracta: the main character of
War and Peace, the peace treaty, the brilliant hypothesis, the horse-like mythical creature,
etc. I also want to claim that definite descriptions for ordinary concrete objects can also
be used to refer to abstracta. Suppose that we are conversing about some fictional story,
according to which (129) is true.
43At this point one might also think that I am implicitly assuming Lewisian counterpart theory, on which
we counterfactually evaluate the counterparts of the objects in question. For example, the mythical character
Pegasus is not identical to the concrete creature Pegasus in a mythical world; but the former stands in
a counterpart relation to the latter. One might think that I need Lewisian counterpart theory because we
cannot make sense of the identity between an abstract character and a concrete animal. How could a
fictional character avoid ceasing to be itself when it loses all its typical properties, such as ‘being created
by such-and-such author’? However, counterpart theory is not necessary for the kind of approach I am
presenting here. We could also assume Lockean substances or ‘bare’ particulars, which in themselves
have no essential property, but underlie all the properties associated with objects. Such a notion of bare
particular may be conceptually coherent (cf. Sider 2006). If we think that an argument of a sentence,
such as Pegasus, nondescriptively denotes a bare particular, then it is not difficult to conceive of an identity
between a fictional and a concrete object. When we identify the mythical Pegasus and the animal Pegasus,
we are merely identifying two bare particulars, which in themselves should not be characterized as ‘being
created by such-and-such’ or ‘having wings’. Bare particulars themselves do not have such a substantial
property.
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(129) [Context: The Persian king finally hunted down a unicorn.]
The unicorn is now penned.
The predicate unicorn is, however, true of concrete animals, not of abstract entities. There
is no such animal as a unicorn. The semantic value of the description the unicorn in (129)
is thereby undefined. This is not a good result for my discussion thus far. My presented
analysis of an internal statement, such as, Hamlet is a prince, relies on the view that the
DP in question has a semantic value. The DP the unicorn must have a semantic value for
the whole utterance to be significant.
Here I again appeal to the distinction between external and internal perspectives. If
we take an external perspective, namely, use (129) to talk about the actual world, then it
is neither true nor false because its semantic value is undefined. This result fits with our
intuitions about (129). As discussed by Strawson, we would be baffled if anyone sincerely
uttered (129) to describe the actual world.44
If we take an internal perspective, then (129) is construed as a shorthand for the
following sentence:
(130) The unicorn in the relevant story is now penned.
The complex predicate unicorn in the relevant story is not a predicate true of concrete
animals. Similarly, the predicate cat in my dream is true of a piece of my imagination,
not of concrete cats. The noun unicorn or cat in such an environment seems to lose its
customary meaning. The meaning of the complex predicate is not a mere sum of the
meanings of the noun and the prepositional phrase. The phrase fake diamond seems to
44We will discuss more on Strawson’s judgments concerning seemingly undefined descriptions in Section
4.6.3.
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be an analogous case. I am not, however, able to provide the compositional semantics for
these phrases. But the result is that the DP in (130) denotes an abstract object, i.e., the
unicorn in the story. This explains why (129) and (130) are meaningful.
4.6.2 Negative existentials
Now I want to turn to negative existentials. One might think that the proposed treatment
of empty expressions directly conflicts with negative existential statements that contain
empty expressions because I claim them to denote abstract ‘existing’ objects. However,
my assumption that the domain includes artificial abstracta in itself is neither refuted nor
supported by our uses of existential constructions. The notion of the discourse domain
is different from that of the extension of the verb exist or there-construction. Accepting
that an individual variable ranges over the characters such as Pierre Bezukhov and Hamlet
does not imply that a competent speaker needs to assent or dissent to Hamlet exists. Here
is a consideration in support of this point. Frederike Moltmann (2011) points out that the
English verb exist has a sortal requirement, which makes a contrast with other verbs such
as occur and happen. The requirement is that, on the one hand, exist usually applies to
ordinary objects, whereas it hardly applies to events; on the other hand, occur applies to
events, whereas it fails to apply to ordinary objects.
(131) a. ?? The assassination of JFK exists/existed.
b. ?? John’s playing the piano exists/existed.
(132) a. The assassination of JFK happened/took place on November 22, 1963.
b. John’s playing the piano occurs in the morning.
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We ordinarily think of and talk about events as existing things. Furthermore, no one denies
the existence of the assassination; it was a real event. However, it is not clear at all if
competent speakers would assent to a use of (131a-b). Therefore, the relation between the
discourse domain and our usages of exist is not straightforward. What competent speakers
say about a use of the sentence Hamlet exists is neither supporting nor falsifying evidence
for creationism about the denotations of empty expressions unless we have a substantial
theoretical assumption about the functions of exist within sentences. In order to provide
an accurate assessment of my proposal, we have to first arrive at a detailed analysis of
existential constructions. In this work, unfortunately, I cannot provide a comprehensive
discussion of existential constructions across languages.
However, I want to sketch a plausible view of existential constructions that is com-
patible with the proposed view of empty expressions. Following Salmon (1987) and
Moltmann (2011), I assume that the verb exist can be seen as a predicate true of individu-
als, which is analogous to the verbs such as happen, take place, and occur. Furthermore, I
suggest that exist is a predicate true of all non-eventive entities, whether they are concrete
or not. Something like the following might be sufficient for the suggestion:
(133) J exist Kg = λx : x is not an event . λs . x ∈ D〈e〉 ∧ x v s
Given this lexical meaning of exist and the presented treatment of empty expressions,
each of the following sentences expresses a true proposition with an appropriate situation
as the value of the coexisting situation pronoun.
(134) a. Pierre Bezukhov exists.
b. Hamlet exists.
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Since fictional characters are artificially created objects in the world, exist is true of them
in the actual world. Indeed, in some contexts, we affirmatively use (134): Yes, Pierre
Bezukhov exists. It’s a character in Tolstoy’s novel.
Sometimes our intuitions are pulled in the opposite direction. We often find our-
selves compelled to dissent to (134): of course, Hamlet does not exist. How is this pos-
sible? The verb exist often appears with an additional phrase: in my dream, as a fictional
character, in the show, etc. Once exist is modified, the whole predicate does not apply to
all concrete and abstract entities. It only applies to some subset of it. A use of
(135) A winning lottery ticket exists in my dream.
would be false when I never dream of a winning lottery ticket. It is not contradictory to
say that many winning tickets exist, but they do not exist in my dream. Likewise, the
extension of exist can be narrowed down by a modifier so that it only applies to some
subset of ordinary concrete objects.
(136) a. Pierre Bezukhov exists in reality.
b. Hamlet exists as a real person.
c. The ghost in my closet really exists.
Given my treatment of empty expressions, for example, (136b) expresses a false proposi-
tion with a situation that contains the play Hamlet because the fictional character Hamlet
is not among the human beings. This is how we would judge some uses of (136a-c) to be
false. We would thereby judge their negations to be true. To summarize, my claim is that
a use of (137a) can be judged true because it can be seen as a shorthand for (137b), which
is true.
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(137) a. Pegasus doesn’t exist.
b. Pegasus doesn’t exist as a real creature.
We can provide a parallel analysis for the there-constructions. I suggest that, for
example, there is an F is true at a world if and only if the world includes an F , whether
it is a concrete entity or not. The compositional details are not important for present
purposes. I will just assume that there be is a vacuous predicate, which fills the second
argument of a generalized quantificational phrase an/no F . Given this assumption and
the preceding discussion, both (138) and (139) are actually true because there is no real
unicorn, while there are many fictional characters such as Hamlet in the world.
(138) There is no unicorn.
(139) There is a fictional character.
That also means that
(140) There is no Hamlet.
is false on the same ground. Hamlet as a fictional character exists. There is something
that was named ‘Hamlet’ in the actual world. However, a use of (140) can be seen as a
shorthand for a modified form, such as (141).
(141) There is no real Hamlet.
(141) is true, assuming that the adjective real is not true of artificial abstracta. That is why
we sometimes judge a use of (140) to be true.
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4.6.3 Strawson’s contrast
I conclude this chapter by discussing a puzzling contrast observed by Strawson, which has
recently attracted some attention in the philosophical and linguistic literature. Consider
the uses of (142) and (143) that take place today. Assume that each speaker is performing
a speech act of assertion by means of the utterances.
(142) The king of France is bald.
(143) My friend went for a drive with the king of France. (Strawson, 1954, 226)
As Strawson argues, there is something uneasy about declaring (142) to be plain false,
unlike the case of (143); some might judge (142) to be ‘squeamish’ or conclude that
the question of its truth or falsity simply ‘does not arise’,45 whereas competent speakers
would nearly uniformly consider (143) to be a false claim. There is at least a contrast
between (142) and (143) that needs to be explained. There are several recent attempts to
account for the contrast in a principled manner (Lasersohn, 1993; von Fintel, 2004; Yablo,
2006; Schoubye, 2009). Although I will not closely examine the extant proposals, I will
argue that the proposed treatment of empty descriptions is compatible with Strawson’s
observations concerning empty descriptions.
First of all, following Strawson, I assume that the semantic values of (142) and (143)
are both undefined because there is no present king of France. However, taking for granted
that the speaker intends to be meaningful, it would be reasonable for the interpreter to
pursue an alternative way to understand the utterance in question. I have argued that a use
of a sentence that contains an empty definite description can be understood as a shorthand
45See Strawson (1950, 1964).
174
for something else. I suggest that a use of (142) can be understood as the shorthand of
(144).
(144) The king of France in the relevant story is bald.
The description in (144) denotes an abstract entity created by the imagination of the
speaker. Thus, the semantic value of (144) is defined. Is the semantic value of (144)
a true proposition or a false one? It depends on whether we take an internal or external
perspective to interpret the utterance. If we take the internal perspective, then we never
know whether the proposition is true or false because we never know whether the king
of France in the story is bald. If we take the external perspective, then (144) expresses a
false proposition because a mental entity is not a bald person.
Thus, my proposal predicts that a use of the sentences like (142) can be true, false,
and neither true nor false. This shiftiness of truth-value judgments has been indeed ob-
served by some authors. In his article von Fintel (2004) reports that a use of (142) is
judged false given a context in which we have a complete list of the hairstyles of monar-
chs today. Anders J. Schoubye (2009) also gives us an elaborate context in which (142)
is clearly false. The actuality oriented Russell deemed (142) to be false as well.
The same story applies to (143). That is, the interpreter reinterprets a use of (143)
to be a shorthand for something else, which contains an expression denoting an abstract
object. However, (143) primarily induces an external perspective because it includes some
object in the actual world. A use of (143) today is judged false because no one can go for
a drive with a mental entity.
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Let me add a few more examples by von Fintel, which tend to induce falsity judge-
ments.
(145) a. The king of France is on a state visit to Australia this week.
b. [Coming across an abandoned umbrella]
This umbrella was left here by the king of France.
c. The king of France is jogging right now. (von Fintel, 2004, 330)
All sentences seem to be externally oriented. In other words, the speaker seems to be using
each to describe the actual world. Then, it is hard for the interpreter to take an internal
perspective to understand the utterances in question. A mental entity cannot participate
in any of the activities listed here. Thus, they are judged false with respect to the actual
world.
4.7 Summary
In this chapter I have developed a situation-based analysis of proper names and defi-
nite descriptions. Syntactically represented situation pronouns play an essential role in
accounting for implicit domain restriction as well as the independent and co-varying in-
terpretations of complex nominals. The singular and bound uses of proper names are
analyzed in terms of the general features of complex nominals. The proposed analysis
has broad implications in a wide range of issues concerning proper names and definite
descriptions. I have discussed how the analysis accounts for rigidity, the de re/dicto dis-
tinction, the bound interpretations, identity statements, propositional attitude reports, de-
scriptive names, and seemingly non-referring names and descriptions.
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Chapter 5
The Semantics of other Bare Nominals
5.1 Introduction
In the preceding chapters I have developed an analysis of proper names that accounts
for the singular, bound, and modified uses of names in English. The goal of the current
chapter is to extend the developed analysis to the uses of proper names in Japanese.
Here is an overview of my analysis of Japanese proper names. Proper names in
Japanese are semantically on a par with those in English. The singular and bound uses
of proper names in Japanese are semantically analyzed as definite descriptions, construed
as bindable referring expressions. The major difference between English and Japanese is
that Japanese has no determiner that is semantically equivalent to the definite article the
and ø . I will argue that there is a non-trivial mapping between syntax and logical form
with respect to Japanese bare nominal expressions. An argumental occurrence of a proper
name in Japanese is constituted by one or more predicative proper nouns at the level of
syntax, but a primitive semantic machinery turns the predicate into a singular referring
device at the level of logical form.
There are three reasons to expand our discussion to include the uses of names in
Japanese. First of all, the broad empirical coverage can be viewed as corroborating evi-
dence for the developed analysis of proper names and definite descriptions. We have seen
earlier in Chapter 2 some puzzling occurrences of names in Japanese, which pose trouble
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to both names-as-individual-constants view and names-as-variables view. My analysis
comprehensively accounts for the otherwise annoying Japanese data in a unified fashion.
A second reason has to do with the cross-linguistic understanding of definite de-
scriptions or the lack thereof. In the philosophical literature within the Anglophone tra-
dition, non-English languages have been rarely reviewed and discussed. The lack of
cross-linguistic considerations does not merely highlight the practical limitation of any
scientific research. It can be a serious shortcoming of a philosophical study. In “On
Denoting” (1905) Russell brings our attention to the syntactic form of what he calls a ‘de-
noting phrase’, in contrast to his earlier work Principles of Mathematics (1903), where he
claims that some concepts inherently and logically denote objects, with no particular dis-
cussion of structural features. Russell in 1905 suggests that a definite description is one
of the denoting phrases that are distinguished from other expressions in structural terms.
(1) By a “denoting phrase” I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a
man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the
present King of France, the centre of mass of the Solar System at the first instant
of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution
of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form.1
(Russell, 1905, 478, emphasis in original)
It remains common practice among philosophers to identify a definite description in
purely formal terms based on its characteristic syntactic structure. We normally consider
a definite description to be a definite article (i.e., the) followed by an NP (e.g., present king
1Russell does not mean that a phrase denotes an object in virtue of its form. In other words, he does not
think that the structure itself is the reason why a phrase can denote. He just calls an expression a ‘denoting
phrase’ in virtue of its form. See (Kaplan, 2005).
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of France). This practice immediately raises a question, ‘What is a definite description in
articleless languages?’.
The presence and the absence of articles classify the world languages into at least
three groups. First, there are many English-type languages, which have both definite and
indefinite articles. Second, some languages such as Turkish have only an indefinite article.
Third, there are also a number of languages that have neither definite nor indefinite article.
One study shows that the third group is not a minority as indicated by Row 5 of (2).
(2) Distribution of Articles in the World’s Languages
Characteristics # of languages
1 Definite word distinct from demonstrative 216
2 Demonstrative word used as marker of definiteness 69
3 Definite affix on noun 92
4 No definite article but indefinite article 44
5 Neither definite nor indefinite article 199
Total 620
(after Dryer and Haspelmath 2011, Ch. 372)
To list a few, the third group (Row 5) includes Latin, Russian, Serbo-Croatian, Czech,
Polish, Ukrainian, Slovenian, Bini (African), Sidaama (African), Quechua, Navajo, Pomo
(Californian), Mohawk, Southern Tiwa, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Hindi, Punjabi, etc.
(Bošković, 2009; Dryer and Haspelmath, 2011).
Seen in this light, any structural definition of definite descriptions that appeals to
the presence of a definite article is problematic because it fails to apply to such articleless
languages.3 What should we say about descriptions in articleless languages? Speakers
2Dryer and Haspelmath includes Japanese as having an indefinite article, i.e., belonging to Row 4, which
can be debated. I put Japanese in the line 5.
3A radical alternative is to conclude that there is no such thing as a definite description in articleless
languages and the speakers of articleless languages never use a definite description, which I do not consider
in this work.
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of articleless languages, of course, talk about the largest prime number, the Solar system,
the Republican candidates, etc. Does Russell’s semantic analysis of descriptions apply to
articleless languages, even though his structural definition is not available? This chapter
offers a rare attempt to address such a cross-linguistic question by presenting a theory
of descriptions for articleless languages. I will argue that our non-Russellian analysis
of definite descriptions can be naturally extended to cover Japanese, one of the world’s
articleless languages.
A third reason is a broader consideration concerning bare nominal expressions in
general. I have compared and assimilated some uses of proper names and definite de-
scriptions. There is another class of expressions that behave similarly to proper names.
In English plural count nouns (e.g., tigers) and mass nouns (e.g., water) can appear in the
surface without being supported by any other word that typically introduces a common
noun (articles, quantifiers, demonstratives, and numerals). Just as proper names, they
alone can be used as arguments of sentences.
(3) Tigers are four-legged.
(4) Retired groupies should receive social security benefits. (Carlson, 1977a, 1)
(5) Water is H2O.
(6) Bill threw snow at Phil.
Several constructions also suggest that bare plurals are more aligned with proper
names and definite descriptions than with quantified phrases. Paul Postal (1969) reports
that the so-called phrase is compatible with all of proper names, definite descriptions and
bare plurals, but not with other complex nominals as in (7). Mass terms also seem to be
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acceptable in the so-called construction as in (8).


















cardinals are so-called because of their color.
(Carlson, 1977a, 60)
(8) Fool’s gold is so called because it bears a visual similarity to real gold.
(Google search)
Likewise, Carlota Smith (1964) notes another construction that prefers bare plurals to-
gether with proper names.
(9) a. Mean though Bill is, he hasn’t the heart to do that.
b. Mean though bobcats are, they are still good pets.






are, they wouldn’t harm our dog.
(Carlson, 1977a, 60)
Bare mass terms can also be used naturally with a similar construction as follows.
(10) Useful and familiar though water is, it is not really tame stuff. (Google search)
181
Proper names and bare plurals are also alike when used as vocatives. Most quantificational
nominals are quite unnatural in the vocative construction, however.














Lend me your ears. (Carlson, 1977a, 60)
Mass terms again seem to pattern more with proper names in vocatives.
(12) We saw a spring there and drank some water. Oh, water! It was so long-expected,
sweet and cold water! (Google search)
Thus, proper names share some syntactic characteristics with other bare nominals.
Furthermore, it has long been pointed out that proper names and other bare nomi-
nals have several semantic characteristics in common (Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1975). For
example, Kripke suggests that theoretical identity statements that contain two general
terms (e.g., Water is H2O) are, if true, examples of necessary aposteriori, just as identity
statements that contain two proper names (e.g., Hesperus is Phosphorus).
I do not think of these striking similarities among bare nominals to be mere coin-
cidence. The similarities call for a unified treatment of proper names, bare plurals, and
mass terms. Nominal expressions in articleless languages such as Japanese provide an
important insight at this point. Japanese bare nominals perform the functions of definite
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and indefinite descriptions, and of bare mass and plural terms in English. If we can apply
our analysis of definite descriptions to Japanese bare nominals in general, then we can in
turn apply it to English bare mass and plural terms. I will indeed argue that bare plurals
and mass terms in argument position are analyzed as a sort of definite descriptions that
denote very large individuals.
In what follows, first, I review the basic data of Japanese articleless NPs (Section
5.2). Second, I present the semantics of Japanese articleless NPs, which is also applicable
to English bare mass and plural terms with a small variation (Section 5.3). Third, I argue
against the view that Japanese articleless NPs contain silent interpretive structure (Section
5.4). Forth, I will discuss some philosophical implications of the extended analysis of
proper names (Section 5.5).
5.2 The Characteristics of Bare Nouns
Japanese is an articleless language, along with many other languages as noted above.
Count and mass terms such as tora (‘tiger’) and mizu (‘water’) can appear on their own
with no demonstrative or quantificational modifier both in argumental and non-argumental
positions. I call such occurrences of NPs that superficially come with no determiner-like
expression ‘bare’ NPs. A single word-form, seemingly the same NP, can be used to ex-
press various different thoughts. I will catalogue a variety of interpretations observed in
the bare uses of common and proper nouns in Japanese. A Japanese bare noun can be
used to express four different sorts of meaning; object-reference, existential quantifica-
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tion, generic quantification,4 and kind-reference, although the taxonomy is theory-laden
and question begging—I follow the standard linguistic convention and use these four the-
oretical terms such as ‘kind-reference’ to describe the relevant phenomena. I am not
suggesting that these four terms are theoretically basic. I will indeed argue in Section
5.3.3 that what is standardly assumed to be kind-referential sentences by linguists are an-
alyzed in terms of non-intensional collections of things, along the lines of Burge’s theory
of mass and plural terms (Burge, 1977). It is also worth noting that we can observe four
different sorts of uses of bare NPs in Japanese, which is also observable in Mandarin
Chinese (Cheng and Sybesma, 1999; Yang, 2001), Hindi, and Russian (Chierchia, 1998;
Dayal, 2004).
5.2.1 Bare common nouns
For all sentences below, the translations in the inverted commas are typical readings peo-
ple would find in hearing the sentences. They by no means exhaust the possible readings
of the sentences used in various contexts. First, I consider the bare common nouns used
as the direct objects of transitive verbs, marked by the accusative case morpheme o. (13)
illustrates an indefinite use of the bare noun hon (‘book’). An utterance of (13) can be
true when the speaker went to a bookstore with the intention of purchasing one or more
books with no particular book in mind. The speaker can add, for example, ‘Because I











4Sentences that express generic quantification are also sometimes called ‘characterizing sentences’
(Krifka et al., 1995)
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‘I went to buy a book/books.’
(14) illustrates the definite interpretation of a bare noun, where the noun hon is
modified by the restrictive relative clause yoyakusiteita (‘that he has reserved’). There is
















‘Taro went to the library to pick up the book/books he reserved.’
(15) and (16) are the examples of ‘generic’ or ‘characterizing’ sentences that are
concerned with some sort of regularities, not with particular events. (15) is about the
referred person’s habit of reading books in general. (16) states that Tanaka is usually in


































‘It’s Tanaka who is mainly in charge of children’s books.’
(17) is often described in the linguistic literature as involving ‘reference to a kind’
because the main predicate seems predicated of a kind or a genus, not of any particular
object. The sentence is also not concerned with any generalization, but with a single event.
The main caveat here is that I use the term ‘kind reference’ for a descriptive convenience.













The examples (13-17) overall indicate that Japanese bare NPs can play analogous
roles of English definite and indefinite descriptions (e.g., the book, a book) and bare plu-
rals (e.g., books). One of the main goals of this chapter is to explain how this interpretive
flexibility is possible.
Now I want to note that one and the same bare NP could be used to convey different
thoughts even when it is in one and the same construction. A use of (13) can be true
when the speaker indeed does have a particular book in mind, just as we use a definite
description to talk about a unique object. (13) can be interpreted as if it contains a definite
description: the speaker went to buy the original edition of Begriffsschrift, which she has
found at the store and promised to buy after retrieving cash.
Likewise, (14) can be used to talk about an indefinite number of books: the local
library will be shut down and needs to dispose of all its collections. Taro is one of many
second hand book dealers who have a contract to purchase whatever amount of books
that the library allots to them. Taro has no idea how many books he would be able to
purchase—the number could range from just one to a few hundreds. He anyway went to
the library with his van. This circumstance is compatible with (14).
(15) contains an individual-level predicate or an expression that specifies somewhat
stable state of an individual, not an action or event in which the individual participates.
And it invokes a generic reading. However, it is compatible with the scenario in which
the bare noun hon is anaphorically used to refer to the previously mentioned book. Here
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is a possible setup. Back then when books were treasures, the average sailors might have
never seen a book in their lives. If so, then the generic reading of (15) might be almost
unthinkable in the following context:
(18) Everything was gone when the ship wrecked. We only have one book and one
scroll left. I like toying with the scroll because I can’t read. But that guy is
literate. So ‘(15)’.
The generic reading is not enforced on the use of (15) despite its naturalness. Similarly,
an anaphoric reading of (16) seems possible. One can be in charge of a particular set
of children’s books. On the other hand, an anaphoric reading of (17) is hard to obtain
unless we impose a somewhat attenuated meaning, like ‘to create something’, on the verb
hatumeis (‘invent’).
To summarize the observations thus far, bare common nouns used as direct ob-
jects can have four different readings, i.e., indefinite, definite, generic, and kind readings,
and, on some occasions, one and the same sentence may be used to invoke two different
readings. We have seen that an anaphoric reading—definitely talking about a previously
mentioned object—is available in most cases.
Now I discuss the cases where bare common nouns are used as the subjects of
sentences. Many more examples will be examined because Japanese has two distinct
particles wa and ga, either one of which usually occurs with the subject of any sentence,
resulting in a variety of interpretations.


















































‘Look! The sky is red’ (Kuno, 1973, 50)
The sentences in (19) seem to involve stage-level and existential predicates, describing
objectively observable action, existence and temporal state of something. We do not
have to worry about if this generalization well captures the meaning of ga. We are more
concerned with the interpretations of bare NPs than those of the particle ga. Both definite
and indefinite readings are attested in (19). (19a) appears to be talking about a unique dog
or a unique set of dogs. (19b) is analogous to an English existential statement containing
an indefinite description. Also note that the adverbial PP tukue no ue ni (‘on the table’)
could appear after the NP (19c), which shows that an existential reading is not a special
property of a certain argument position. It is hard to obtain an existential reading in (19a).
But, if we substitute the main predicate with something that is temporally or epistemically

























‘It seems like a dog was going to cross the street.’
A use of an NP plus ga can also generate a generic and a kind-referential reading in
limited circumstances. (21a) depicts what Kuroda and Kuno call the exhaustive-listing




































‘I know that potatoes contain vitamin C.’
(21a) attributes human ancestry to nothing but the monkey species. A use of (21a) im-
plies that no other candidate can be the human ancestor. This characteristic of ga has a
somewhat similar effect as a focused element in many English sentences (cf. John kissed
Mary). As in (21b), the subject of an embedded clause tends to have the ga particle instead
of wa. (21b) seems to make a nutritional generalization about potatoes, not commenting
on any particular event or potato.
Another point to note is that the topic marker wa is not necessary for a generic
interpretation. Krifka et al. (1995, 118) note that, in Japanese, the subject nominal is
marked by wa when it gets a generic interpretation, whereas it is marked by ga in the case
of existential reading, which does not hold generally, as we just saw.
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Therefore, four different readings, i.e., indefinite, definite, generic and kind ones,
are observed in the subject uses of Japanese bare common nouns with the ga particle. The
pattern is slightly different from the one in Mandarin Chinese reported by Lisa Lai-Shen
Cheng and Rind Sybesma (1999) because they claim that Mandarin bare NPs in preverbal
positions cannot have indefinite interpretations. Of course, that does not mean that all
four readings are always available to every occurrence of an NP plus ga. The availability
of a reading seems dependent on the choice of a main predicate.
Now I turn to the other particle wa. We can again observe all four readings in some
or other constructions that involve the NP-wa sequence. The particle wa is said to play
two different roles: marking topics or themes, and making contrasts. The topical use of



























‘Speaking of my son/sons, he/they came to the party.’
The contrastive use of wa seems to allow an indefinite reading of a bare noun.





















‘There is a book over there, but no magazine.’
To summarize, Japanese bare common nouns allow four different readings, whether
they are used as the subjects or objects of sentences, with either particle wa or ga. An
occurrence of a bare NP, abstracting away from its environment, is superficially ambigu-
ous. Of course, that does not mean that the Japanese people are always confused—
disambiguation occurs and communication flows. The question is where the disambigua-
tion occurs. In Section 5.4, I will deny the view that it occurs at the level of syntax. Now
I turn to proper nouns in Japanese, which exhibit the same pattern with bare common
nouns.
5.2.2 Proper nouns
I have defended the predicate thesis of proper names. Proper and common nouns belong
to the same category of noun, and one or more proper nouns constitute NPs, which are
used as proper names. Based on the predicate thesis, we can predict that Japanese proper
names can be used to express four different interpretations just as common nouns. This
prediction is indeed born out.
As the singular use of a proper name shows, Japanese bare proper names can be
definitely used to talk about particular individuals. See the examples in Chapter 1. It
is also possible to indefinitely use a proper name with no assumption about uniqueness.
Indefinite uses of proper names are probably not very common because there are not many
circumstances in which nothing but the existence of an individual with a certain name is
the main topic of the conversation. But we can certainly entertain such a scenario.
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Suppose that there is an obsolete custom known by few: it is a privilege for a
young child to meet with someone whose surname is ‘Kotobuki’, which literally means
longevity. Perhaps driven by anachronism in his family, a young man, Taro, is desperate
looking for a Kotobuki. He wishes to see, at least, one Kotobuki, and if possible a cou-













































































‘I found Kotobukis. Surprisingly, there are four of them in this town.’
No occurrence of the name Kotobuki in (24a-d) can be seen as referring to a particular in-
dividual.5 The sentences therein seem to existentially quantify over individuals whose
name is ‘Kotobuki’. These examples can be easily accommodated by assuming that
names such as Kotobuki belong to the category of predicates along with common nouns
because, as we have seen above, bare common nouns permit existential interpretations.
5Arguably, the bare proper noun in the first half of (24d) is definitely used, designating the set of persons
named ‘Kotobuki’ in the town.
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As we have seen in Chapter 2, a proper name in Japanese can also be used to make
a generic assertion. I repeat the demographic statement about the distribution of surnames
in (25a). I can also think of pseudoscientific statements about the relations between names
and some characteristics such as personalities as in (25b). Perhaps inevitably, such a use




































‘Those named ‘Keiko’ tend to be good-tempered.’ OR ‘Keiko is good-tempered.’
In Japanese, the uses of proper nouns exhibit the same variety of possible interpretations
as those of common nouns. Thus, we have substantial evidence to treat proper names as
nominal predicates, along with common nouns.
5.2.3 Narrow scope
Researchers of bare NPs have not failed to notice that they seem to have peculiar scopal
properties. English bare plurals always seem to take the narrowest scope possible with
respect to scope-sensitive expressions, as in the examples below from (Carlson, 1977b).
(26) a. Minnie wishes to talk with a young psychiatrist. (∃ > wish or wish > ∃)
193
b. Minnie wishes to talk with young psychiatrists. (only wish > ∃)
(27) a. Everyone read a book on caterpillars. (∀ > ∃ or ∃ > ∀)
b. Everyone read books on caterpillars. (only ∀ > ∃)
(28) a. A goat didn’t run across my lawn. (¬ > ∃ or ∃ > ¬)
b. Goats didn’t run across my lawn. (only ¬ > ∃) (Carlson, 1977b)
For example, there is a transparent reading in (26a), according to which there is a certain
young psychiatrist with whom Minnie wishes to talk. Not any young psychiatrist will do.
The indefinite description a young psychiatrist is somehow able to produce two different
scopes with respect to wish. By contrast, the bare plural young psychiatrists in (26b) is
not just a plural version of the singular indefinite description. (26b) only allows a narrow
scope reading, according to which Minnie wishes to talk with some or other group of
young psychiatrists. There is no specific group of young psychiatrists to whom she is
showing interest.
Hotze Rullmann and Aili You (2006) claim that bare nouns in Mandarin Chinese
also take the narrowest scope possible by presenting the Chinese sentences analogous to
Gregory Carlson’s examples. One needs to be cautious, however, when carrying over
Carlson’s observation to Chinese or Japanese because they always allow bare NPs to have
the readings equivalent to the referential or anaphoric uses of definite descriptions. It is
not straightforward to distinguish a transparent reading of a plural indefinite description
from a reading of an incomplete plural definite description.
To verify Rullmann and You’s point, I want to consider an intermediate reading of
an indefinite description. Logically speaking, if we have ∀, ∃, and ¬, then there would
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be two combinations (∀ > ∃ > ¬) and (¬ > ∃ > ∀), in which ∃ takes the intermediate
scope. Consider (29a), which seems to have at least one intermediate reading of some
goat, as paraphrased as (29b).
(29) a. Every person didn’t see some goat.
b. For any person, there is some goat that the person didn’t see. (∀ > ∃ > ¬)
Such an intermediate reading is also available to a Japanese indefinite description
as in (30a). However, once we drop the indefinite quantificational term nan-biki-ka-no as




















‘Every person didn’t see goats.’ (*∀ > ∃ > ¬)
(30b) has neither (∀ > ∃ > ¬) nor (¬ > ∃ > ∀) reading—the latter would be paraphrased
as ‘there is no goat that everybody saw’.
Therefore, Japanese bare NPs seem to take the narrowest scope possible. This
finding is a desideratum that any adequate analysis of Japanese bare NPs must meet. I
will explain this property by treating bare NPs as mere predicates, non-quantificational
terms.
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5.3 The Semantics of Bare Nouns
This section presents a semantic account of Japanese bare nouns that accommodates
all the relevant characteristics we have just discussed. The very nature of my basic
strategy requires the comprehensive treatment of singular/plural, count/mass, and indefi-
nite/definite nominals. I can by no means do justice to the massive literature on such wide
ranging topics. However, my account substantiates the thesis that the properties of proper
names naturally follow from the general architecture of the nominal domain.
The account roughly goes as follows. In spite of its interpretive variations, any
use of a bare NP has a uniform linguistic meaning: all bare NPs are of the predicative
semantic type. There are, however, a handful of independent semantic rules implied by
the domain of discourse and type theory. Such semantic rules, though they complicate the
relation between syntax and logical form, can yield the observed interpretations with no
overgeneration.
I will throughout use singular quantification together with an assumption that the
domain includes collections of individuals, which also count as individuals. I need ref-
erence to such plural entities to provide the semantics of mass terms (e.g., water) and
plural count nouns (e.g., cats). Logic with plural quantification might as well simplify
my account to a non-negligible extent, the proof of which I reserve for another occasion
(cf. Schein 1993; Rayo 2002; Pietroski 2005a; Nicolas 2008).
Whatever theoretical framework one adopts, the main message that I am advocating
is clear. Proper names are not very special. A variety of characteristics we find in their
uses (e.g., rigidity, bindability, etc) are not the inherent properties of some distinctive
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expressions, but derived from the primitive rules of interpretation in the nominal domain.
5.3.1 Background
I introduce two notions as the necessary background for my analysis of Japanese bare
NPs.
5.3.1.1 Domains with aggregates
Following Burge (1977), I assume that the ordinary notion of ‘aggregate’ is theoretically
tractable and plays an important role in semantic theory that deals with not only singular
constructions such as the king of France, but also non-singular constructions such as the
kings and queens of France.
An aggregate never introduces an ontologically distinct category over and above
what I have been referring to by ‘individuals’, ‘objects’, and ‘particulars’. We think that
there are stars in the sky, and we can talk about one star or another individually; We can
also talk about many stars at the same time as in (31).
(31) The stars that presently make up the Pleaides galactic cluster occupy an area that
measures 700 cubic light years. (Burge, 1977, 97)
If we literally take what the stars denotes to ‘occupy’ a spatial region, then we can under-
stand the denotation as a collection of stars because we take each star to occupy a space,
and expect their collection together to occupy a space as well.
I will call a collection of individuals that also counts as an individual an ‘aggregate’.
An aggregate is an object that has other objects as its members. If all of its members are
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physical objects occupying space and time, then the aggregate is also a physical object
occupying space and time. This does not exclude a possibility in which there are some
aggregates that, partially or wholly, consist of nonphysical objects.
Burge theoretically specifies the notion of aggregate in terms of Nelson Goodman’s
calculus of individuals (Leonard and Goodman, 1940; Goodman, 1966). I follow the sub-
sequent work by linguists, such as Godehard Link (1983) and Fred Landman (1989), and
introduce a few additional primitive notions into the semantic system presented in Chap-
ter 4. But I believe that none of my theses about natural language and their philosophical
implications essentially relies on any formal detail.
I stipulate that the discourse domain is a set containing both atomic objects and
aggregates that have atomic objects as their members. An aggregate is an individual
consisting of one or more atomic objects, which is individuated by its ‘members’. For
example, if Snoopy and Odie are atomic objects, then Snoopy+Odie is an aggregate,
where Snoopy is a ‘member-component of’ (≺) the aggregate Snoopy+Odie. It is worth
emphasizing that an aggregate is not a mereological fusion. Thus, Snoopy’s tail is not a
member-component of (⊀) the aggregate Snoopy+Odie.
An atomic object has nothing but itself as its member. The notion of ‘atomic object’
has nothing to do with the fundamental entities in the universe. Atomic objects are usually
conceived of with respect to a particular noun. Imagine a domain that contains just two
dogs: Odie and Snoopy. Now consider the noun dog, which applies to Odie and Snoopy.
With respect to dog, Odie and Snoopy are atomic because none of their parts are dogs.
Odie’s tail is not a dog. Snoopy’s ear is not a dog. Tails, ears, and other things in the
domain are smaller parts of Odie and Snoopy, but they are not atomic with respect to dog.
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As we saw in Chapter 4, the domain is partially ordered by a ‘part-of’ relation ‘v’.
In addition to a mereological relation, the domain is also partially ordered by the member-
component relation ≺. The ‘join’ operation ‘+’ is an operation that takes any nonempty
subset of the domain and maps it onto the smallest element of the domain such that every
element of the subset is its member. For example, the join operation maps {a, b} onto
a+ b, which is the smallest aggregate in the domain that has both a and b as its members.
So I use a saturated join function to stand for its value, an aggregate. An object a is atomic
with respect to a noun N if and only if, for anything b such that b is (an) N in the domain,
if b ≺ a, then b = a.
A domain containing three atomic objects and their aggregates can be visualized as
follows:
(32) a. a+ b+ c
a+ b a+ c b+ c
a b c
b. i. a ≺ a
ii. a ≺ a+ b
iii. b ≺ a+ b
iv. a+ b ≺ a+ b+ c
. . .
(32a) represents the elements of the domain, where a, b, and c are atomic and a+ b+ c is
the largest element. The member-component-of relation holds among the elements as in
(32b).
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Now imagine that (32a) represents all the dogs there are. That is, (32a) is a subsest
of a larger domain, and the atomic elements a, b, and c in (32a) exhaust all dogs in the
domain. (32a) distinguishes dogs from the rest of objects in a number-neutral fashion.
Anything falls under (32a) just in case we count it as a dog or an aggregate of dogs.
The count noun inu (‘dog’) in Japanese is a number-neutral predicate. It applies to
anything that we count as a dog or dogs regardless of their number. I claim that the lexical
meaning of inu can be described in terms of (32a), so inu is true of each dog and also of





































‘A thousand/many dogs barked at once.’
Note that none of the occurrences of inu in (33) is number marked, although it is used to
talk about many different numbers of dogs. I suggested that this is because inu indiscrim-
inately applies to atomic and aggregate dogs.
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5.3.1.2 Type-shifting and how to represent maximality
Following Barbara Partee and others,6 I assume that a limited number of independent
semantic rules play an important role in a semantic analysis of NPs. The following ex-
plains what I mean by an ‘independent semantic rule’. First, there is no element in a
syntactic representation that encodes such a rule. Second, it changes the category of the
meaning of an expression and sometimes adds content to the basic meaning. Third, it
is not a pragmatic consideration such as an inference based on Gricean maxims and the
cooperative principle of conversation. Independent semantic rules open the possibility of
a one-to-many relation between syntax and logical form of natural language.7
I assume that ‘type-shifting’ functions theoretically capture the essence of, at least,
some of the independent semantic rules required to explain the uses of bare NPs. Our
semantic theory appeals to some notions in type theory. Expressions and also objects in
the domain are associated with semantic types. For example, if we treat the adjective red
as an expression of type 〈e, t〉, then it is associated with an entity of type 〈e, t〉, which
is a function from e-typed objects (i.e., ordinary entities) to t-typed objects (i.e., truth-
values). This suggests that we classify the entities in the domain into several categories
according to their semantic types; some subsets of the domain consist only of the entities
6See (Partee and Rooth, 1983; Partee, 1986b; Chierchia, 1998; Tomioka, 2003; Dayal, 2004).
7The possibility just mentioned must be discussed a little more carefully. For Partee and Rooth originally
introduced a type-shifting rule as a ‘redundancy’ rule that insures that ‘each “low-type” verb has predictable
homonyms of higher type’ (Partee and Rooth, 1983, 339, my emphasis). A redundancy rule can be seen as
introducing a derived homophonous word into a syntactic representation, and hence never complicates the
mapping between syntax and logical form. Redundancy rules are concerned rather about disambiguation
or the complexity of the lexicon. Partee (1986b) also suggests that type-shifting rules are compatible with
Montague’s even stronger homomorphism requirement between syntactic categories and semantic types
(See fn.1 in Partee, 1986). I take her considerations to indicate that the mere introduction of type-shifting
rules would not necessarily complicate the syntax-logical form mapping. I will discuss why the semantics
of Japanese bare nouns need to introduce a non-trivial mapping between syntax and logical form later.
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of a certain type, and they thereby easily stand out (e.g, D〈e〉). We can think of various
mapping relations between the entities in such homogeneous subsets. Such a function is
type-shifting because it maps an entity of a certain type onto another of a different type.
Thus, our semantic theory by its design entails a variety of type-shifting rules. That
does not show that, however, all such rules are available to natural language semantics.
In general, I consider the relation between logic and natural language semantics very
unclear.
I appeal to a widely-used definiteness operation that encodes the notion of maximal-
ity, which is just a variant of the iota operation. The iota operation is a partial mapping
from D〈e,t〉 to D〈e〉, mapping any singleton set onto its member (Partee, 1986b), which is
described in our metalanguage with the inverted ‘ ’. I used iota as the lexical meaning of
the definite article the for simplicity. Apparently, iota cannot handle plural constructions.
Following Sharvy (1980, 612), I use a mu to express in our metalanguage the largest
object that satisfies F as follows:8
(34) µx(Fx)
Sharvy defines ‘µx(Fx)’ as an incomplete symbol, which is designed to be an extension
of Russell’s quantificational theory of definite descriptions. I have, however, criticized
and didn’t adopt a quantificational approach to the semantics of definite descriptions in
Chapter 4. I use ‘µx(Fx)’ as a complete expression of type 〈e〉. ‘µ’ is an operator that
forms a term when combined with an open sentence. The truth-conditions of a sentence
8In the linguistic literature, the non-inverted ‘ι’ is often implicitly redefined as encoding maximality
and used in the place of Sharvy’s ‘µ’. Some theorists use ‘σ’, following (Link, 1983). This comment may
seem all terminological. But to distinguish the singular iota and a non-singular variant is important for my
analysis because I consider the silent determiner ø  in English encodes iota, not its plural variant.
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that contains ‘µx(Fx)’, such as (35a), can be represented as follows:
(35) a. G(µx(Fx))
b. ∃x([Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y v x)] ∧Gx)
The first two conjuncts within square brackets are to be understood as a presuppositional
content. Sharvy makes sure that x is the largest F in terms of the ‘part-of’ relation:
‘∀y(Fy → y v x))’ implies any F is part of x—x is all F that there is.
Now we can define iotam as a partial function that maps any set onto its largest
element, if there is such a thing.
(36) iotam: λF〈e,t〉 : ∃x(Fx ∧ ∀y(Fy → y v x)) . µx(Fx) (Extensional version)
The English definite article the encodes iotam as its lexical meaning. All singular cases
discussed in the previous chapter are subsumed as a subset of the uses of iotam.9 For
any x, x v x. If there is just one atomic object that is uniquely F in the domain, then
that object is µx(Fx). I will explain how iotam is employed to account for the attested
readings of Japanese bare NPs.
5.3.2 Object Reference
Let us first consider a referential or anaphoric use of a bare NP.














‘A dog and cat entered the room.’
9That is, the lexical meaning of the is (an intensional version of) iotam, which is distinct from the non-
plural iota. As mentioned in Chapter 3 and 4, there is no singular use of a plural proper name. Smiths
cannot be used to refer to, say, the two contextually salient Smiths. So I take ø  to encode the uniqueness












‘The cat crawled up on my lap.’
b. i. ∃x∃y(dog(x)∧cat(y)∧entered(x)∧entered(y))
ii. crawled-up( xcat(x))
The occurrence of neko in (37a.ii) is used to refer to the previously mentioned cat.
An analysis of bare NPs must produce something similar to (37b.ii).
I propose that a bare NP in Japanese lacks a determiner, but everything else is
analogous to English DPs. Since I posited a situation pronoun inside a DP in Chapter 4,
I assume that a situation pronoun also coexists with a Japanese NP. I also retain the basic
semantic types introduced in Chapter 4. A situation pronoun is of type 〈s〉. All nouns,
adjectives and verbs are of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, which has a situation argument slot.








. . . swarikonda〈e,〈s,t〉〉
The NP neko co-occurs with an unbound situation pronoun. But there is no unpronounced
determiner introducing the NP. This configuration on its own yields no proposition even
after a variable assignment assigns values to all variables. The semantic value of the
constituent α is clearly undefined.
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However, the iotam operation rescues us to obtain a proposition from the utterance
made. The following is the iotam rule within our situation semantics, which is equivalent
to the meaning of the definite article.
(39) iotam: λF〈e,t〉 . λs : ∃x(F (x)(s) ∧ ∀y(F (y)(s)→ y v x)) . µx(F (x)(s))
(Situation version)
iotam turns a Japanese bare NP into an individual concept of some sort by changing its
type to 〈s, e〉, which can be combined with a situation pronoun of type 〈s〉. The outcome
is an individual of type 〈e〉. That is, a bare NP in Japanese or the constituent α as a whole
can be a definite description at the level of logical form. The phrase s2 neko together
with iotam denotes the largest cat in the relevant situation, i.e., the previously mentioned
cat. Since iotam is what the definite article encodes as its lexical meaning, this analysis
guarantees that Japanese bare NPs have anaphoric and referential readings just as English
definite descriptions.10
Consequentially, since the singular and bound uses of proper names in Japanese
are bare NPs, an argumental occurrence of a proper name in Japanese can be analyzed
in the same way as the bare NP neko above. Our analysis of English proper names and
definite descriptions developed in Chapter 4 is now extended to Japanese proper names
and definite uses of common nouns.
10I do not have anything special to say about the semantic significance of the case morphemes such as
ga in this example. I here simply treated them as semantically vacuous. Here is a possible analysis of the
case morphemes. The morpheme ga and other case particles clearly correlate to the thematic roles that
the denotations of the attached nominals perform. It might as well be the case that the case morphemes
turn referential expressions into predicates of events. For example, the nominative ga can be assigned the
function from an entity to a function that maps an event onto Truth if and only if the given entity is the
agent of the event. One problem to be solved for this analysis is that Japanese has a few verbs that create
the ‘double-nominative construction’, in which ga is attached not to an agent, but to a theme of the relevant
event.
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Maximality As a piece of evidence for the use of iotam, I cite the examples to show that































‘One girl remained silence.’
(40a) sets up the scene in which three girls came to the park to play. (40b) contains a
bare NP, whose interpretation is now under consideration. As is clear from the previous
discussions, (40b) could be about some other girl mentioned elsewhere. If there is no
other contextual information, however, the bare noun onnanoko in (40b) seems to be
anaphoric to sanninno onnanoko in (40a). In such a circumstance, crucially, onnanoko
is used to refer to all three girls without leaving out any. Why does this have to be
the case? Just one or two girls, not all three, could have started singing. I claim that
the anaphoric interpretation of (40b) involves some form of maximality encoded in our
linguistic knowledge. One might suggest that the maximality of (40b) stems from Gricean
reasoning. The speaker should have used a partitive construction or something else if she
wanted to report that some but not all girls started singing. Otherwise, the interpreter
would settle down at what has been explicitly stated, i.e, ‘three girls’. This suggestion,
however, does not work because it is difficult to cancel the maximality as shown in (40c).
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Therefore, maximality must be semantically registered in some way or other. The use of
iotam accounts for why this is the case.
5.3.3 So-called Kind-Reference
5.3.3.1 What is a kind?
I will argue that we should consider what is referred to as ‘kind’ in the linguistic literature
to be an aggregate of objects, not literally an abstract kind. A number of studies on
generics have put forward the thesis that bare NPs and some other expressions denote
abstract kinds (Carlson, 1977a; Krifka et al., 1995; Chierchia, 1998, a.o.). For example,
Manfred Krifka says that ‘kinds seem to be ontologically prior to specimens’ (Krifka,
1995, 399). Surprisingly, however, we have seldom seen explicit discussions on abstract
kinds in the generics literature.
Carlson’s discussion of kinds in the late seventies, which has initiated the talk of
kinds among linguists, seems to be confused. Carlson introduces quantification over
stages or temporal parts of objects in order to build a semantics of particular objects.
Carlson (1977a, 68-9) also likens a stage of an object to be an instantiation of a kind.
Multiple stages are related to a single object. He suggests that multiple objects that share
some property are also related to a distinct object, which he calls a ‘kind’. Thus, he says,
‘[a] set of objects, too, may be related to a kind in the same way a series of stages is
related to an object’ (Carlson, 1977a, 69).
But what is this relation that connects not only objects and their stages, but also
kinds and their instantiations? Usually, a stage or temporal part of an object is, literally, a
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part of an object. In light of the stage ontology, an object is a four-dimensional mereolog-
ical sum of many stages that exist in spacetime.11 This ‘part-of’ relation does not quite
square with the instantiation relation we usually associate with a kind and the objects that
are the instantiations of that kind. If we literally extends the mereological talk to the se-
mantics of generics, then ‘kinds’ must be conceived of as four-dimensional mereological
fusions of particular objects that perhaps share some essential properties.
Perhaps Carlson does not consider the part-of relation relevant at all when he dis-
cusses the relation between objects and their stages. He says that ‘[a] stage is conceived of
as being, roughly, a spatially and temporally bounded manifestation of something’ (Carl-
son, 1977a, 68, my emphasis). He also later paraphrases ‘manifestation’ as ‘realization’
and ‘exemplification’ (Carlson, 1977a, 70). These terms are not usually understood as
expressing the part-whole relation. If we literally follow Carlson’s suggestions, then I
am not only a series of spatiotemporal entities (stages), but also an abstract entity existing
outside any spatiotemporal coordinate because I am also a multi-realizable non-particular.
At any rate my point is that Carlson’s initial discussion leaves it unclear whether we
really have to introduce abstract kinds as the denotations of some classes of expressions.12
Gennaro Chierchia’s discussion of kinds is also not decisive as to whether we nec-
essarily have to introduce abstract kinds into our semantic theory (Chierchia and Turner,
1988; Chierchia, 1998). He only says that kinds ‘can be represented as individual con-
cepts of sort’ (Chierchia, 1998, 350). What sort of individual concept does Chierchia
have in mind? It is a total function from possible worlds to aggregates of objects (〈s, e〉),
11See (Heller, 1990) for a general discussion and defense of four-dimensional ontology.
12Of course, our ontology, and thus, our domain might include abstract entities. That is different from a
theoretical decision to systematically associate abstract entities with a class of expressions.
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which is, of course, not what we usually understand as a natural kind. Chierchia is fully
aware of this, and thus says, ‘[k]inds are whatever your favorite worldview says that they
are’ (Chierchia, 1998, 350).
It is misleading to say that Chierchia and his followers13 analyze bare NPs as de-
noting abstract kinds. What is essential for their view is that they present a unificatory
analysis of the various uses of bare NPs: bare NPs always have the denotations of the
same type. I agree with them in that we can provide a unified analysis for all different
uses of bare NPs. But my analysis is different from theirs in its typological details.
Before introducing the semantics of bare nominals based on the notion of aggregate,
I like to present one consideration that argues against the thesis that bare nominals denote
abstract kinds.
Paradigmatic ‘kind-referential’ sentences are never about abstract kinds, but about
concrete animals and molecules. Consider a few examples that are typically considered
sentences involving kind-reference and kind predicates.
(41) Gold is rare.
(42) Dogs are widespread.
(43) Salt occupies space. (Burge, 1977)
(44) If all atoms with atomic number 79 ceased to exist, gold would cease to exist,
although a slot would remain open in the periodic table. (Hull, 1978, 349)
Chierchia analyzes (41) and (42) based on kind reference as follows:
(45) Gold is rare. ⇒ RARE(kgold)
13Dayal (2004) extends Chierchia’s analysis to Hindi, and Yang (2001) to Mandarin Chinese.
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(46) Dogs are widespread. ⇒ WIDESPREAD(kdog) (Chierchia, 1998, 363)
These logical forms or semantic representations are, however, not illuminating what’s
intuitively said. By using (41), the speaker, of course, is not making a metaphysical claim
that a certain abstract kind or a universal ‘goldhood’ is to be considered rare—although
such a claim would be true because there would be no more than one goldhood, if there
is such a thing at all. The speaker instead asserts that the amount of gold is not abundant.
The same comment applies to a use of (42) as well. I do not know whether doghood is
widespread—perhaps it is ubiquitously present. At any rate that is not, for sure, what I
would mean by (42). Such predicates as rare and widespread are predicates of objects that
occupy spacetime. Similarly, the denotation of gold in (44) must also be some amount of
concrete gold molecules, not an abstract element, which is presumably non-perishable.14
Chierchia’s analysis indeed captures these intuitions. According to Chierchia, the
sort of individual concepts that can model abstract kinds provide aggregates relative to
possible worlds, and the so-called ‘kind-predicates’ are, relative to possible worlds, pred-
icated of such aggregates. Given a circumstance of evaluation, his ‘kind’-term denotes
the totality of objects in that possible world, and the utterance is judged true or false de-
pending on whether the totality falls under the extension of the predicate with respect to
that world. Thus, to be precise, Chierchia appeals to individual concepts and aggregates
of objects in his semantics of bare NPs. But then, what is the point of introducing abstract
kinds into our semantics of bare NPs? Why do we want to say that the logical form a
‘kind-referential’ sentence is something like (45)?
What I will show below is that we do not have to follow the exact same steps
14I will discuss other types of ‘kind-referential’ predicates below.
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that Chierchia and others have taken to derive the truth-conditions of ‘kind-referential’
sentences. Instead of starting from 〈s, e〉, I would like to start with a predicate, 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉,
before deriving the totality of objects 〈e〉. The results would be equivalent to Chierchia’s,
which can be viewed as an extension of Burge’s treatment of mass and bare plural nouns.
The type-shifting rule iotam determines the largest element that a predicate applies
to. For example, iotam derives from the value of inu (‘dog’) the function from possible
situations to the largest aggregates of dogs. Recall that a situation is merely a part of
a possible world; possible worlds and situations are not of different kinds. When the
assigned value of a situation pronoun coexisting with a bare NP is a possible world, the
bare NP together with iotam produces the totality of the objects, to which the noun applies
with respect to the possible world. Thus, the totality of the actual dogs would be the result
of the application of iotam to inu (‘dog’) with respect to the actual world.
Note that a possible world includes all its temporal slices. The totality of the actual
dogs consists of all dogs in the past, the present, and the future. That is a four-dimensional
aggregate, which stretches across spacetime. I claim that the sentences that are said to
involve ‘kind-reference’ are sentences that involve such four-dimensional aggregates of
objects.
5.3.3.2 English mass terms and bare plurals
Let us consider whether such four-dimensional aggregates are appropriately predicated of
by so-called kind predicates. I want to discuss the ‘kind-reference’ in English first before
turning to Japanese cases. The kinds-as-aggregates view should work equally well for
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both English and Japanese. Agreeing with Chierchia, I do not think that our semantic
investigation answers the question, ‘What is a natural kind?’. I am not here defending
nominalism about natural kinds by claiming that we do not need an abstract entity as
the denotation of a bare noun. Nor do I defend a more specific philosophical thesis that
species are mereological sums (Hull, 1978; Ghiselin, 1987; Brogaard, 2007). I will wait
for another occasion to see if my semantics of ‘kind-referential’ sentences would lend any
support to such theorists.
I assume that the DP analysis is correct for English (Chapter 3). Bare mass and
plural nouns are, despite their appearances, the complements of some phonologically
unrealized determiner: I named it ‘ømass/pl’. In order to distinguish ømass/pl from the definite
article the, I assume that ømass/pl encodes a variant of iotam, which might be something like
the following:
(47) λF〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs : ∀s′(s v s′ → s = s′) ∧ ∃x(F (x)(s) ∧ ∀y(F (y)(s) → y v
x)) ∧ ∃z(Pl(z) ∧ F (z)(s)) . µx(F (x)(s))
where the first conjunct of the presuppositional content ‘∀s′(s v s′ → s = s′)’ en-
sures that the DP is not concerned with any situation smaller than a possible world; Also
‘∃z(Pl(z) ∧ F (s)(z))’ excludes the possibility of being combined with a singular predi-
cate that only applies to atomic objects. Pl is true of any aggregate. That is why Cat is on
the next door sounds funny unless we take Cat to be a mass noun or proper noun, which
would be happily taken as the complement of ø , the determiner for proper names.
Following Uli Sauerland (2003),15 I assume that the denotation of a plural noun in-
cludes atomic objects. That is, the meaning of dogs is the same as the meaning of number-
15Also see (Chierchia, 2010), where he recants his former position.
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neutral inu in Japanese. Mass and plural nouns are thereby compatible with ømass/pl. This
assumption creates a question as to why we cannot say There are dogs on the mat when
there is just one dog on the mat. But I also assume that there is some way to handle the
question.16
An argumental bare mass or plural term in English has a different structure than
that of a Japanese bare NP.
(48) a. English
si ømass/pl NP
b. Japanese si NP
It is purely optional whether a Japanese bare NP is interpreted as denoting the totality of
objects. Depending on what value si receives, (48b) can be used to talk about a single ob-
ject, a unique aggregate in a specific situation, or the largest aggregate of some sort in the
world. On the other hand, an occurrence of a bare nominal in English is more structurally
constrained as in (48a). If a common noun is not preceded by an overt determiner such
as the, then it is selected by ømass/pl and denotes the totality of the objects that the noun
applies to with respect to a certain possible world. Now let us discuss some sentences to
see the plausibility of this proposal.
Spatiotemporal predicates First of all, four-dimensional aggregates of objects seem to
be suitable objects for spatiotemporal predicates as in (49) and (50) as well as widespread,
common, and rare.
(49) Bengal tigers are distributed over south-central Asia. (Burge, 1977)
(50) Black rats are thought to have arrived in Australia with the First Fleet, and subse-
quently spread to many coastal regions in the country. (Wiki)
16Chierchia (2010, fn.17) suggests that a form of implicature blocks such a use.
213
(49) contains a present-tensed predicate that describes the spatial property of the present
part of an aggregate. A single tiger nor an abstract entity cannot be said to be ‘distributed
over south-central Asia’. (49) is used to assert that the aggregate of Bengal tigers today
are located across some region. (50) is concerned with a broader part of an aggregate.
The predicate in (50) is not merely concerned with the present slice of the aggregate of
black rats, but also with some extended slice. The aggregate of black rats changed its
spatial location and also got thicker over time.
‘Extinct’, ‘generate’, etc. Predicates concerning species and those related to creation
also fit nicely with four-dimensional total aggregates of objects. The adjective extinct
currently does not apply to a single living creature (e.g., #Mary is extinct); Instead it
mostly applies to families and species. However, extinct is still predicated of fires, lights,
and things comparable to a fire, such as a hope. It also used to be synonymous with dead
and apply to an individual person (The Pope being dead, and Valentine extinct. OED).
These facts would make more sense if we analyze extinct as a predicate true of some
individuals in the domain. The exact meaning of the word has changed over time, but its
semantic type remains the same. I suggest that the following lexical meaning sufficiently
characterizes our uses of the word today.
(51) JextinctK = λx : H(x) . λs . ∀y(y ≺ x→ DEAD(y)(s))
where H(x) means that x is an aggregate whose members share some property and no
nonmember has that property: ‘extinct’ is undefined for an arbitrary set of things. The
basic idea is that things are extinct when all of their members are dead. The predicate
extinct is used only for homogeneous and exclusive groups of things. So I assume that
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its argument x has to satisfy some selectional property specified by H , which can be
understood in the following way. An aggregate is H if and only if there is some (perhaps
essential) property F such that all and only members of x are F . The predicate extinct
signifies that any member of x that has a certain property is dead or disappeared. In
other words, extinct is correctly predicated of the subject when any member of the subject
disappeared or is not present.
(52) Dinosaurs became extinct.
(53) The Slytherin family was extinct in the male line. (Harry Potter Wiki)
(54) The fire is extinct.
(55) [Pointing at the pictures of three particular dinosaurs.]
#These three dinosaurs became extinct.
My proposal entails that a use of (52) asserts that the total aggregate of dinosaurs com-
pletely disappeared some time in the past. The total aggregate of dinosaurs kept shrinking
to the extent that it no longer has any member today. We indeed consider (52) true just
in case no dinosaur (any member of the aggregate) is alive today. The presence of even a
single dinosaur makes it false. Likewise, for a use of (54) to be true, the whole mass of
fire in the relevant situation must be gone completely. (55) would sound funny if the inter-
preter takes the denotation of the description the three dinosaurs to be the particular three
individuals. This is another result of having specified the meaning of extinct as above.
Perhaps the three dinosaurs are dead, but it does not guarantee that the entire species has
gone. The selectional feature of predicate requires the subject x to be a homogenous
and comprehensive aggregate of objects. The three individual dinosaurs cannot constitute
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such a comprehensive aggregate. An utterance would be natural if the interpreter takes it
to be about the three ‘kinds’ of dinosaurs, i.e., the three whole groups of dinosaurs, which
is the taxonomic use of a definite description I will return momentarily.
(56) Horses are indigenous to eastern Chile. (Carlson, 1977b)
(57) Brown bears evolved into polar bears.
Now, similarly, a use of (56) describes where the totality of horses has its initial
point. (57) sketches a process of speciation, which involves a great number of particular
bears. It should be noted that the process of speciation does not directly involve abstract
natural kinds, if there are such things at all. A natural kind perhaps never turns into
something else nor undergoes any form of change. What evolved are those particular
animals, not an abstract entity. This is one of the reasons why some philosophers of
biology doubt that species are natural kinds (Hull, 1978; Ghiselin, 1987).
(58) Lead has been generated from lighter matter. (LaPorte, 2004)
(59) If all atoms with atomic number 79 ceased to exist, gold would cease to exist,
although a slot would remain open in the periodic table. (Hull, 1978, 349)
Likewise, what is asserted by a use of (58) is that the instances of lead were created
from the instances of different elements. It is not about the kind or the essence of lead.
The essence ‘lead’ presumably exists regardless of their instances. Certainly we can talk
about ‘leadhood’ and ‘goldhood’. So I am not suggesting there is no such a thing. But
when we use a mass term as gold in (59), we are talking about the instances of such an
element. That is why it makes sense to say ‘gold would cease to exist’, which would be
impossible if gold were denoting something imperishable.
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Bare plurals as direct objects A bare plural in a direct object position behaves differ-
ently from a bare mass term, and also from a definite singular description. Bare mass
terms and definite singular descriptions are acceptable as the objects of the verbs such as
invent and discover, whereas bare plurals are less acceptable (60-62).
(60) The Americans invented the chewing gum / chewing gum.
(after Krifka et al. 1995)
(61) Shockley invented the transistor / ?transistors. (Krifka et al., 1995, 70)
(62) The French settlers in Mauritius exterminated the dodo / ?dodos.
(Krifka et al., 1995, 71)
Also note, however, the difference seems to disappear if bare plurals are used in
passive constructions.
(63) Transistors were / the transistor was invented in 1947.
Below I will argue that definite singular descriptions (e.g., the transistor) can denote
what bare plurals denote, i.e., the total aggregates of objects. So the difference is not
captured in terms of semantic values on my proposal. However, I am also not sure if we
should describe the differences between the grammatical subjects and objects in terms of
semantic values. Perhaps, the differences should be understood at the level of information
structure, the discussion of which goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Property attribution, classification, etc. First, consider the cases where mass or plural
terms are used as the subjects of the sentences. Predicates such as being warm-blooded,
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being white seem to be number-neutral as in These animals are warm-blooded. The fol-
lowing examples are easily accounted for by the proposal under consideration because
such predicates can be true of aggregates.
(64) Horses are warm-blooded.
(65) Snow is white.
(66) Gold is a precious metal.
(67) Water is wet.
My proposal suggests that (67) seems true to us because we think that any member of the
total aggregate of water, i.e., any water is wet.
Second, consider the copula sentences that contain two occurrences of mass and
plural terms.
(68) Whales are mammals.
(69) Muddy water is water.
The copula be in this type of cases cannot be seen as the be of identity because we can
hardly paraphrase them by explicitly referring to the identity relation. The sentences
below strike me as false.
(70) Muddy water is the same thing as water.
(71) Muddy water is one and the same thing as water.
Following Burge, I consider bare mass or plural terms in the predicate positions to
be mere predicates, which is also entailed by the proposed analysis if we assume that the
predicate positions are not DPs.
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(72) Blue styrofoam is styrofoam. (Parsons, 1970)
If we are evaluating a use of (72) with respect to the actual world, then the predicate
styrofoam is true of any amount of actual styrofoam. The DP blue styrofoam denotes the
aggregate of all actual styrofoam that is blue. Thus, (72) is true.
Definite singular descriptions and taxonomic interpretations English and some other
languages with articles contain the construction sometimes called the singular definite
generic, where a singular definite description is used to make a general statement about a
certain species, as in (73) and (74).
(73) The Irish economy became dependent upon the potato. (Krifka et al., 1995)
(74) The dolphin is a whale. (Krifka et al., 1995, 74)
Krifka et al. (1995) and Dayal (2004) discuss the singular definite generic together
with other sentences that contain other determiners, which seem to concern sub-species
or taxonomic hierarchies.
(75) Every whale (from the pygmy whale to the blue whale) is protected by law.
(Krifka et al., 1995, 74)
(76) Some (kinds of) lions are in danger of becoming extinct. (Dayal, 2004, 427)
Dayal argues that these sentences can be explained without any complication by
introducing quantification over sub-kinds. Her analysis roughly goes as follows. The
lexical meanings of the definite article the and the other determiners remain as usual.
But the nouns denote properties of sub-kinds, and hence, the DPs quantify over or de-
note sub-kinds. I adopt the same basic strategy while construing sub-kinds as individual
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aggregates.
Dayal suggests that common nouns such as whale and lion are ambiguous between
concrete predicates that are true of particular objects, and abstract predicates true of ab-
stract sub-kinds.17 For example, the noun whale is normally just true of this or that whale.
But when it is used in an utterance like (74) or (75), it is construed as a predicate true
of species, not of concrete animals. The noun whale in (75) determines the set of whale
sub-species {the pygmy whale, the humpback whale, ...}, not a set of particular whales.
A use of (75) is, thus, true if and only if every one of such whale species is protected
by law. If we assume that an individual variable quantifies over sub-species, which is an
abstract entity, then the lexical meaning of the quantificational determiner every does not
have to be complicated. The same analysis applies to the singular definite generic such as
the dolphin in (74).
A first problem with this particular proposal is that we have no intention to pro-
tect an abstract entity in this context of utterance. When we depend upon the potato or
campaign for the whale protection, we have particular plants or animals in mind, not a
presumably imperishable entity. Of course, the semantic values of an utterance do not
have to completely align with our intuitions. But this is a downside of Dayal’s analysis.
A second problem with Dayal’s proposal is that a sub-kind predicative noun (e.g.,
lion in a taxonomic reading) is context sensitive even after disambiguation. Dayal sug-
gests that lion in a taxonomic context determines the set of lion species. That means,
however, a kind predicate such as lion is usually not a singleton, which creates a prob-
17Dayal also mentions an alternative possibility in which each determiner that allows a taxonomic reading
is ambiguous.
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lem for Dayal. The definite singular description the lion with a taxonomic reading has
to denote the entire lion species, not just a sub-species. For a singular definite generic
(e.g., the lion) to denote a unique kind, the extension determined by the predicate lion
must be a singleton. Notice that none of abstract entities is larger than the others. Or it is
simply a category mistake to talk about the size of an abstract, non-spatial entity. Thus,
according to Dayal’s analysis, the lion denotes the lion species because lion determines
a singleton set. However, as noted earlier, the taxonomic reading of lion can determine
a non-singleton set. When the same taxonomic noun lion is used with other quantifica-
tional expression such as many or three the noun lion must determine a non-singleton set.
Otherwise, we would not be able to get the interpretations available to the taxonomic sen-
tences above. Therefore, taxonomic nouns such as lion change their meanings depending
on which level of the hierarchy of a kind we are talking about. This form of meaning
change is not theoretically explained.
I can avoid these two problems by simply assuming that taxonomic nouns are predi-
cates of aggregates, not of abstract kinds. Furthermore, the kinds-as-individual aggregates
view explains the same set of data that Dayal explains. Therefore, my analysis of taxo-
nomic interpretations is superior to Dayal’s analysis.
The taxonomic hierarchies of natural kinds or species that Dayal has in mind di-
rectly apply to the aggregates in the world. That is, we can hierarchically classify the
aggregates in accordance with our interest, world view, scientific theory, etc. The aggre-
gate of all mammals includes the aggregates of all dogs, whales, dolphins, lions, etc. The
aggregate of all whales includes the aggregates of the ‘kinds’ of whales, i.e., blue whales,
humpback whales, etc. Following Dayal, I treat a common noun such as whale as either
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ambiguous or polysemous. It is sometimes a predicate true of this or that whale. It is
sometimes a predicate true of well-defined, possibly naturally carved aggregates.18 The
taxonomic noun whale is true of the aggregate of all blue whales, the aggregate of all
humpback whales, and so on, as well as the aggregates of all whales. The semantic type
of a taxonomic noun is not different from that of a regular noun. It can be combined with
a determiner as usual.
The singular definite generic the lion denotes the entire lion species, not merely
African lions, because it denotes the largest aggregate that the taxonomic noun lion ap-
plies to with respect to a possible world. The same noun with the same meaning can be
used with other quantificational expressions to produce taxonomic interpretations. The
extension lion determines with respect to a possible world contains all aggregates of lion
sub-species. If you think that every one of such aggregate will soon disappear, then you
would agree that every lion will be extinct soon.
Theoretical identity statements Some of us have intuitions that theoretical identity
statements such as (77) and (78) are necessarily true.19 Some, including Kripke (1980,
140), have suggested that they are necessarily true because they are analogous to ‘a = b’
where ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid designators.
(77) Pure water is identical to H2O.
(78) Heat is identical to molecular motion.
18This fits with our intuitions because we think of the term whale to be a ‘name’ of species.
19Not all of us have such intuitions. Joseph LaPorte (2004, 43) reports that ‘water is H2O’ does not even
seem to him to be true, let alone discovered to be necessarily true.
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I have expounded how definite descriptions can be rigid designators. I have also proposed
that mass and plural terms in argument positions are a variant of definite descriptions.
Thus, my analysis indeed predicts that the occurrences of mass terms in (77) and (78) can
be rigid designators. (77) and (78) thereby can have a necessity reading.
First of all, let us see how we can construe the identity relation between two ag-
gregates of things. On the aggregate approach, since an aggregate is individuated by its
members, not its spatiotemporal location, the identity relation can be expressed as fol-
lows:
(79) Ja is (identical to) bK = [∀x : x ≺ a][∃y : y ≺ b](x = y) ∧ [∀w : w ≺ b][∃z : z ≺
a](w = z)
That is, two aggregates are identical when their member constituents are identical. For
example, the aggregate Hesperus+Cicero is identical to the aggregate Phosphorus+Tully
because Hesperus is Phosphorus and Cicero is Tully.
Now let us consider (78). Suppose that both DPs in the sentence have a situation
pronoun of the same index, which I schematically represent as follows:
(80) Heat1 is identical to molecular motion1.
If the index of s-PRO in the VP is not 1, then the situation pronouns in the DPs are
used deictically. Assuming that the speaker is describing the actual world, the DP heat1
denotes the aggregate of everything we count as heat in the universe, while molecular
motion1 denotes the aggregate of everything we count as molecular motion. The speaker
is identifying the aggregate that heat1 denotes with the aggregate that molecular motion1
denotes. That is, given (79) each member-component of the heat aggregate is molecular
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motion, and each member-component of the molecular-motion aggregate is heat.
If the speaker is right, then the proposition expressed is necessarily true because
one thing is identical to itself in all possible worlds, and an aggregate is a mere collection
of things. Each DP is a rigid designator because its value, i.e., an aggregate of things,
remains the same in any circumstance of evaluation. Therefore, my analysis explains
why general terms are sometimes rigid designators in the same way as proper names.
It is also worth noting that the aggregate approach is not susceptible to the problem
for the traditional mereological approach. It has been argued that we need something
intensional for the denotation of a bare nominal argument (Parsons, 1970). For example,
the denotation of a bare noun in (81) cannot be a sum of things because it is false even if
the sum of all wood is identical to the sum of all furniture.
(81) Wood is identical to furniture. (after Pelletier and Schubert 1989)
Imagine a world in which all wood has been used to manufacture furniture and every
piece of furniture has been made of wood. The sum of wood spatiotemporally coincides
with the sum of furniture. However, such a world hardly supports the truth of (81).
The aggregate approach indeed makes a right prediction. Even if the total aggregate
of wood occupies the same spatiotemporal region as the total aggregate of furniture, a
member of the wood aggregate is not necessarily a piece of furniture because perhaps the
piece of wood constitutes only a part of a piece of furniture (e.g., its leg). Two aggregate
are identical when their constituents are also identical. Thus, the aggregates of wood and
furniture are not identical. Therefore, the aggregate approach to bare nominals accounts
for our intuitions concerning theoretical identity statements.
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5.3.3.3 ‘Kind-reference’ in Japanese
The presented semantics of English bare nominals applies to the Japanese ‘kind-referential’
sentences. One major difference between English and Japanese bare nominals is that the
latter are always NPs, lacking a determiner projection even in argument position. For






Unlike English, an argumental NP is not headed by a determiner that imposes some or
other interpretation on the argument. Thus, the interpretation of (82) is not as restricted
as its English counterpart. A bare NP itself is a predicate of type 〈e, 〈s, t〉〉, which is
type-shifted to have an individual concept as its semantic value by virtue of iotam. The
individual concept together with the value of the coexisting situation pronoun provides
the denotation of the NP argument as a whole. Thus, a bare NP argument as a whole
denotes the largest individual to which the descriptive content applies, which depends on
the value of the coexisting situation pronoun. For example, depending on the value of
the coexisting situation pronoun, the bare argument in (82) can denote either the entire
four-dimensional aggregate of brown cows, or some or other specific brown cow(s) in a
contextually restricted situation. Existential and generic interpretations are also derived
from the same structure as we will see below.
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Since Japanese nouns are number-neutral and there is no morphological distinction
between common and mass nouns, a simple bare noun is used with any of the predicates
we have seen above. That is, in Japanese, the bare unmodified form of a noun is used



















‘Heat is molecular motion.’
There is no difference at the level of logical form between these Japanese examples and
their English counterparts. For example, consider (85). By uttering (85), the speaker has
no intention to talk just about this or that small situation. Instead, the speaker seems to be
expressing her thought about any heat in the entire world. In such a context, the value of
the coexisting situation pronoun of a bare NP argument is the entire world, which yields a
totality of objects as the denotation of the bare NP argument. So my treatment of English
‘kind-referential’ sentences directly applies to Japanese counterparts.
5.3.4 Existential Quantification
Now I turn to the existential readings that are available to Japanese bare NPs as well as













‘A cat is in the next room’; ‘Cats are in the next room’
(87) Phil threw snow on Bill.
(88) Dogs barked.
How could we obtain the readings found in these sentences? What currently seems
plausible to me is to adopt David Hilbert’s ε notation to formally represent our perspecti-
val shifts from the totality of entities to its member.
Just as we treat  x(F (x)) as a primitive expression of type 〈e〉, I suggest that,
following Hilbert and Bernays (1939), we treat εx(F (x)) as a primitive expression of
type 〈e〉 that denotes some object of which F is true.20
When used in a sentence, the truth-conditions of the term formed by the ε operator
can be represented as follows:
(89) G[εx(F (x))]←→ ∃x(F (x) ∧G(x))
where I stipulate that the existential quantifier always take the narrowest scope possible
with respect to G. Both  x(F (x)) and εx(F (x)) are expressions of type 〈e〉: their seman-
tic values are things in the domain and they are thereby scopeless, whose apparent scopal
properties, if any, are accounted for by bound situation pronouns.
Now consider the extra-syntactic rule, I call it epsilon, that turns an aggregate of an
object into some of its member.
(90) epsilon: λx . εy(y ≺ x)
20The same approach has been suggested to account for English indefinite descriptions. The η (‘eta’)
operator is introduced by Reichenbach (1947, 264-6), and also adopted by Lauri Karttunen (1968).
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The rule epsilon might not be seen as a type-shifting function because it does not change
the type of an expression; it simply represents our ability to think about some member of
an aggregate, when the aggregate is given.
For example, the DP snow in (87) first denotes the totality of snow in the universe.
But no one could throw such an amount of snow, which urges the interpreter to use epsilon
to derive some manageable amount of snow. (3) expresses a proposition in which there is
some amount of snow Phil threw on Bill.
The derivation of an existential reading by means of epsilon has the same result as
Chierchia’s two step derivations via two different type-shifting devices. Neither of them
take existential readings to follow from the uses of quantificational devices. Both explain
the scopelessness of Japanese bare NPs as well as English bare mass and plural terms.21
5.3.5 Generic Quantification
The proposed analysis of bare nouns is compatible with the standard treatment of generic
quantification, which is basically an extension of Lewis’s (1975) account of adverbs of
quantifications (e.g., always).
Following Chierchia (1995) and many others, I assume that generally, typically,
and usually are unselective quantifiers in Lewis’s sense. An unselective quantifier can
bind different types of variables (variables ranging over individuals, times, events, and
situations); they also bind more than one variables at the same time. We can express an
21For example, Chierchia takes snow to lexically denote an individual concept of sort. He first applies a
type-shifting principle that turns the individual concept into a property. Then, he utilizes existential closure
to generate an existential quantification. Bare nouns are usually scopeless because he does not introduce a
generalized quantifier. My epsilon also does not introduce a quantificational term.
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unselective quantifier by removing the variable subscript from an ordinary, selectively-
binding quantifier or noting all variables that it binds (e.g., ‘∀’ or ‘∀x, y, s, t’).
Following Chierchia, I also assume that there is a silent counterpart of generally,
which is constructed as Gn at LF. For example, a use of A bird flies is understood as





where the subject a bird is originally generated as the VP internal argument.
Chierchia (1995, 194) presents a syntax-semantics mapping generalization for Gn
and other quantificational adverbs, according to which the nominal element that c-commands
an adverb of quantification contributes to the restrictor of the adverb, and what the adverb
c-commands is its scope. The generalization also allows the content of the restrictor to be
contextually enriched.
The representation below can be derived from the structure (91) based on Chier-
chia’s mapping generalization with a few auxiliary assumptions.
(92) Most x, s [bird(x, s) ∧ C(x, s)] [ fly(x, s)]
Let ‘Most’ stand for the quantification that generally, typically, usually, and Gn introduce.
‘C(x, s)’ represents the ceteris paribus clause, whose content needs to be contextually
understood. Perhaps it says that x has functioning wings, s contains enough atmosphere,
etc. Roughly speaking, (92) states that, for most situation such that it contains a bird, the
bird flies in the situation, other things being equal.22
22Possibly the contextual element ‘C(x, s)’ needs not be represented here as part of the semantic content
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Chierchia notes several possibilities of how the indefinite phrase a bird introduces
the bound variables. The indefinite a bird as it is might introduce a predicate that can
be bound by ‘Most’, following the dynamic semantics traditions. If a bird is a restricted
quantifier of type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉, then he suggests that we can appeal to a sort of Montague’s
BE, which turns a restricted quantifier into a predicate (Montague, 1973; Partee, 1986a).
At any rate ‘bird(x, s)’ appears in the restrictor of the quantification ‘Most’ because a
bird c-commands Gn.
Let us now consider a simple generic sentence that contains a bare noun in both












b. Most x, s [Potato(x, s) ∧C(x, s) ] [contain-v.c(x, s)]
(94) a. Potatoes (generally) contain vitamin C
b. Most x, s [Potato(x, s) ∧C(x, s) ] [contain-v.c(x, s)]
Following Chierchia, I claim that (93a) and (94a) respectively have the following
structures (95a) and (95b), which are only marginally different. Both yield the same





of an utterance. It might just reflect a proposition that is non-linguistically inferable based on common
sense.
23Chierchia assumes that Gn is generated as the specifier of Aspectual Phrase. That is why Gn appears in
the same position in the Japanese structure (95). Gn could be something else (perhaps a functional head),







On Chierchia’s analysis, the subject potatoes denotes an individual concept, but
he also assumes that the type-shifting rule ‘∪’ (‘up’ or ‘predicativization’) turns it into a
predicate. Thus, both structures straightforwardly map into the truth-conditions (93b =
94b).
My analysis concurs with Chierchia’s theory of the generic operator. The typolog-
ical details are slightly different. How does potatoes contribute to the restrictor meaning
on my analysis? In the case of Japanese, I need no additional type-shifting rule. I have
argued that a bare NP itself is a predicate, which can be bound by the quantification in-
troduced by Gn.
In the case of English, there are at least two possibilities. First, it seems plausible
to me to appeal to the non-intensional version of Chierchia’s ‘∪’, which can be defined as
follows:
(96) ∪ex : λx . λy . y ≺ x
If we apply ∪ex to an aggregate of objects, it returns a predicate that is true of any member
of the aggregate, which would be suitable for the restrictor of Gn. For example, given the
total aggregate of potatoes, ∪ex yields a function that assigns Truth to any potato, i.e., an
ordinary predicate of potatoes.
Second, we could alternatively utilize epsilon described earlier. I suggest that we
can paraphrase (94a) as follows:
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(97) For most situation such that it contains some potato, the potato contains vitamin
C in the situation.
(98) Most s [C(s, εx(Potato x))] [contain-v.c(x, s)]
The paraphrase seems to adequately describe the truth-conditions of a use of (94a). Since
the unselective quantifier ‘Most’ is anyway regarded as capable of binding eventualities,
and we know that a generic reading does not always require the quantification over indi-
viduals, the second approach might be preferable for simplicity.
5.3.6 Summary
In this section I have presented a comprehensive treatment of Japanese bare nouns and En-
glish bare mass and plural terms. Both languages employ the same semantic resource, but
how they employ it is different. An argumental bare NP is structurally different between
English and Japanese.









In the case of Japanese, the derivation in (99b) crashes due to a type-mismatch.
Overall I appeal to two extra-syntactic semantic operations: iotam and epsilon. The
semantic value of (99b) is derived in virtue of applying iotam, which is lexically encoded
as the in English. (99b) becomes a definite description together with iotam.
Both object-referential and so-called ‘kind’-referential sentences are understood as
involving definite descriptions. The latter is merely a subcategory of definite descriptions,
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which denote the totalities of objects in the entire world. Existential statements involve a
use of epsilon, which turns a totality of objects into its part. The proposal is compatible
with the standard treatment of generic quantificational statements.
5.4 Argument Against Silent Determiners
My syntactic and semantic treatment of Japanese is different from that of English. Why
does there have to be such a divergence? One might wonder what is wrong with intro-
ducing semantically significant silent structure within Japanese bare NPs just as we do
for English bare plural and mass terms. This section attacks the potential opponent of my
analysis that posit silent determiners for bare NPs in articleless languages.
5.4.1 Introduction: grammatical form and logical form
A use of the sentence
(100) Every boy danced with some girl.
is compatible with two different types of circumstances. One type entails the other, but
not vice versa. The use is ambiguous in the non-technical sense.
The standard explanation for this fact is to consider the use not to be ‘ambiguous’
in the technical sense. We theoretically say that there are in fact two different sentences
whose surface forms are identical.
Although a use of (100) might be ambiguous, each reading is phenomenologically
perspicuous. The hearer does not have to mull it over to specify what it means. The
hearer immediately sees either one of the interpretations, or flips back and forth from one
233
interpretation to the other. An analogy would be an necker-cube. The two-dimensional
input is ambiguous. But it is not the case that what the subject perceives at one time is
‘ambiguous’. We see one non-ambiguous picture at one time.
Much in the same way as our vision as an information-processing system can ac-
count for the ambiguity of a necker-cube, the knowledge-conception of our linguistic
capacities offers a plausible explanation for this linguistic ambiguity, according to which
our knowledge of English imposes two different structures upon (100). Perhaps due to
the operation like Quantifier Raising (henceforth QR), as in (May 1977), our linguistic
knowledge disambiguates the use of (126) by providing two distinct representations, each
one of which is not ambiguous.
After observing that one and the same bare NP in Japanese has four different types
of interpretations, one might wonder if bare NPs are ambiguous. In other words, it might
be the case that each reading of a bare noun corresponds to a distinctive structure. There
are four distinct structural configurations competent speakers attribute to a single bare
noun, each of which unambiguously has a specific reading.
With covert operations such as QR and phonologically empty items such as situ-
ation pronouns, one might entertain this possibility seriously. I have presented and ap-
pealed to several independent semantic rules, which complicates a syntax-logical form
mapping. But why do we have to do that? We could alternatively introduce some silent
elements at the level of syntax that encode the semantic rules. There seems to be no
conceptual difficulty with the view that sentences are all ambiguity-free at some level of
syntactic representation.
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In what follows I will offer an independent argument against this approach to the se-
mantics of bare NPs, according to which we posit some unpronounced syntactic heads that
encode interpretive features (Cheng and Sybesma, 1999; Watanabe, 2006). My argument
against the silent-head approach is based on the behaviors of Japanese unpronounced ar-
guments that take bare NPs as their antecedents. The silent-head approach has difficulties
in explaining the semantics of phonologically null arguments.
5.4.2 Interpretive independence of null argument anaphora
I want to first present an interpretive characteristic of unpronounced arguments in Japanese,
which is crucial for the argument against silent determiners that I will offer in the next
subsection.
Japanese is a ‘radical’ pro-drop language, which allows any thematic argument to
be left unpronounced without explicit marking. I will call an instance of implicit argument
that seems to have a linguistic antecedent ‘null argument anaphora’ (NAA).
The interpretation of NAA does not have to be equivalent to that of its antecedent


















































‘A Portuguese sailor ate a dodo first, and the Dutch people later exterminated
them.’
The first clause is used to say something about cola as a kind (which is understood as the
totality of cola on my proposal above).24 But the second clause is not. Whatever it is the
bare NP cola in the first clause denotes, the NAA ø in the second clause has an existential
interpretation, denoting some quantity of cola—Germans must have consumed only some
amount of cola, not the whole kind. (102) is an analogous case where its NAA should
also be existentially interpreted. (103) exhibits the opposite pattern. The antecedent bare
NP dodo in (103) invokes an existential quantification while the NAA refers to the entire
species. I will refer to the observed semantic mismatch between bare NPs and NAA as the
‘interpretive independence of NAA’. On the basis of NAA’s interpretive independence, I
will present an argument against any semantic analysis of bare NPs that posits a silent
determiner.
The main line of reasoning in this section goes as follows. NAA is analyzed either
as a kind of ellipsis or as a kind of pronoun. Either way, the silent-head approach to bare
NPs would have difficulties in explaining the interpretive independence of NAA observed
above. Therefore, by reductio, the silent-head approach is problematic when we consider
a broader context, even if it adequately captures the behaviors of bare NPs.
It is controversial what the right syntactic analysis of NAA is. NAA might be an el-
24The main argument in this section does not presuppose my own analysis of bare NPs, and applies to
the standard view that bare NPs denote abstract kinds.
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lipsis phenomenon (Takahashi, 2008). Alternatively NAA might amount to unpronounced
pronouns (Hoji, 1998). Perhaps Japanese null arguments consist of more than one type of
phenomena, and both ellipsis and pronominal analyses are correct in different cases (Abe,
2009). I do not have to decide, however, among the possible syntactic analyses of NAA
because I will argue that the silent-head approach has limitations, whatever analysis of
NAA turns out to be on the right track.
5.4.3 Ellipsis analysis of null argument anaphora
Let us first suppose that NAA in sentences like (101-103) are elliptical. Also suppose, for
reductio, that bare NPs include silent determiners that are responsible for their interpreta-
tions, i.e., that the silent-head approach is correct. For example, the bare NP cola in (101)





where øk is the silent determiner whose interpretive feature somehow contributes to the
kind interpretation of the phrase.25
If this is the right picture of bare NPs, then the interpretive independence of NAA is
best explained as an instance of NP-deletion: NAA ø is a maximal projection of a silent
determiner whose constituent NP gets deleted or unpronounced. For example, NAA ø in
(101) can be analyzed as follows:






where ø∃ is unpronounced and introduces an existential quantification. The overall struc-
ture (105) remains silent and has an existential interpretation whose content is related but
not identical to its antecedent interpretation (‘the kind cola’). The silent determiner in the
antecedent bare NP is irrelevant to the choice of determiner in (105). bare NPs and NAA
can have different interpretations because of the presence of silent determiners.
We can in fact find an analogous case of NP-deletion inside a quantificational phrase
in English:
(106) a. John bought [every [NP required textbook]],
but Mary bought only [some/a few [NP required textbook ]].
b. John bought [two [NP books]], and Mary bought [four [NP books ]].
It might seem natural to assume that what can be done in English can also be done in
Japanese.
Such an assumption is, however, unfounded. Japanese does not allow NP-deletion











































‘Taro bought this/these car(s), and Hanako bought that/those one(s)’
Both (107) and (108) would be perfectly grammatical were there no ellipsis. The impos-
sibility of NP-deletion in (107) and (108) undermines the analysis of NAA represented by
(105). Therefore, the silent-head approach has no simple explanation for the interpretive
independence of NAA when we assume that NAA is elliptical.
One might wonder whether the impossibility of NP-deletion in (107) and (108)
is due to their particular configuration, and whether NP-deletion is possible in some
other context, which would be an overt counterpart of (105). Indeed Japanese allows
NP-deletion in limited circumstances even when an NP is modified by a determiner-like
expression. Now I turn to such cases to see if there is any evidence for the NP-deletion in
(105).
NP-deletion in Japanese seems possible only when (i) an NP is modified by a pos-
sessive no-phrase or (ii) an NP has a floating quantifier (FQ). I will argue that both cases
are not analogous to the structure (105) and cannot support the analysis of NAA under
consideration.
Possessive no-phrases The following examples (109-112) suggest that NP-deletion is
possible if a stranded no-phrase is relational in some sense, and paraphrasable by means
of an of-phrase in English. The individual Hanako referred to by the no-phrase Hanako
no in (109) is the possessor of an implicit object. That is, what is deleted is the attitude
‘of Hanako’. Kyoto no hakai in (110) indicates the destruction ‘of Kyoto’; and kinoo no
ondo in (111) must be understood as the temperature ‘of yesterday’. The nouns can be
deleted in those three cases (109-111). By contrast, (112) is clearly ungrammatical, where
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the no-phrase ame no plays a role of an adjective and has no relational meaning, which


















































































‘Sunny days are OK, but I feel depressed on rainy days.’ (Saito et al., 2008, 253)
If the silent determiners required for the ellipsis analysis of NAA fall under the
category of these relational no-phrases, then what they modify could be deleted, i.e., the
NP-deletion in (105) would be plausible. The silent determiners can hardly be considered
relational, however. For example, the determiner ø∃ in (105) cannot be paraphrased by
any of-phrase. We cannot identify the other relatum for cola unlike for the deleted nouns
in (109-111). Therefore, the instances of NP-deletion in (109-111) are irrelevant to the
hypothesized NP-deletion required for the silent-head approach to explain the interpretive
independence of NAA.
Floating quantifiers It is also possible in Japanese to delete an NP and leave a floating
quantifier (FQ) behind. Japanese quantificational phrases, including numerals, need not
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be adjacent to the modified nouns as example (113) indicates, where a quantificational
phrase may appear away from what it modifies. NP-deletion is possible in such circum-
stances like (113) and (116), whereas slightly different constructions, such as (114) and
(115), exclude NP-deletion, where a quantificational phrase appears either prenominally


















































‘Taro reads three books in a day, but Hanako reads five.’











































‘I brought one dog, but Hanako brought two to school.’
If the silent determiners in the ellipsis analysis of NAA are FQs, then a structure
like (105) would become plausible. We have, however, good reason to deny that they are
FQs.
Kimiko Nakanishi (2007) points out that FQs have peculiar semantic characteris-
tics. One of them is that they somehow exclude collective interpretations, while their
non-floating counterparts would allow both collective and distributive readings as shown























‘Three boys built a boat yesterday.’ (Xdistributive, Xcollective)
(Nakanishi, 2007, 58)













‘A/The/Some boy(s) made four boats.’ (Xdistributive, Xcollective)
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Since a noun in Japanese is number-neutral, any use of (119) might be concerned with
more than one boy. A use of (119) seems true when the boys in question made the
four boats together. Such a collective reading is not permitted in (117) that contains a
FQ. Thus, the silent determiner that is possibly present in (119) is not a FQ. The silent
determiners required for the silent-head approach do not provide the right environment for
ellipsis to be well-formed. Therefore, we have no evidence for the entertained possibility
of NP-deletion in a structure like (105).
5.4.4 Pronominal analysis of null argument anaphora
I have argued that the silent-head approach has difficulties in explaining the interpretive
independence of NAA if we take NAA to be elliptical. NAA might be, however, a sort of
pronoun and have nothing to do with ellipsis. The proponents of the silent-head approach
could argue that NAA is not structurally related to its antecedent bare NP and that NAA
contextually receives a variety of interpretations as free variables, just as unbound overt
pronouns receive a variety of interpretations. If that is the right analysis of NAA, then
one might think that the interpretive independence would not threaten the silent-head
approach.
Let us then discuss the details of such a suggestion. Now suppose that unpro-
nounced pronouns constitute NAA. How could the silent-head approach explain the in-
terpretive independence of NAA?
Kind-referential readings of NAA we saw earlier as in (103) can be accounted for
by assuming that Japanese contains a small pro, to which a variable assignment assigns
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an abstract kind as its value. I will argue, however, that existential readings available to
NAA as in (101) and (102) cannot be explained in terms of silent pronouns.
In what way could a silent pronoun yield an existential quantification? One possi-
bility is to treat it as a type-neutral variable that can receive a property as its value and to
stipulate that the property gets existentially closed. This suggestion, however, defeats the
purpose of the silent-head approach because existential closure must be introduced as an
independent type-shifting procedure that has no lexical realization. Otherwise, we would
have to introduce a silent determiner that takes a pro as its complement and creates an
existential quantification, which is exactly the structure that I have refuted in the previous
subsection.
Another possibility is to introduce a silent pronoun that is in itself existential: a
context-sensitive existentially quantified NP. For example, we can think of something
like the following:
(120) J pro∃ K = λF∈D〈e,t〉.∃x[Π(x)&F (x)]
(where Π is a contextually salient property)
If there is such a pronoun, then we can account for the existential readings of NAA in
(101) and (102).26
Although the specification of the hypothesized pronoun (120) is logically possible
and sufficiently covers the cases at hand, it is empirically deficient because pro∃ overgen-
erates unattested readings when it interacts with scope-taking devices.
It seems natural to assume that something like pro∃ has multiple scope possibilities.
26(120) is what Tomioka (2003) discusses as part of a possible analysis of Japanese null arguments. He
ultimately objects to (120) and adopts the type-shifting approach to Japanese null arguments.
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Indeed an overtly existential expression dareka (‘someone’) interacts with other scope-


















Depending on how to interpret seito no dareka (‘some student’), (121) has three different
readings as follows:
(122) a. For each teacher x, x heard that, for some student y, y was scolded. (nar-
rowest scope)
b. For each teacher x, for some student y, x heard of y that y was scolded.
(intermediate scope)
c. For some student y, for each teacher x, x heard of y that y was scolded.
(widest scope)
(122a) is a paraphrase of the narrowest scope reading of (121), which seems true when
every teacher heard just that there is some scolded student, without knowing who. Under
the intermediate reading (122b), (121) seems true when every teacher learned about a
different student that the student was scolded. (121) can also be used to express the
thought that there is a particular student such that every teacher learned that she was
scolded, as paraphrased in (122c).27
27The existential term in question dareka consists of the indeterminate pronoun dare, which can also
form a wh-phrase, and the suffix ka. I am not suggesting that dareka must be analyzed as a quantificational
phrase analogous to (120). As far as it explains the observed scope possibilities, any analysis would be
sufficient. Indeed Yatsushiro (2009) analyzes dareka in terms of choice functions. My claim is that pro∃
would also have different scope possibilities whether it is analyzed as a quantificational phrase or choice
function.
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Now consider the sentence (123b), which is structurally identical to (121) except
that it contains NAA ø in the place of the overt existential expression seito no dareka. The




























‘But each parent heard that some student was beaten.’
One can observe that it is very difficult to obtain an intermediate reading analogous to
(122b) in (123a) and (123b). If the NAA in (123b) were the silent pronoun pro∃, then
we could find an intermediate reading in (123b) as easily as in (121). Therefore, it is
undesirable, on an empirical ground, to posit something like pro∃.
My contention is not that it is impossible for a silent pronoun to have an existential
meaning. We know that overt pronouns can have existential meanings as my glosses
earlier, (101) and (102), suggest. I also cite some examples from (Carlson, 1977a) below:
(124) a. May hates raccoons because they stole her sweet corn.
b. My brother thinks that snakes are nasty creatures, but that hasn’t stopped me
from having them as pets. (Carlson, 1977a, 25)
English plural pronouns in these contexts must be existentially interpreted, although their
antecedents seem to have kind-referential or generic readings. It is plausible to assume
that covert pronouns can have existential meanings as well, if such a pronoun exists at all.
What I am claiming is that such covert pronouns alone cannot generate existential
246
interpretations of NAA. The question we have is whether we can strictly follow the silent-
head approach and stay away from any purely semantic procedure to account for the
interpretive independence of NAA. I have argued that, with respect to Japanese, we cannot
directly encode an existential quantification as the lexical meaning of a covert pronoun. I
have also earlier argued that we cannot introduce an existential quantification by positing
more structure. We have to appeal to an extra-syntactic rule to generate an existential
quantification.
I have argued that the silent-head approach to Japanese bare NPs has difficulties in
explaining the interpretive independence of NAA. Whatever syntactic analysis we adopt
for NAA, the silent-head approach cannot fully account for the various interpretations
available to NAA. On the silent-head approach, if NAA is elliptical, then we would have to
appeal to a form of NP-deletion that is not permissible in Japanese. If NAA is pronominal,
then we would have to introduce an existential pronoun, which overgenerates unattested
readings.
It is not always clear how to investigate the division of labor between syntax and
semantics. Although we have seen several well-developed type-shifting analyses of bare
NPs, it has been far from clear what is wrong with introducing more structure into bare
NPs, rather than making semantics complex. I have presented an empirical argument
against such an approach to bare NPs that posits more structure to account for the available
meanings.
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5.5 Philosophical Implications: Grammatical Form and Logical Form
In this section I will argue that, regardless of the empirical success of my analysis of
bare nominals, our discussion of articleless languages like Japanese has philosophical
implications. If my type-shifting approach to bare NPs is on the right track, then it counts
against a position in the philosophy of language, which is a Tractarian association between
natural language syntax and logical form. If my analysis is not correct, then the semantics
of bare NPs can be seen as a partial vindication of the association.
I will argue that the proposed analysis of bare NPs supports a mismatch between
linguistic and propositional structure—the view we mainly attribute to Frege and Russell.
The type-shifting approach implies that there is a one-to-many relation between syntactic
structure and logical form. We have to discard the idea that structural features of natural
language sentences tightly mirror the logical features of propositions.
To be more precise about what is at stake, I want to define the following Tractarian
thesis.
(125) One-to-One
For any complete, declarative sentence, its underlying disambiguated syntactic
structure and closed-class functional constituents (e.g., every, some) uniquely de-
termine its logical form.
An ‘underlying syntactic structure’ is assumed to be dictated by the best syntactic the-
ory available to us. Following the generative tradition, an underlying structure can be
different from the superficial form of a sentence. If the sound of an utterance is many-
way ambiguous, then the disambiguation can take place when an interpreter imposes a
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hierarchical syntactic structure upon the perceived sound. For example, a use of (126) is
disambiguated at some level of syntax, yielding two distinct underlying structures as in
(127a-b).
(126) Every boy danced with some girl.
(127) a. every boyx some girly (x danced with y)
b. some girly every boyx (x danced with y)
The interpreter then constructs a semantic value for either one of (127a-b) based on her
semantic knowledge. (127a) and (127b) yield two different semantic values that have two
different logical forms. At the surface level of (126), there is no one-to-one relation be-
tween grammar and propositional structure. But, once we take into account its underlying
structures, a tight relation between linguistic form and logical form emerges.
The One-to-One thesis is a pretty robust generalization, according to which such
a one-to-one relation can be found everywhere. My analysis of bare NPs puts the One-
to-One thesis in danger: it does not hold for Japanese utterances that contain bare NPs,
and hence, the generalization fails. This outcome would be significant because the One-
to-One thesis is sometimes implied or presupposed by some theorists. I will discuss two
such examples: the works of Stanley and Jeffery King.
Stanley’s overall picture of the interaction between natural language content and
context implies the One-to-One thesis.28 He states that ‘all effects of extra-linguistic con-
text on the truth-conditions of an assertion are traceable to logical form’ (Stanley, 2000,
p. 395), where his sense of ‘logical form’ is that of my ‘underlying syntactic structure’.
28The picture is developed and defended in a series of his work (Stanley, 2000, 2002a,b, 2005; Stanley
and Szabó, 2000; King and Stanley, 2005).
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The basic structure of his ‘truth-conditions’ is what I mean by ‘logical form’.29 On the
one hand, Stanley’s view implies that the underlying syntactic structure of an utterance is
informative enough to determine its truth-conditions once we assign the semantic values
to all constituents of the structure, including context-sensitive expressions. That is, for
any underlying syntactic structure of an utterance, there is at least one proposition, and
thereby one logical form, determined by the structure and assignment of semantic values
to all of its constituents. Otherwise, there would be truth-conditional effects of a con-
text that cannot be traced to to an underlying syntactic structure. On the other hand, his
view implies that there is only one logical form for each underlying structure. When two
utterances express two formally distinct truth-conditions, we expect to find some differ-
ence at the level of underlying syntactic structure. Otherwise, again, there would be some
contextual effects that are not triggered by any aspect of underlying structure.30
Now recall that we posited two extra-syntactic principles that derive different inter-
pretations from one and the same semantic value of a bare NP. Japanese NPs are always
29As Stanley (2000) describes, there are largely two different conceptions of logical form that have been
widely used by philosophers and linguists. One of them is the traditional conception of logical form, ac-
cording to which logical form is the underlying structure of a proposition in argumentation, not necessarily
of a natural language sentence. Under this conception natural language syntax is not a perfect guide to
the propositional structure or logical form of statements in philosophy, mathematics, and sciences. The
grammatical form or syntactic structure of a natural language sentence does not transparently map onto the
logical form of the proposition expressible by a use of the sentence. As noted at the outset, I use ‘logical
form’ in this traditional sense.
The other conception stems from the tradition of generative grammar, according to which logical form
is a certain level of syntactic representation, which is sometimes called ‘LF’, to be distinguished from
the traditional sense of ‘logical form’. LF is the level of syntactic representation that is produced by the
speaker’s I-language, whose constituents are relevant to interpretation, not to pronunciation. I assume that
each constituent of an LF representation is an expression that receives a semantic value with respect to a
context. I call logical form/LF in this (Stanley’s) sense ‘underlying disambiguated syntactic structure’.
30Certainly, it is logically possible that there is a context-sensitive constituent that changes the logical
form of a sentential semantic value. For example, we can at least conceive of a variable that can mean either
∀ or ∃ depending on the context of use. Strictly speaking, on Stanley’s perspective, one syntactic structure
can determine more than one logical form. However, I am not sure how one could empirically motivate or
falsify such a variable, and Stanley also does not seem to have in mind such a variable when he argues for
covert variables that provide implicit domain restriction (Stanley and Szabó, 2000; Stanley, 2002b).
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mere predicates, but iotam can be used to derive the largest individual that fulfills the pred-
icative content; epsilon can be additionally used to derive an existential reading. What is
important for present purposes is that such a type-shifting principle is not a constituent of
a syntactic representation. An LF representation can be used as an example of syntactic
representation. Can iotam be a constituent of an LF representation? That is not possible
by definition because iotam is not an item in the lexicon, and cannot be inserted in any
part of a syntactic derivation. An extra-syntactic principle is not the semantic value of
any constituent of grammatical structure; it is by no means a context-sensitive expression
because it is not an expression to begin with. Due to the intervention of an extra-syntactic
principle, it is not always the case that the semantic values of all context-(in)dependent
constituents of a sentence and their structural positions uniquely determine a sentential
semantic value. On this type-shifting approach, it might as well be the case that a seman-
tic theory determines multiple propositions that have distinct logical forms from a single
syntactic structure, which rejects the One-to-One thesis.
I have argued that an argumental bare NP in Japanese is a mere combination of
a situation pronoun and a predicate. The derivation cannot take place because of a type-
mismatch. That is, some utterances that contain a bare NP cannot have sentential semantic
values unless the semantic type of the NP is appropriately modified. For the bare NP to
denote a particular object, iotam must be employed. Furthermore, if it is used indefi-
nitely to talk about some object that fulfills its descriptive content, then epsilon must be
employed to obtain the denotation. Details aside, what is crucial here is that both defi-
nite and indefinite interpretations of a bare NP in Japanese are derived from one and the
same syntactic structure, i.e., a mere combination of a situation pronoun and a predicate.
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Depending on how many semantic principles are employed in the middle of a semantic
derivation, the output semantic value is different: there are two possible values that have
two different logical forms. That is not compatible with the One-to-One thesis. Therefore,
if the presented type-shifting analysis of the semantics of bare NPs is on the right track,
then the One-to-One thesis is falsified, which demands a substantial revision of Stanley’s
view on content and context.
Before moving on to discuss the role of the One-to-One thesis in King’s view on
propositions, I like to qualify the conclusion drawn in the last paragraph. I am assuming
here, as Stanley explicitly does so, that syntactic theory posits a semantically relevant
level of syntactic representation that is distinct from the surface syntax of natural lan-
guage. By ‘underlying disambiguated syntactic structure’, I mean a representation on
such an additional level of representation, such as LF. A constituent of such a representa-
tion is potentially phonetically inert, but always contributes to its semantic interpretation.
For example, according to Stanley’s theory of domain restriction (Stanley, 2002b), unpro-
nounced variables over individuals are constituents of syntactic structures. In light of this
assumption, I have argued that a type-shifting principle in bare nominal semantics is not
represented as a constituent of the syntax. Therefore, the conclusion was that, because
of type-shifting principles, there cannot be a one-to-one relationship between the general
form of syntactic structures and the logical form of propositions, the latter of which are
partially determined by means of type-shifting.
However, there is another view of the syntax and syntactic structure, under which
my analysis of bare nominals poses no challenge to the One-to-One thesis. The view
of the syntax rejects the idea of a covert level of syntactic representation, and treats the
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surface syntax of natural language as a transparent interface to propositions that can be
expressed by means of language use (Bach, 1976; Steedman, 2000, a.o.). There is, for
example, no LF representation on which semantics derives its interpretation. The view
treats a syntactic structure as a derivational process toward a semantic representation as
well as a representation that is relevant to the pronunciation features. The ‘constituents’
of the syntax are the primitives of the derivational processes: they are either expressions,
which combines a contribution to meaning with a contribution to form, or operations
over expressions. Some of such operations are binary and combine two expressions to-
gether. Function Application would be one of such binary operations in the syntax. A
type-shifting principle, such as iota, would be a unary operation. Under this view of the
syntax, such operations within the syntax are, whether binary or unary, ‘constituents’ of
the syntax. Thus, a syntactic structure, construed as a derivational process, indeed in-
cludes a type-shifting rule as its part. So if Stanley fully adopts this picture of the syntax,
then the One-to-One thesis remains intact because a use of a type-shifting principle par-
tially constitutes the general form of a syntactic structure. Therefore, Stanley can revise
his explicit assumption about syntactic structure to retain the One-to-One thesis.31
Now I turn to another philosophical position that can be influenced by my analysis
of bare nominals. The empirical denial of the One-to-One thesis is also damaging to
King’s view on propositions, according to which the structure of propositions is partially
identified with the structure of natural language. King in his monograph (2007, 32) states
as follows:
31At least as for covert individual variables, Stanley indeed suggests that he can accept the sketched
alternative view of the syntax (Stanley 2005, 2007, ‘Postscript’).
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(128) ... the sentential relation R that binds together the words in the LF representation
... is a component, literally a part, of the relation that binds together Rebecca and
the property of swimming in the proposition that Rebecca swims ... In general,
... sentential relations will provide all the significant structure to the propositional
relations, and hence to propositions.
According to King, within our terminology, some part of an underlying syntactic structure
of an utterance is a constituent of the proposition expressed by the utterance. Furthermore,
the linguistic structure that partially constitutes a proposition is supposed to illuminate the
questions of why and how the proposition has truth-conditions at all and why and how it
has the specific truth-conditions it has (King, 2007, 25-6; also 59-62). So the roles that
King imposed on natural language syntax goes much beyond the One-to-One thesis—
King’s overall thesis is indeed truly ‘Tractarian’.
It is not clear to me if King’s view on propositions requires the One-to-One thesis,
or tolerates a ‘many-to-one’ mapping between syntactic structure and logical form. John
Collins (2007b, Section 2) points out that there is (much) more syntactic structure than
is required for propositional structure. King somehow has to distinguish substructures in
syntax that are ‘propositional’ and those that are there for some other reasons (Collins,
2007b, 819). In any case, the instance of ‘one-to-many’ relation discussed above cannot
be tolerated by King’s Tractarian metaphysics of propositions. Suppose that my type-
shifting analysis of bare NPs is on the right track. Consider a sentence that contains an
bare NP that can be used either as a definite or indefinite description. There are two
propositions that can be expressed by a use of the sentence. The propositions have two
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different logical forms because one is about a unique individual, but the other is not.
However, according to the presented type-shifting analysis, there is no fact of the matter
in the underlying structure of the sentence that distinguishes one proposition from the
other. One extra-syntactic principle needs to be employed in order to produce the former
proposition, whereas two for the latter. Nothing at the level of syntax explains why the
utterance expresses one proposition, not the other. This clearly betrays King’s expectation
that grammatical structure is an essential determinant of propositional structure. King’s
view on propositions is presumably language-neutral, applicable to a use of any complete,
declarative sentence in any human natural language. Therefore, bare NPs in Japanese,
again, might constitute a serious counterexample to King’s view on propositions.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter I have presented a unified semantic analysis of bare nominals in English
and Japanese, which also leads us to further philosophical implications on the nature of
logical form. The analysis of proper names and definite descriptions developed in Chap-
ter 4 is extended to other bare nominals in English and Japanese. Occurrences of plural
and mass terms themselves are predicative expressions, and constitute definite descrip-
tions when used in argument position. The predicate thesis holds not only for proper
names, but also for other bare nominals. I have also presented an argument against the
idea that some unpronounced syntactic heads are responsible for various interpretations
of Japanese bare nominals based on the behaviors of phonologically null arguments in
Japanese. The silent-head approach has difficulties in explaining the semantics of null
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arguments, whatever syntactic analysis of null arguments turns out to be correct. The
type-shifting approach to the semantics of bare nominals, by contrast, easily accounts for
the semantics of null arguments. The overall outcome supports the traditional idea that
there is a mismatch between linguistic form and logical form, and undermines the recent












(2) Atomic semantic values
a. J every Kg = λF〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs′ . [∀x : F (x)(s)][∃s′′ : s′′ v s′](G(x)(s′′))
b. JbottleKg = λx . λs . x is a bottle in s
c. Jbe-emptyKg = λx . λs . x is empty in s
(3) Derivation
a. J every bottle Kg = λs . λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs′ . [∀x : x is a bottle in s][∃s′′ : s′′ v
s′](G(x)(s′′)) (FA)
b. J s8 [every bottle] Kg = λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs′ . [∀x : x is a bottle in g(s8)][∃s′′ : s′′ v
s′](G(x)(s′′)) (PT, FA)
c. J [s8 every bottle] [is empty] Kg = λs′ . [∀x : x is a bottle in g(s8)][∃s′′ : s′′ v
s′](x is empty in s′′) (FA)
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d. J s3 [s8 every bottle is empty] Kg = Truth iff [∀x : x is a bottle in g(s8)][∃s′′ :
s′′ v g(s3)](x is empty in s′′) (PT, FA)
e. J s-PRO3 [s3 s8 every bottle is empty] Kg = λs . [∀x : x is a bottle in g(s8)][∃s′′ :
s′′ v s](x is empty in s′′) (SB)
f. λs . every bottle in the relevant situation is empty in s (Paraphrase)
(4) Every student answered every question.
[Context: Three students each got a different set of questions.]








answered s4 every question
t2
(5) Atomic semantic values
a. JansweredKg = λy . λx . λs . x answered y in s
b. JMKg = λx . λs .M(s) = x
(6) Derivation
a. J answered t2 Kg = λx . λs . x answered g(t2) in s (PT, FA)
b. J M answered t2 Kg = λx . λs . x answered g(t2) in s ∧M(s) = x (IPM)
c. J t1 M answered t2 Kg = λs . g(t1) answered g(t2) in s ∧M(s) = g(t1)
(PT, FA)
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d. J 2 t1 M answered t2 Kg = λx . λs . g(t1) answered x in s∧M(s) = g(t1) (PA)
e. J s4 every question Kg = λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . [∀x : x is a question in g(s4)][∃s′ :
s′ v s](G(x)(s′)) (PT, FA)
f. J [s4 every question] [2 t1 M answered t2] Kg = λs . [∀x : x is a question in g(s4)]
[∃s′ : s′ v s](g(t1) answered x in s′ ∧M(s′) = g(t1)) (FA)
g. J s4 [s4 every question 2 t1 M answered t2] Kg = Truth iff [∀x : x is a question in g(s4)]
[∃s′ : s′ v g(s4)](g(t1) answered x in s′ ∧M(s′) = g(t1)) (PT, FA)
h. J s-PRO4 [s4 s4 every question 2 t1 M answered t2] Kg = λs . [∀x : x is a question in s]
[∃s′ : s′ v s](g(t1) answered x in s′ ∧M(s′) = g(t1)) (SB)
i. J 1 [s-PRO4 s4 s4 every question 2 t1 M answered t2] Kg = λy . λs . [∀x :
x is a question in s][∃s′ : s′ v s](y answered x in s′ ∧M(s′) = y) (PA)
j. J s3 every student Kg = λG〈e,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . [∀y : y is a student in g(s3)][∃s′′ :
s′′ v s](G(y)(s′′)) (PT, FA)
k. J s3 every student [ 1 s-PRO4 s4 s4 every question 2 t1 M answered t2] Kg =
λs . [∀y : y is a student in g(s3)][∃s′′ : s′′ v s][∀x : x is a question in s′′][∃s′ :
s′ v s′′](y answered x in s′ ∧M(s′) = y)
l. Given the context of taking a qualifying exam, M(s′) = y holds just in case
s′ contains y’s exam, on which there are y’s questions. Since s′′ includes s′,
all the questions in s′′ are the questions assigned to y. There has to be such s′
for each student y. Thus, we can paraphrase (6k) as follows:
λs . for every student x in the relevant situation, there is some situation in
s such that it includes all the questions assigned to x, and x answer every
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question in that situation
(7) If it rains, I bring an umbrella.
if it rains
1
I bring an umbrella PREP if it rains
s1
I here assume that the antecedent can leave a trace that ranges overs situations.
(8) Atomic semantic values
a. J if Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λqcon〈s,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . [∀s′ : s′ v s∧p(s′)][∃s′′ : s′′ v s](qcon(s′′)(s′))
b. J PREP Kg = λs . λs′ .M(s′) = s
(9) Derivation
a. J PREP s1 Kg = λs′ .M(s′) = g(s1) (PT, FA)
b. J I bring an umbrella Kg = λs . I bring an umbrella in s (Assumption)
c. J I bring an umbrella PREP s1 Kg = λs′ . I bring an umbrella in s′ ∧M(s′) =
g(s1)
Here I need a variant of IPM, which can fuse two propositions to form a new
proposition.
d. J 1 [ I bring an umbrella PREP s1] Kg = λs . λs′ . I bring an umbrella in s′ ∧
M(s′) = s
Here I need a variant of PA, which applies not only to individual variables,
but also to situation variables. Alternatively, we could use s-PRO in the place
of the numeral 1.
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e. J it rains Kg = λs . it rains in s (Assumption)
f. J if it rains Kg = λqcon〈s,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . [∀s′ : s′ v s ∧ it rains in s′][∃s′′ : s′′ v
s](qcon(s′′)(s′))
g. J if it rains [1 I bring an umbrella PREP s1] Kg = λs . [∀s′ : s′ v s ∧
it rains in s′][∃s′′ : s′′ v s]( I bring an umbrella in s′′ ∧M(s′′) = s′)
h. Suppose that M(s′′) = s′ contextually means that s′′ includes an event that
is causally or explanatorily related to an event in s′. Then we can paraphrase
the derived proposition as follows:
For any situation in which it rains, there is some situation in which I bring an
umbrella because of the raining.
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Appendix B
Evidence for situation pronouns
Here I want to enumerate the evidence for situation pronouns. What follows takes the
form of an argument to the best explanation. There is no direct confirmation of the ex-
istence of situation pronouns. By positing such variables ranging over situations at the
level of syntax, we become able to handle many puzzling cases, which would otherwise
remain puzzling.
Scope paradoxes
Consider the following example, originally due to (Bäuerle, 1983):1
(1) George believes that a woman from Boston loves every member of the Red Sox.
(Keshet, 2008)
The following scenario makes my assertion (1) true: While traveling toward Boston,
George passes a bus and sees a group of athletes. He supposes at least one woman from
the Boston area loves every one of them. George now believes at least one woman from
Boston loves everyone on the bus. Unbeknownst to George, every RS player is on the
bus. The question is how (1) receives this interpretation.
The sentence (1) contains two quantificational DPs: a woman from Boston and
every member of the Red Sox, each of which has a scope. One might think that a certain
1Among many others Keshet (2008, 31-32) and von Fintel and Heim (2011, Ch.7) discuss the example,
on which my exposition depends.
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scopal relation between the DPs yields the expected reading. However, this idea based
on scopes cannot be verified. First, the scope of the DP a woman from Boston must be
above the scope of the DP every member of the Red Sox, because George thinks that there
exists, at least, one woman who loves every Red Sox member, not that for every member
of the Red Sox, there exists one woman who loves him. Second, the a-DP must be below
the propositional verb believes because George does not have a specific woman in his
mind. His belief is not de re, but de dicto. Third, however, the scope of the every-DP
must contain believes. For Georg does not know that those men belong to the Red Sox.
He is not thinking of the men as the Red Sox players. But his belief is about the specific
group of men he perceived. In short, (a) the a-DP must precede the every-DP. However,
(b) the every-DP must precede believes that precedes the a-DP. Both (a) and (b) must hold
at the same time, which is apparently impossible. Linguists sometimes call this problem
a ‘scope paradox’.
(2) a. [ a woman from Boston ] > [ every member of the Red Sox ]
b. [ every member of the Red Sox ] > believes > [ a woman from Boston ]
One of the solutions to Bäuerler’s scope paradox is to syntactically represent re-
stricted domains of discourse as we have done so by introducing situation pronouns. The
following structure is now possible for (1):
(3) George believes s-PRO1 [ s1 [ s1 a woman from Boston ] loves [ s0 every member
of the RS ]]
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in which the two DPs have two distinct situation pronouns, and the coexisting pronoun in
every-DP receives its interpretation contextually via an assignment.2
What does George believe according to this structural specification? The proposi-
tion expressed by the embedded that-clause is a diagonal proposition something like the
following:
(4) λs . [∃x : x is a woman from Boston ][∀y : y is a member of the RS actually on the bus ]
(x loves y in s)
Although the every-DP appears below the a-DP, it has a de re interpretation. The situation
pronoun s0 denotes the world in which George thinks about the athletes on the bus. The
predicate [ s0 member of the Red Sox] means the set of the members of the Red Sox in that
world, i.e., those who Georg sees on the bus. In some counterfactual situations, some of
those men might not be baseball players; other people could be the members of the Red
Sox in such situations. The others, however, are always irrelevant to the interpretation of
this structure because the value of s0 remains the same. Wherever (in any counterfactual
circumstance) you evaluate the structure, [ s0 member of the Red Sox ] always means
those who Georg sees on the bus. For he sees the bus in s0 and thinks about them in s0.
The members of Red Sox in s27, for example, never enters the specification of the truth-
conditions of (3). Therefore, the situation pronoun approach can keep the desired scopal
relation between the two DPs (2, a.), while realizing the de re reading of the every-DP
with no syntactic evacuation.
2The names George, Boston and Red Sox must also occur with a situation pronoun on the predicate
thesis. But I suppress them for simplicity.
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In between de re and de dicto
Janet Dean Fodor (1970) observes that the traditional scopal account of the de re and de
dicto distinction cannot account for all possible readings of indefinite DPs:
(5) Charlie wants to buy a coat like Bill’s. (Fodor, 1970, 241)
The de re reading of (5) would be that there is a particular coat that Charlie wants to
purchase. Charlie may or may not know that Bill also owns a similar coat. This reading
is possible presumably because the DP a coat like Bill’s has wide scope. On the de dicto
reading of (5), Charlie desires to purchase a coat that fulfills a certain description, i.e.,
‘like Bill’s’. He likes to copy Bill’s style. For this reading, the a-DP takes scope below
the attitude verb want. The standard analysis of want involves quantification over the
subject’s desire-worlds. Charlie wants a certain circumstance to be the case where he
buys a coat that is similar to Bill’s. The a-DP must be evaluated with respect to Charlie’s
desire worlds. Otherwise, Charlie could have ended up with a wrong coat.
Besides these two readings, Fodor points out that there is a third reading of (5),
which she calls ‘non-specific de re’. The non-specific de re reading of (5) indeed seems
the most natural one for this specific construction. Suppose that Charlie knows what he
wants to purchase. He considers certain characteristics of a coat (e.g., its color, shape,
and material), and wishes to own a coat that satisfies many of those characteristics. Un-
beknownst to Charlie, as a matter of fact, Bill happens to own one of such Charlie’s ideal
coats.
On the one hand, unlike the de re reading, Charlie has no specific coat to pick up.
So the a-DP should not take scope over the attitude verb wants. On the other hand, unlike
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the de dicto reading, Charlie does not have in mind the description ‘like Bill’s’. The
descriptive content is the speaker’s way of describing the kind of coat Charlie wants to
buy, not his own. The a-DP must be evaluated with respect to the actual world, not to
all of Charlie’s desire-worlds because, in some of his desire-worlds, Bill would not own
the kind of coat Charlie wants to have. So the a-DP must take scope over wants. But,
then, (5) would have to have the de re reading, which is not the case on the third reading.
Now we have a problem—how could the a-DP get the non-specific de re reading without
appeal to scopal properties?
Positing situation pronouns solves this problem because they allow us to locally
evaluate the content of the a-DP. The DP a coat like Bill’s can be evaluated with respect
to the actual situation where Bill owns the right type of coat, while taking narrow scope.
Our semantic system can derives a proposition like the following as the content of the
embedded clause.
(6) λs . [∃x : x is a coat like what Bill actually owns ](Charlie buys x in s)
If this proposition is true in every world that is compatible with Charlie’s desire, then
the use of the sentence is true. The proposition indeed determines the all those worlds in
which Charlie buys what he has in mind. Thus, the situation pronoun theory is empirically




The notion of ‘minimal situation’ is standardly used within a situation semantic system
(Berman, 1987; Heim, 1990; Elbourne, 2005; Schwarz, 2009). It is also known that, how-
ever, the notion of minimal situation causes some difficulties (Kratzer, 2007; Schwarz,
2009)
An intuitive characterization of a minimal situation goes something like the follow-
ing. The minimal situation s for a proposition contains just as much stuff as making the
proposition true. When we understand a proposition p as a set of situations, the minimal
situations for p are a subset of p such that no smaller part of them belongs to p. In other
words, there is no proper part of s in which p is true, while p is true in s. Why do we need
such a minimal situation with respect to a proposition? Let us think about a use of (1),
which is true in the scenario in which many donkeys appeared one by one and all of them
greatly welcomed.
(1) Whenever/If a donkey appeared, the donkey was greeted enthusiastically.
(after Kratzer 2007)
First, when we consider the antecedent in isolation, what kind of situation makes it true?
The antecedent is true in any situation in which at least one donkey appeared. A situation
that contains more than one such donkey of course makes the antecedent true. However,
we detect a problem as soon as we consider the consequent together with the situations
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in which two or more donkeys appeared. For there is not exactly one donkey in any of
such situations. The definite description the donkey is thereby undefined, and the whole
utterance fails to express a proposition.
The antecedent introduced by whenever or if must quantifies over the minimal sit-
uations that make a donkey appeared true. Such a minimal situation contains only one
donkey, and it can be used to provide a restricted domain for the description the donkey
in the consequent. We can provide a minor modification to the lexical meaning of if and
whenever we discussed in Chapter 4.
(2) J if Kg = λp〈s,t〉 . λqcon〈s,〈s,t〉〉 . λs . [∀s′ : s′ v s ∧ s′ ∈ min(p)][∃s′′ : s′′ v
s](qcon(s′′)(s′))
The minimality condition min(p) is understood as a subset of p, any element of which
contains no smaller situation that is in p. With this definition, the antecedent quantifies
over only minimal situations in which a donkey appeared.
But, now, consider the following.
(3) When snow falls around here, it takes ten volunteers to remove (it).
(after Kratzer 2007)
If some snow falls in a situation, then the antecedent is true in the situation because the
when-clause quantifies over all minimal situations that satisfy the condition expressed
by snow falls around here. Presumably, any part of snow is snow. That means that the
antecedent is true in a very minuscule situation in which snow falls (it is true as long as a
bit of snow falls). Of course, we do not need ten people to remove such a small amount
of snow. Or such small situations are not what we want to talk about when we utter the
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sentence. So the notion of minimal situation does not work for all cases.
To avoid this problem, Kratzer (2007) and Schwarz (2009) introduce the notion of
‘exemplification’ and a metaphysical principle concerning how to count things. I am not
sure if their suggestion solves the problem or worsen the condition.
The examples such as (1) and (3) strongly suggest that we are in need of event
semantics. If the antecedent of a sentence does not quantify over situations, but over
events, then the problem of minimality seems to disappear. For example, what kind of
event does the antecedent of (3) quantify over? That is a sufficiently large event that we
identify given the conditions specified by ‘falling of snow around here’. Divisibility prob-
ably does not apply to such a snow-falling event. A few snowflakes would not count as
a snow-falling event, although they are spatiotemporally contained inside a snow-falling
event. However, mushing up situation semantics and event semantics is not a simple task,
and I need to leave it for a future occasion.
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